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Foreword 
This study is the English version of the original German report that has 
been published back in June 2005. Only a very small number of amend-
ments have been made for the purpose of this English version. 
The study examines the progress that the countries in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) region have made so far in implementing the inter-
national Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in the Middle East and 
North Africa (the MENA region) and focuses on whether and to what ex-
tent Germany is currently contributing to the process and what conse-
quences may be derived from this state of affairs for German development 
cooperation with the region. For the purposes of the study the following 
countries are defined as part of the region: all of the Arab countries (in-
cluding Mauritania, Sudan, and the Palestinian Territories) as well as Iran.1 
The initiative for this study has been made by the German Development 
Institute/ Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) itself. However, 
it has been highly appreciated by the responsible divisions of the Federal 
German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development/ Bundes-
ministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ). 
Its aim is to contribute, with a view to the MDGs, to a critical analysis of 
German policy toward the MENA countries. The BMZ must reflect what 
role the MDGs shall play in Germany’s development policy: to what ex-
tent German DC is presently meeting the challenges posed by the agenda; 
and how this issue should best be dealt with in the future.  
A first draft of the study served as a background paper for a workshop 
conducted by the BMZ at the DIE in March 2005. The aim of the work-
shop was to review the contribution of German DC to achieving the 
MDGs in the Maghreb countries (Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, and Tuni-
sia) and to identify potential needs for adjustment. The workshop partici-
pants included representatives of the BMZ, the GDI, the Deutsche Gesell-
                                                          
1  This definition includes all countries – excepting Turkey – covered by the BMZ’s cur-
rent regional concept “Middle East / Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Region”: 
Egypt, Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Iran, Yemen, Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Morocco, Mauritania, Oman, the Palestinian (Autonomy) Territories, Saudi Arabia, Su-
dan, Syria, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). 
schaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), and the KfW Development 
Bank. The final draft was published in German language in June 2005.  
The study is based at large on existing documents such as e.g. the statisti-
cal databases provided by international organizations (World Bank, 
UNDP, WHO, UNICEF, UNSD, UNAIDS), the national MDG reports 
presented by the governments of the MENA countries, UNDP’s regional 
MDG report, and BMZ strategy papers. However, the author has also con-
ducted several interviews with representatives of the BMZ, the KfW, and 
the GTZ. In addition, prior to, during, and after the BMZ workshop men-
tioned above, many participants made comments and proposals for im-
provements that have been taken into account in the present, revised ver-
sion of the study. 
The author wishes to take this opportunity to express his gratitude to the 
interview partners from the BMZ, the GTZ, and the KfW for their valuable 
suggestions and comments as well as for the fact that they took their time 
to talk with the author and to read the draft version of the study. He also 
wishes to extend his thanks to his colleagues in the DIE, in particular to 
Susanne Neubert, Guido Ashoff, and Oliver Schlumberger, all of whom 
contributed numerous comments for the study.  
 
Bonn, August 2006 Markus Loewe 
 
  
Contents 
Abbreviations 
Executive Summary 1 
1 Introduction 23 
2 Millennium Declaration and Millennium 
Development Goals 26 
2.1 Historical background and genesis of the Millennium 
Declaration 26 
2.2 Significance of the Millennium Declaration 31 
2.3 Evaluation of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) 33 
2.4 The Millennium process 38 
2.5 Implications for German development cooperation 40 
3 State of the Millennium process in the countries of 
the Middle East and North Africa 41 
3.1 Eradicating extreme poverty and hunger (MDG1) 45 
3.2 Achieving universal primary education (MDG2) 49 
3.3 Promoting gender equality and empowering women 
(MDG3) 56 
3.4 Reducing child mortality (MDG4) 69 
3.5 Improving maternal health (MDG5) 72 
3.6 Combating HIV/Aids, malaria, and other diseases 
(MDG6) 74 
3.7 Ensuring environmental sustainability (MDG7) 80 
3.8 Developing a global partnership for development 
(MDG8) 88 
4 Acceptance of the MDGs in the Middle East and 
North Africa 103 
4.1 Level of awareness and acceptance of the MDG agenda 104 
4.2 Commitment of the MENA governments to the MDGs 109 
4.3 Influence of the MDG agenda on national policy 110 
5 Orientation of German development cooperation 118 
5.1 Country concentration 119 
5.2 Definition of sector priorities 126 
5.3 Measures engaged in by German bilateral DC 138 
5.4 Policy dialogue 144 
5.5 Implementation of MDG8 146 
6 Recommendations for the future 151 
6.1 Regional orientation of bilateral German DC 152 
6.2 Sectoral orientation of bilateral German DC 153 
6.3 Orientation of bilateral German DC within the priority 
sectors defined for it 155 
6.4 Policy dialogue 157 
6.5 Documentation and analysis of the German contribution 
to implementing the MDGs 159 
6.6 Contribution to multilateral DC 160 
6.7 German measures aimed at implementing MDG8 161 
 
 
  
Bibliography 163 
List of Interview Partners 183 
Annex 185 
 
 
Overviews 
Overview 1: The MDGs, with targets and indicators 17 
Overview 2: The decade of world conferences 27 
Overview 3: State of MDG implementation in the Middle East and 
North Africa compared with other world regions 43 
Overview 4: Strategy papers of selected MENA countries that may  
have been prepared under the influence of the MDGs  
or the world conferences of the 1990s 113 
Overview 5:  The MDG agenda and Yemen’s official development 
goals: a comparison 116 
Overview 6: Model for comparing the urgency, capacity and  
disposition of the partner governments of German 
development cooperation to solve the development 
problems of their countries 122 
Overview 7:  MDG orientation of German DC with the countries of  
the Middle East and North Africa 130 
Overview 8:  Ongoing German DC measures in the countries of the  
Middle East and North Africa, 2004 132 
Overview 9:  Questions as to the MDG relevance of DC strategy  
papers 141 
 
Boxes 
Box 1:  Discrimination against women in the civil-status  
codes of Arab countries 64 
Figures 
Figure   1:  Trends in the implementation of MDG1 / Target 1 
(Halve the proportion of people with less than  
1 US$ a day) 47 
Figure   2:  Trends in the implementation of MDG1 / Target 2 
(Halve the proportion of people who suffer from hunger) 48 
Figure   3:  Trends in the implementation of MDG2  (Universal  
primary education) 50 
Figure   4:  Comparative time-series analysis of school enrolment  
rates in different countries 52 
Figure   5:  Trends in the implementation of MDG3  
(Gender equality in education) 58 
Figure   6:  Trends in the implementation of MDG3  
(Gender equality on the labor market) 60 
Figure   7:  Income opportunities of women 61 
Figure   8:  Trends in the implementation of MDG4  
(Reduction of child mortality rates) 70 
Figure   9:  Trends in the implementation of MDG4  
(Reduction of infant mortality rates) 71 
Figure 10:  Comparative time-series analysis of the development  
of the child mortality rates of 176 countries between  
1980 and 2000 72 
Figure 11: Trends in the implementation of MDG5  
(Maternal health) 73 
Figure 12:  Present state of implementation of MDG6 / Target 7 
(Prevalence of HIV/Aids) 75 
Figure 13:  Trends in the implementation of MDG7 / Target 9  
(Reduction of carbon dioxide emissions) 81 
Figure 14:  Trends in the implementation of MDG7 / Target 9   
(Reduction of CFC emissions) 82 
  
Figure 15:  Trends in the implementation of MDG7 / Target 9  
(Increase in energy efficiency) 83 
Figure 16:  Trends in the implementation of MDG7 / Target 10 
 (Access to safe drinking water) 85 
Figure 17:  Trends in the implementation of MDG7 / Target 10 
(Access to sanitation) 86 
Figure 18:  Trends in the implementation of MDG8 / Target 12 
(Regulation of the trading and financial systems,  
based on World Bank indicators) 91 
Figure 19: Trends in the implementation of MDG8 / Target 12 
(Openness of the financial systems) 93 
Figure 20:  Trends in the commitment to good governance   
(based on World Bank indicators) 95 
Figure 21:  Trends in the commitment to good governance   
(based on Freedom House Index) 96 
Figure 22:  Trends in the implementation of MDG8 /  
Targets 13 and 15 (Solution of debt problems) 98 
Figure 23:  Trends in the implementation of MDG8 /  
Targets 13 and 15 (More generous ODA) 99 
Figure 24:  Trends in the implementation of MDG8 /  
Target 14 (Access to affordable medical drugs) 102 
Figure 25:  Trends in the implementation of MDG8 / Target 18  
(Access to modern information and communication 
technologies) 103 
Figure 26:  Orientation of German development cooperation  
towards developing countries with good governance  
in comparison with other donors 147 
Figure 27:  Share of ODA provided to the poorest 25% of  
developing countries between 1999 and 2003 149 
Figure 28:  Share of ODA dedicated to basic social services 150 
Figure 29:  Awareness about the MDGs 151 
Tables (Annex) 
Table   A1: Prospects to achieve MDG1–7 until 2015 according  
to different institutions 187 
Table   A2: Implementation of MDG1 / Target 1 (halving the share  
of people whose income is less than one dollar a day) 189 
Table   A3: Implementation of MDG1 / Target 2 (halving the  
share of people who suffer from hunger) 191 
Table   A4: Implementation of MDG2 (achieving basic  
education for all) 193 
Table   A5: Implementation of MDG3 (promoting gender  
equality and empowering women) 195 
Table   A6: Legal position of women according to national  
civil status laws in selected MENA countries 198 
Table   A7: Implementation of MDG4 und MDG5  
(reducing child and maternal mortality) 199 
Table   A8: Implementation of MDG6 (combating HIV/AIDS,  
malaria and other diseases) 202 
Table   A9: Implementation of MDG7 / Target 9 
(sustainable development) 203 
Table A10: Implementation of MDG7 / Target 10 und Target 11  
(improving access to water, sanitation and secure  
tenure) 205 
Table A11: Implementation of MDG8 (global partnership for  
development) by selected indicators 207 
Table A12:  Quality of governance according to the World Bank  
Governance Indicator and the Freedom House Index 209 
Table A13: Capacity to monitor and evaluate the implementation  
of the MDGs 211 
Table A14: Quality of the ‘supportive environment‘ / national  
support for the MDG implementation 213 
  
Table A15: Commitment of the government in the MENA  
regions for the MDGs 214 
Table A16: Volume and priorities of German development  
cooperation with MENA countries 215 
Table A17: Reference to the MDGs in the planning and strategy  
papers of German development cooperation 216 
Table A18: Implementation of MDG8 by Germany and other 
OECD/DAC member countries 219 
 
  
 
  
Abbreviations 
AFESD  Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, Cairo 
AHDR Arab Human Development Report 
ALO Arab Labour Organisation / Arab Labour Office, Cairo 
BMZ  Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und  
Entwicklung/ Federal German Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, Bonn 
CAS Country assistance strategy 
CFC Chloro-Fluoro Carbon 
DAC  Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, Paris 
DALE Disability-adjusted life expectancy  
(an arithmetic value: life expectancy in full heath, i.e. life expec-
tancy minus expected years of health life lost due to disability) 
DC Development cooperation 
DIE  Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik/ German Development 
Institute, Bonn 
EFA  Education for All initiative 
ESCWA United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western  
Asia, Beirut, New York 
EU European Union 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome 
FC Financial cooperation 
FCND  Food Consumption and Nutrition Division of the International 
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Washington, DC 
FDI Foreign direct investment 
FES Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn, Berlin 
FTI Fast Track Initiative 
GDI Gender development index (arithmetic measure developed by 
UNDP; calculated in a way similar to the HDI, the GDI measures 
differences in the human development of the genders, ranking them 
on a scale that ranges from 0 to 1) 
GDP Gross domestic product  
GNI Gross national income 
GNP Gross national product 
  
GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, Eschborn 
HDI Human Development Index  
HDR Human Development Report  
HICs  High-income countries  
(countries with a per capita income of more than US$ 9076 in  
purchasing-power parities for the year 2002) 
HIPC Heavily indebted poor countries 
IEA International Energy Agency, Paris 
IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC 
ILO International Labour Organization / International Labour Office,  
Geneva 
IMF International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC 
InWEnt Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung gGmbH / Capacity 
Building International, Bonn  
IPU Inter-Parliamentary Union, Geneva 
ITU International Telecommunication Union, Geneva 
IUCN  The World Conservation Union (originally International Union for 
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources), Gland (Switzer-
land) 
KfW KfW Development Bank (originally ‘Kreditanstalt für Wiederauf-
bau’), Frankfurt/Main 
LDCs Least developed countries 
LICs  Low-income countries (countries with a per capita income lower 
than US$ 735 in PPP for the year 2002) 
LLDCs Land-locked developing countries 
MDGR Millennium Development Goals (Progress) Report 
MDGs Millennium Development Goals 
MENA  Middle East and North Africa region 
MFI Micro-finance institution 
MICs  Middle-income countries (countries with a per capita income be-
tween US$ 735 and US$ 9076 in PPP for the year 2002) 
n.a. No author cited  
n.d. No date available  
NGO Nongovernmental organization 
ODA Official development assistance 
  
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris 
PA Palestinian (National) Authority, Ramallah, Gaza 
PARC  Public Administration Research & Consultation Center, Cairo 
PAT Palestinian Authority Territories (areas of the Palestinian Territo-
ries/ West Bank and Gaza Strip that are administered by the PA) 
PCI Per capita income (GDP per inhabitant) 
PPP Purchasing power parities (concept used to translate exchange rates 
into so-called international or PPP US$; factors in differences in 
the real value of monetary variables in different countries – e.g. the  
purchasing power of incomes – that result from the heterogeneity 
of the prices for nontradable goods) 
PPP US$ International US$ (national currencies are converted into interna-
tional US$ on the basis of PPP) 
PRB Population Reference Bureau, Washington, DC 
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
PSP Priority strategy paper  
PT Palestinian Territories (the parts of the former British mandate  
territory of Palestine that were occupied by Israel in 1967, i.e. the 
Gaza Strip and the so-called West Bank, including East Jerusalem) 
SAP Structural adjustment program  
SF Social fund 
SME Small and medium-size enterprise  
TB Tuberculosis 
TC Technical cooperation 
UAE United Arab Emirates  
UN United Nations, New York, Geneva 
UNAIDS Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, Geneva 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, 
New York  
UNDG  United Nations Development Group 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme, New York 
UNEP  United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi  
UNESCO  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 
Paris 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Bonn 
  
UN HABITAT United Nations Human Settlements Programme, Nairobi 
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund, New York 
UNRISD United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Geneva 
UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in 
the Near East, Gaza, Vienna 
UNSCO Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Israeli 
Occupied Territories, Jerusalem 
UNSD United Nations Statistics Division, New York 
US United States of America 
US$ US dollar 
USAID United States Agency for International Development, Washington, 
DC 
VENRO  Verband Entwicklungspolitik deutscher Nichtregierungsorganisationen 
e.V., Bonn 
WHO World Health Organization, Geneva 
WiRAM Wirtschaftsreform und Aufbau der Marktwirtschaft/ 
Economic Reform and Market Systems Development  
(BMZ country priority area) 
WTO World Trade Organization, Geneva 
ZEF  Zentrum für Entwicklungsforschung/ Center for Development  
Research, University of Bonn 
 
 
  
Key to the tables 
n.a. No data available  
... Item positive, but no exact data available  
– Item exactly zero or meaningless  
0 Item only approximately zero (rounded to zero) 
 
 

Middle East / North Africa and the Millennium Development Goals 
German Development Institute 1 
Executive Summary 
In September 2000, the so-called United Nations Millennium Summit, 
which was held in New York, unanimously adopted the Millennium Dec-
laration. It contains, inter alia, eight goals, which, in 2001, were further 
specified to include 18 so-called targets, and 48 indicators (see Overview 1 
at the end of this summary) and became later known as the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). Most of them are supposed to have been im-
plemented in every single country worldwide by the year 2015. The goals 
include: (i) worldwide reduction of income poverty and hunger; (ii) access 
for all children to a full course of primary schooling; (iii) elimination of 
gender disparities in all countries; (iv and v) worldwide reduction of ma-
ternal and child mortality rates; (vi) reversal of the spread of HIV/Aids and 
containment of the spread of malaria and other infectious diseases; 
(vii) improvement of environmental and resource protection; (viii) build-
ing of a global partnership for development between industrialized and de-
veloping countries. 
The present study is concerned with the Middle East / North Africa and the 
Millennium Development Goals: Implications for German Development 
Cooperation. On the one side, the study asks what progress the MENA 
countries have made in implementing the MDGs and what the most impor-
tant impediments are. On the other side, it discusses what contribution Ger-
many is currently making to support the implementation of the MDGs in the 
MENA region, whether and to what extent this contribution is conceptually 
well-founded and documented, and what consequences the foregoing im-
plies for future German DC. 
What the study finds is that the MENA countries are faced with major 
deficits in their efforts to reduce income poverty and hunger (MDG1), im-
prove the quality of and access to primary-school education (MDG2), 
eliminate gender disparity (MDG3), protect natural resources and the envi-
ronment (MDG7), improve political and economic governance (MDG8), 
reduce youth unemployment (also MDG8), and further develop informa-
tion and communications infrastructure (likewise MDG8). The study also 
notes that the reason for this state of affairs must be sought not least in the 
insufficient commitment of and the disinterest shown by the governments 
of the region. 
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German DC is presently positioned in such a way as to be able to provide 
its partner countries in the region with support in relevant areas in their ef-
forts to achieve the MDGs. But it is impossible to say with certainty 
whether or not German DC is in fact doing so, since thus far (i) not one of 
the BMZ’s country concepts and only a limited number of its priority 
strategy papers state what precisely the German contribution to imple-
menting the MDGs consists of and what measures are being used to reach 
the objective; and (ii) as yet no impact analyses have been conducted to 
determine the effects of DC on the implementation of the MDGs. 
Millennium Declaration and Millennium Development 
Goals 
The Millennium Declaration results from a paradigm shift in the interna-
tional development debate. The declaration is in effect a summation of 
resolutions and declarations of intent adopted by a series of world confer-
ences that were held during the 1990s and signaled – at least in part – a 
break with the Washington Consensus of the 1980s. A one-sided focus on 
economic growth was superseded by the model of a sustainable human 
development marked, among other things, by the following points: 
– Poverty is an ‘unacceptable global problem’. Reducing poverty is 
thus the central goal of all development policies. While other goals, 
like economic growth and price stability, which dominated the devel-
opment policy of the 1980s, continue to be relevant, they are now ex-
pected, in their ultimate consequence, to serve the end of reducing 
poverty.  
– Poverty is a multidimensional problem. It manifests itself not only in 
inadequate incomes and assets but also in a lack of access to educa-
tion, healthcare, political rights, the means of social integration, and 
social protection. 
– There are a great number of interdependencies between the various 
aspects of poverty. This is why poverty reduction invariably includes 
efforts to promote democracy and good governance, the development 
and expansion of systems of social protection, environmental and re-
source protection, and gender equality.  
Middle East / North Africa and the Millennium Development Goals 
German Development Institute 3 
– Economic growth can contribute to reducing poverty. However, there 
is no automatism involved here, in particular as far as the non-eco-
nomic dimensions of poverty (education, healthcare, political partici-
pation, social integration) are concerned.  
– The sine qua non for any lasting reduction of poverty is that devel-
opment, with all its economic, ecological, and social aspects, prove 
sustainable.  
– One essential condition is a liberal economic system geared to com-
petition and equality of opportunity. In many cases, however, there is 
a need for targeted government intervention to sustain such economic 
systems (institutions matter!). 
It is on this holistic approach to development that the Millennium Declara-
tion rests. The MDGs, on the other hand, are based on only two of the four 
central chapters of the declaration (III ‘Development and poverty eradica-
tion’ and IV ‘Protecting our common environment’) The goals laid out in 
the chapters ‘Peace, security and disarmament’ (II) and ‘Human rights, 
democracy and good governance’ (V) were not included in the list of 
MDGs. 
This must be seen as problematic inasmuch as the MDG agenda is not 
wholly in line with the newly established, comprehensive notion of pov-
erty. None of the MDG indicators measure deficits in human and civil 
rights, participation, and rule of law, in social integration and acceptance, 
or in social protection. Even environmental problems have been back-
grounded to the extent that they are referred to in only one of the 18 tar-
gets. 
Furthermore, the MDGs are designed above all to measure quantitative, 
not qualitative, dimensions. To cite an example, MDG2 measures school 
enrolment, but not the quality of the education provided. 
As to the sustainability of development, the MDGs may even have adverse 
effects. This entails a danger that all development-related efforts may be 
geared solely to a timely implementation of the MDGs, but without paying 
due heed to their long-term implications. It would, for instance, be possi-
ble to develop generous social welfare systems with a view to reducing by 
half the proportion of income poverty among a population in the key year, 
2015, compared with the year 1990. Even if this should prove successful, 
 Markus Loewe 
 German Development Institute 4
it would not be sustainable, because the success would not be rooted in 
structural change. It would, together with the resources invested for the 
purpose, vanish without a trace as soon as these social welfare systems 
turned out to be unaffordable.  
A further risk is that the MDG agenda awakens unrealistic expectations. 
At the moment it appears unlikely that all developing countries will 
achieve the MDGs. Still, they are a reasonable and promising means of 
spurring all relevant actors to accept the greater commitment and to mobi-
lize the additional resources needed to at least come closer to achieving the 
goals agreed on. If, however, the public gets the impression that the MDGs 
are realistic for all countries of the world, a lack of success could entail a 
major loss of credibility for DC – particularly if it turns out in 2015 that a 
good number of developing countries have failed to achieve the MDGs. 
By the same token, markedly development-minded governments in the de-
veloping world could find themselves faced with a delegitimization prob-
lem if they disappoint the exaggerated hopes that have been awakened 
among their populations. 
Still, the MDG agenda does offer chances. It amounts to the first common 
goal system ever adopted for all actors involved in development policy, 
one that has been agreed upon by donor countries and international or-
ganizations alike: 
– The eight goals are a frame of reference in which all actors can be 
expected to seek orientation in their development policy. They should 
bundle their development-related efforts (as to benefit from syner-
gies) and coordinate (harmonize) them each of them with the others. 
In the process, however, the actors involved would be well advised 
not to lose sight of the political and other goals set out in the Millen-
nium Declaration. 
– The common goal system can contribute to a more pronounced out-
come orientation in both development policy and cooperation. 
Looked at against the background of the MDGs, the question of what 
inputs are provided by individual actors is a secondary one. The cru-
cial question is what impacts these actors achieve (individually or 
jointly). This is the measure by which they will be gauged. They 
should, however, be careful not to stick too doggedly to the exact tar-
gets set out in the MDG agenda. It would for the most part be prefer-
Middle East / North Africa and the Millennium Development Goals 
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able to interpret these targets as an orientation framework; otherwise 
the relevant actors would be running the risk of awakening unrealistic 
expectations and jeopardizing the sustainability of development. 
– One effect of the MDG agenda may be to induce all actors – govern-
ments of developing countries, the private sector, civil society, and 
donors – to mobilize additional resources and to undertake greater 
efforts to ensure that the MDGs are implemented – as far as possible 
(and reasonable) – by the year 2015. In parallel, however, it is essen-
tial that all actors undertake whatever efforts they can to optimize the 
efficiency of their funding modalities. 
The MDG agenda has the following implications for German DC: 
– German DC must ensure that it is providing a significant contribution 
to implementing the MDGs. There is no reason whatever to subordi-
nate all German DC to the MDGs, or for German DC to contribute to 
achieving each and every MDG. But it should, in one way or another, 
support every one of its partner countries in their efforts to reach the 
MDGs. Furthermore, Germany must provide its contribution to 
achieving MDG8, a goal for which the donor countries are principally 
responsible – i.e. it should work, among other things, for trade liber-
alization and debt relief and seek to increase the level of the official 
development assistance (ODA) it provides.  
– German DC must also pay more heed to its effectiveness and effi-
ciency – starting with the planning phase and ending with the devel-
opment of instruments designed to analyze the actual effects of DC 
on the implementation of the MDGs.  
– Finally, German DC must, above all, gear its activities to partner pri-
orities and its own strengths. It should support mainly measures that 
have priority for the developing countries themselves, even though 
they may be unable to carry them out without external support. In ad-
dition, German DC should be coordinated with other donors in such a 
way that each donor takes on tasks in which it has comparative 
strengths of its own. 
The current state of the MDG process in the countries of 
the Middle East and North Africa 
Thus far, the MENA countries have made sufficient progress on only a 
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limited number of MDGs. Like countries in other regions of the world, the 
MENA countries are faced with problems in implementing MDG1 and 
MDG7. But – unlike the situation e.g. in Latin America – the most serious 
deficits encountered here have to do with the quality of primary education 
(MDG2), economic and legal gender equality (MDG3), and improvement 
of economic and political governance (a sub-aspect of MDG8). 
One country that has proven relatively successful is Tunisia, which is 
likely to reach five to seven of the eight MDGs. It is having difficulties in 
implementing MDG5 and MDG7, but also, and in particular, in meeting 
the call for good governance set out under MDG8. Egypt, Libya, Qatar, 
and Kuwait are likely to reach at least four to five of the MDGs, although 
these countries also have very serious deficits in good governance. Major 
problems have been noted for Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain, and the 
Palestinian Territories – and in particular for Iran, Lebanon, the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Oman. The situation looks very 
bad for the three low-income counties Yemen, Sudan, and Mauritania as 
well as for Iraq. Iraq and Yemen may possibly fail to reach all eight 
MDGs, while Mauritania and Sudan are likely to miss six.  
Alleviation of income poverty and hunger (MDG1) 
The majority of the MENA countries will not reach MDG1 if they do not 
step up their efforts substantially. While the proportion of those that are af-
fected by hunger or live on less then 1 US$ per day is lower than in other 
world regions, the figure has not declined since 1990, indeed it has risen. 
In the past 15 years, only Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, and Mauritania have 
made any progress in reducing income poverty. At the same time, the pro-
portion of people affected by income poverty has risen drastically in Alge-
ria, Iraq, Morocco, the Palestinian Territories, and, above all, Yemen. The 
proportion of undernourished persons has declined in Tunisia, Egypt, and 
Mauritania, while it has risen in Iraq, Jordan, Algeria, Lebanon, and Mo-
rocco. 
Universal primary education (MDG2) 
Since 1990, the MENA countries have failed to make sufficient progress 
in the field of education, and accordingly they are highly unlikely to reach 
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MDG2 as a whole. Numerous children in the MENA countries have yet to 
attend primary school. Thus far, only South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa 
have made less progress on MDG2. In particular, Iran and the UAE, where 
net enrolment ratios in primary education have actually declined, will fail 
to reach MDG2, as will, in all likelihood, Sudan, Oman, Saudi Arabia, 
Yemen, and Kuwait. On the other hand, the Palestinian Territories, Tuni-
sia, Algeria, Qatar, Jordan, and Egypt are quite likely to reach the goal, as-
suming that present trends continue in these countries. The same is also 
conceivable for Morocco, Bahrain, and Syria. 
School education in the region is furthermore of poor quality and does little 
to prepare students for their later working life. 
Gender equality (MDG3) 
The MENA countries have made more progress in achieving gender equal-
ity in education. Nearly all of these countries have succeeded in substan-
tially increasing school enrolment rates for girls at all levels of their educa-
tional systems, and enrolment rates for girls are now approaching the fig-
ures for boys. This means that the MENA region as a whole is very likely 
to reach MDG3. The only exceptions are Yemen and Iraq. 
All the same, however, even in 2015 the MENA countries will still be far 
removed from any comprehensive gender equality. While it is true that 
improved educational opportunities for girls are translating out into declin-
ing illiteracy rates among women, the latter’s chances to find gainful em-
ployment have nevertheless shown a downward trend. The percentage of 
women in the nonagricultural working population has declined in most 
countries in the region; only in Algeria, Oman, and Bahrain has the figure 
risen. Moreover, the average income of working women in the MENA 
countries – with the exception of the Palestinian Territories – is still only a 
fraction of what men earn.  
Looking at their political and legal situation too, we find that women con-
tinue to be disadvantaged compared with men. In the Gulf states (except-
ing Bahrain) women still do not have the right to vote, and in the minis-
tries and parliaments of all other MENA countries women are conspicu-
ously underrepresented. Almost everywhere in the region, even civil law 
(above all laws covering civil status, inheritance, and citizenship) confers 
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fewer rights on women than on men. Finally, women are also disadvan-
taged in the administration of justice since there are informal (mainly so-
cial) barriers in place that hinder their access to justice and administration. 
Reduction of child and maternal mortality (MDG4 and MDG5) 
Most of the MENA countries have made great strides in health policy. 
They have succeeded in appreciably reducing infant, child, and maternal 
mortality rates, which means that they are likely to reach MDG4 and 
MDG5. This likewise appears to be the case for Jordan, Algeria, Syria, and 
Lebanon, provided that they step up their efforts in the coming years. On 
the other hand, Mauritania, Sudan, and Yemen, the region’s three low-
income countries, and Iraq are very likely to fail to reach MDG4 and 
MDG5.  
Reversal of the spread of HIV/Aids and reduction of the prevalence of 
malaria and other infectious diseases (MDG6) 
At present, it is impossible to make any exact statements on the implemen-
tation of MDG6 in the MENA countries, since no reliable data are avail-
able on the spread of HIV/Aids and malaria in the region. One of the rea-
sons for this is that HIV/Aids continues to be a taboo issue in the region. 
The figures for both HIV infections and the number of Aids cases are 
likely to be considerably lower than in other parts of the world. One ex-
ception here is Sudan, where more than 2 % of all adults are infected. 
However, there are also indications that the number of new infections has 
increased drastically in all MENA countries over the past five years. This 
goes in particular for southern Sudan, southern Algeria, Mauritania, and 
the coastal plain of Yemen.  
Malaria is endemic in eight MENA countries, although it does not consti-
tute a major health risk in any of them. 
Improvement of the environmental sustainability of country policies 
(MDG7) 
MDG7 sets out three targets that are only loosely interrelated and may 
even lead to goal conflicts. These are environmental sustainability (Tar-
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get 9), sustainable access to safe drinking water and sanitation for a larger 
proportion of the population (Target 10), and improvement in the lives of 
slum dwellers (Target 11). 
Six indicators have been designed to measure the implementation of Tar-
get 9. The first indicator (proportion of land area covered by forests) is not 
especially meaningful for a region that – with the exception of Sudan, Mo-
rocco, and Lebanon – has long been without any significant forest cover. 
But all of the other indicators show that the MENA countries will still 
have to make substantial efforts to reach Target 9. Soil, air, and water in 
the region have been affected by growing levels of pollution. For example, 
averaged across the region, CO2 emissions have risen by 50 % since 1990, 
and the MENA countries have made far less progress in reducing Chloro-
Fluoro Carbon (CFC) emissions than other parts of the world. Further-
more, many MENA countries have yet to ratify some important interna-
tional environmental conventions, including e.g. the Kyoto Protocol. And 
per capita energy consumption has risen substantially almost everywhere 
in the region, although some progress has been made in improving energy 
efficiency (net domestic product per unit of energy consumption). 
The MENA region has made major progress in implementing Target 10, 
but it still may not reach the target by 2015: Mauritania, Libya, Oman, and 
Yemen are likely not to reach it. Tunisia and Morocco will have to step up 
their efforts substantially. According to the official statistics, Egypt, Bah-
rain, Lebanon, Syria, and the Palestinian Territories have already reached 
Target 10. However, these statistics indicate only the number of house-
holds connected to the public water mains, not whether they are regularly 
supplied with water and quality this water has. Moreover, the statistics 
mask the fact that the greatest problem facing the MENA region is overuse 
of scarce water reserves by intensive irrigated agriculture, which accounts 
for 60-80 % of overall water consumption in the region. 
Some MENA countries have made good progress since 1990 in expanding 
their wastewater disposal systems. Egypt and Jordan, for instance, have al-
ready reached the target of halving the proportion of people without sus-
tainable access to sanitation, and Tunisia, Syria, and Oman are also likely 
to reach it by 2015. Sudan, Yemen, and Libya, however, have thus far 
made very little progress in developing their sanitary infrastructure. 
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Global partnership for development (MDG8) 
MDG8 consists of a large number of targets, most of which fall under the 
primary responsibility of the industrialized countries. Some of them, 
though – as in the case of MDGs 1–7 – are mainly the responsibility of the 
developing countries. This goes above all for (i) improvement of economic 
and political governance at the national level, (ii) reduction of youth un-
employment, (iii) access of the population to medicines, and (iv) access of 
the population to modern communications and information technologies. 
The economic governance of the MENA countries continues to be poor. 
These countries use a mix of numerous legal regulations and informal bar-
riers to seal off their goods and financial markets to potential new market 
entrants from abroad, but also to competitors of established domestic sup-
pliers. Those interested in investing or producing here are forced endure 
protracted, costly, and too little transparent approval procedures without 
any predictable outcome. And when it comes to legal disputes, it is very 
difficult to say how courts will decide. Intellectual property rights are not 
given adequate protection, competition laws (assuming they exist in the 
first place) are either poorly crafted or regularly ignored by the competent 
authorities. 
Political governance in the MENA region is in an even worse state. No 
other world region (with the possible exception of Central Asia) suffers 
from comparably large deficits with respect to political participation, gov-
ernment accountability, civil rights, and other liberal freedoms of the in-
habitants. As to transparency and the rule of law, the MENA region does 
not rank much better. But worst of all – and in contrast to the situation in 
all other parts of the world – not even the smallest improvement has taken 
place in these regards in the MENA countries over the past fifteen years. 
And since 1990 the MENA countries have also made as good as no progress 
in reducing youth unemployment. In Egypt and Bahrain, for example, youth 
unemployment ratios have even increased drastically. Although there are no 
data available for the other countries of the region, they have generally been 
faced with rising unemployment, and the actual rates are far higher then the 
official figures indicate. In other words, it is safe to assume that youth un-
employment rates have increased as well. This goes in particular for the Pal-
estinian Territories, Yemen, Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Lebanon. 
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Access of the population to affordable essential drugs has improved in the 
MENA countries. For instance, the populations of Algeria, Jordan, Libya, 
and the Gulf states have access to all essential medical drugs. On the other 
hand, however, only half the populations of Mauritania, Morocco, and 
Yemen, and an even smaller percentage of the population of Sudan, are 
adequately supplied with essential medical drugs. 
The communications and information infrastructure in the MENA countries 
is badly underdeveloped. Only in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa are 
there fewer telephone subscriptions per 1000 population, and this includes 
mobile phone networks. The figure is especially low both for the MENA re-
gion’s low-income countries and for Algeria, Libya, and Syria: The situation 
is similar when we looks at personal computers and Internet connections. 
Here the MENA region lags far behind Latin America, Eastern Europe, and 
Central Asia. In this regard the situation in the Gulf states, Lebanon, Jordan, 
and Iran is relatively good, while the figures for Yemen, Sudan, and Mauri-
tania, but also for Egypt, Morocco, and Syria, are very low. 
Acceptance of the MDGs in the Middle East and North 
Africa 
The question now is whether and to what extent the MDG agenda is find-
ing acceptance in the MENA countries, or to what extent the region’s po-
litical decision-makers are prepared to commit to the agenda. This is not at 
all simply a matter of course. Those in power in countries that have al-
ready made good progress in relevant areas may find the MDG agenda to 
their liking, since they are after all in a position to cite successes they have 
posted as an additional argument to shore up the legitimacy of their re-
gimes in the eyes of both their own populations and the international 
community. The picture is different in countries that are faced with severe 
difficulties in implementing the MDGs. The governments of these coun-
tries can of course still attempt to reach the goals, although this would re-
quire them to set aside substantial funds in their budgets. This could mean 
that they then lack funds for other purposes that may appear more oppor-
tune to them, e.g. for strategic efforts to consolidate their power. On the 
other hand, though, politicians in the countries concerned can simply ig-
nore the MDGs and make an all-out effort to prevent their populations 
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from learning about and discussing the MDGs. The challenge posed by 
such strategies is to convince the donors that the government is, in spite of 
all, doing everything in its power to reach the MDGs. 
There are reasons to believe that the majority of rulers in the MENA re-
gion are not wholly committed to the MDGs, although this is difficult to 
prove for lack of sound and reliable evidence.  
In formal terms, all MENA countries have accepted the MDGs. All of 
them were represented at the Millennium Summit (indeed most of them by 
heads of state or government). They voted for the Millennium Declaration, 
expressly welcoming it individual statements and comments. The govern-
ments of the MENA countries have also taken every opportunity to make 
official reference to the Millennium Declaration and the MDGs. However, 
official documents and communiqués of this kind seldom reflect the actual 
intentions of the politicians making them.  
A more instructive gauge is whether and to what extent ruling politicians 
have informed their societies about the MDGs and involved their citizens 
in the preparation of national MDG reports. In most MENA countries this 
has – with few exceptions – not been the case, and the MDG agenda has 
played as good as no role in public discourse, not even among intellectu-
als. While some individual themes of the MDG agenda have received at-
tention, the MDGs themselves are not touched upon, at least not explicitly. 
Furthermore, the themes that are addressed are restricted to issue areas that 
pose no danger to the region’s rulers (school enrolment, child mortality, 
etc.). Even a number of scientists, NGOs, and ministry officials concerned 
with MDG-relevant issues have yet to hear anything about the goals. Only 
Egypt and Morocco may possibly differ somewhat from the rest of the re-
gion, although the information currently available is highly contradictory. 
Another source of information is the national MDG reports, most of which 
indicate that the MENA countries lack a supportive environment (i.e. level 
of motivation and commitment of the relevant actors are seen as very little 
conducive to the implementation of the MDGs). However, the overall pic-
ture we get here is neither uniform nor intuitively plausible, especially in 
view of the fact that, of all countries, Saudi Arabia and Syria have re-
ceived highly positive assessments for their supportive environments.  
 
Middle East / North Africa and the Millennium Development Goals 
German Development Institute 13 
The governments of the MENA countries are fully aware of the fact that 
they will be unable to completely ignore the MDG agenda. Yet this leads 
them to draw highly different conclusions. Countries such as e.g. Syria, 
Egypt, or Jordan emphasize that they unreservedly welcome the MDG 
agenda, though this is for them no reason to embark on a fundamentally new 
course, since, as they claim, the MDGs, have, in essence, always been cen-
tral goals of their respective governments. In some cases they may not even be 
all that wrong. Even before the Millennium Summit, Tunisia, for instance, had 
made considerable progress in several MDG-relevant areas (reduction of in-
come poverty, improvement of gender equality, etc.), while in other areas, in-
cluding good governance, the country has made no progress whatever, even 
since the summit. By comparison, there is no reason of any kind for the com-
placency displayed by many other governments in the region. 
Still, for some years now these countries have been drawing up a growing 
number of development plans and sector strategy papers whose objectives, 
though they may not explicitly refer to the MDG agenda, do coincide in 
large measure with individual MDGs (especially often with the MDGs 4, 
5, and 7). But whether and to what extent these documents are taken seri-
ously and in fact implemented remains to be answered. It is also conceiv-
able that these efforts are designed mainly to curry favor with donors. 
The situation is different with countries such as Mauritania, Yemen, or 
Algeria. These countries frankly admit that they have in the past neglected 
certain MDG-relevant areas and are now obliged to make substantial cor-
rections in the policies they have been pursuing. Their planning documents 
make explicit reference to all of the MDGs, specifying them as national 
development goals. However, the actions undertaken by these countries 
have lagged even further behind their own stated goals than they have 
among the first group of countries named above.  
Orientation of German development cooperation 
German DC is positioned both geographically and sectorally in such a way 
that it is able to provide important contributions to implementing the 
MDGs in the MENA region. However, neither the partner countries nor 
the German side are undertaking sufficient efforts to analyze and docu-
ment these contributions.  
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German DC engaged intensively in what is referred to as its priority part-
ner countries. In the MENA region these are Egypt, Yemen, Morocco, and 
the Palestinian Territories. But Germany also engages in cooperation with 
Algeria, Jordan, Mauritania, Syria, and Tunisia. In essence, this orientation 
would also appear reasonable and appropriate from the perspective of the 
MDG agenda. There are justifiable political grounds for the fact that Ger-
man does not engage in DC with Iran, Sudan, and Iraq. Libya and the Gulf 
states, on the other hand, have sufficient financial resources of their own 
and are thus in a position to solve their problems without DC. One note-
worthy fact in this connection is that Mauritania, a low-income country 
that, because of its poverty, is faced with substantial problems in imple-
menting all of the MDGs, and will be unable to reach them without outside 
assistance, is what is known as a ‘simple’ partner country – whereas Egypt 
and Morocco, both middle-income countries, have the status of priority 
partner countries, even though they have been making better progress in 
implementing the MDGs, have sizable financial and organizational capaci-
ties of their own, and are not marked by any conspicuous willingness to 
seek solutions to the problems facing them. 
Germany’s cooperation with the MENA countries, mainly in the field of 
‘economic reform and market systems development’/ ‘Wirtschaftsreform 
und Aufbau der Marktwirtschaft’ (WIRAM) as well as in the water sector 
is also wholly justifiable – especially with a view to the MDA agenda. 
German DC in WIRAM and the water sector can contribute to reaching 
MDG1 and MDG7, respectively. A large number of MENA countries are 
faced with major problems in reaching these two goals, although it must 
be said that they are also not making sufficient progress in other MDG-
relevant areas and that official German DC is much less heavily engaged 
in the latter areas. These include above all the promotion of democracy 
and good governance, gender equality, and improvement of the quality of 
primary education – fields that, according to the Arab Human Develop-
ment Reports, constitute the major obstacles to overall development in the 
MENA region. 
In its dialogues with the governments of the partner countries in the 
MENA region the BMZ now regularly addresses the issue of the MDGs. 
However, thus far, hardly any of Germany’s Arab partner countries have 
explicitly raised the issue, a disquieting state of affairs. 
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But the most serious weaknesses in Germany’s DC with the MENA coun-
tries must be seen in its conceptual underpinning and documentation. The 
BMZ’s country concepts and priority strategy papers have hardly a word to 
say about the MDGs and Germany’s contribution to implementing them. 
While it is true that many of the goals set out in these documents are in line 
with the general thrust of the MDG agenda, they are not sufficiently clear 
about this. Moreover, many BMZ papers do not adequately indicate the ex-
tent to which the projects and programs of German DC serve higher-level 
goals. This is not even looked into ex post; thus far German DC has not been 
subjected to an MDG-specific impact analysis in one single partner country. 
There is also good reason to take a critical view of the German contribu-
tion to implementing MDG8 (although this goes not specifically for Ger-
many’s commitments in the MENA but for the whole of German DC, or 
indeed for all of Germany’s external policies). While the German govern-
ment is highly committed to the interests of developing countries in many 
different fields (trade, international financial markets, debt relief, etc.), 
German ODA still lags behind the target level of 0.7 % of GNP, which 
was set in the 1970s. Furthermore, Germany earmarks considerably 
smaller shares of its ODA than other donors for (i) the least-developed 
countries (LDCs) and (ii) basic social services (primary education, primary 
health care, food, drinking water, and sewage disposal).  
Recommendations for the future 
The German government has declared that “the MDGs and the Millennium 
Declaration constitute the binding frame of reference for German devel-
opment policy” (Bundesregierung 2004, 1). This permits us to derive the 
following recommendations for future German DC with MENA countries: 
– The BMZ’s strategy papers should better document how the German 
DC is contributing or expected to contribute to the implementation of 
the MDGs in its partner countries. 
– MDG-specific impact analyses should be carried out regularly to 
check whether a given contribution to implementing the MDGs has in 
fact been achieved. This goes above all for WiRAM, where it would 
be important to examine critically and to document in more depth the 
poverty-related impacts of German DC. 
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– The dialogue with partner countries must be focused more than in the 
past on implementing the MDGs. This should mean above all calling 
for (i) a greater measure of poverty orientation in economic policy, 
(ii) reforms in the field of governance, and (iii) a greater commitment 
in the field of gender equality. 
– German DC should concentrate more on countries and sectors in 
which problem urgency is especially marked while the situation is 
otherwise characterized by a sufficiently high problem-solving dispo-
sition and limited problem-solving capacities on the part of partner 
countries. What this could mean in effect is that German DC might 
consider e.g. stepping up its engagement in Mauritania (as well as in 
other countries) in the fields of (i) democratization and good govern-
ance, (ii) gender equality, and (iii) quality of primary education. 
– Finally, it is important not to lose sight of MDG8. This means to raise 
the German ODA quota substantially and to direct a greater share of 
the funds provided to the LDCs as well as to basic social services. 
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Overview 1: The MDGs, with targets and indicators 
Goals and targets Indicators  
(with the international organization/s  
responsible for collecting the statistical data) 
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 
Target 1: Halve, between 
1990 and 2015, 
the proportion of 
people whose  
income is less 
than one dollar a 
day 
1. Proportion of population below $1 (PPP) 
per day (World Bank) 
 (For monitoring country poverty trends,  
indicators based on national poverty lines 
should be used, where available) 
2. Poverty gap (World Bank) 
 (Mean distance of the poor below the  
poverty line as % of the poverty line. This 
mean is taken over the entire population, 
counting the non-poor as having zero  
poverty gap.) 
3. Share of poorest quintile in national con-
sumption (World Bank) 
Target 2: Halve, between 
1990 and 2015, 
the proportion of 
people who suffer 
from hunger 
4. Prevalence of underweight children under 
five years of age (UNICEF / WHO) 
5. Proportion of population below minimum 
level of dietary energy consumption 
(FAO) 
Goal 2:  Achieve universal primary education 
Target 3: Ensure that, by 
2015, children 
everywhere will 
be able to com-
plete a full course 
of primary school-
ing 
6. Net enrolment ratio in primary education 
(UNESCO) 
7a. Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who 
reach grade 5 (UNESCO) 
7b. Primary completion rate (UNESCO) 
8. Literacy rate of 15–24 year-olds 
(UNESCO) 
Goal 3:  Promote gender equality and empower women 
Target 4: Eliminate gender 
disparity in pri-
mary and secon-
dary education, 
preferably by 
2005, and  
in all levels of 
education no  
later than 2015 
9. Ratio of girls to boys in primary, secon-
dary and tertiary education (UNESCO) 
10. Ratio of literate women to men, 15–24 
years old (UNESCO) 
11. Share of women in wage employment in 
the non-agricultural sector (ILO) 
12. Proportion of seats held by women in  
national parliament (IPU) 
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(Overview 1: The MDGs, with targets and indicators, continued) 
Goals and targets Indicators  
(with the international organization/s  
responsible for collecting the statistical data) 
Goal 4:  Reduce child mortality 
Target 5: Reduce by two 
thirds, between 
1990 and 2015, 
the under-five 
mortality rate 
13. Under-five mortality rate (UNICEF / 
WHO) 
14. Infant mortality rate (UNICEF / WHO) 
15. Proportion of 1 year-old children immu-
nized against measles (UNICEF / WHO) 
Goal 5:  Improve maternal health 
Target 6: Reduce by three 
quarters, between 
1990 and 2015, 
the maternal mor-
tality ratio 
16. Maternal mortality ratio (UNICEF/ WHO) 
17. Proportion of births attended by skilled 
health personnel (UNICEF / WHO) 
Goal 6:  Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases 
Target 7: Have halted by 
2015 and begun 
to reverse the 
spread of 
HIV/AIDS 
18. HIV prevalence among pregnant women 
aged 15–24 years  
(UNAIDS / WHO / UNICEF) 
19. Condom use rate of the contraceptive pre-
valence rate (UNAIDS / UNICEF / UN 
Population Division / WHO) 
19a. Condom use at last high-risk sex  
 (UNICEF / WHO) 
19b. Percentage of population aged 15–24 years
  with comprehensive correct knowledge of 
 HIV/AIDS (UNICEF / WHO) 
19c. Contraceptive prevalence rate 
 (UNICEF / WHO) 
20. Ratio of school attendance of orphans to 
school attendance of non-orphans aged 10–
14 years (UNAIDS / WHO / UNICEF) 
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(Overview 1: The MDGs, with targets and indicators, continued) 
Goals and targets Indicators  
(with the international organization/s  
responsible for collecting the statistical data) 
Target 8: Have halted by 
2015 and begun 
to reverse the  
incidence of  
malaria and  
other major  
diseases 
21. Prevalence and death rates associated with 
malaria (WHO) 
22. Proportion of population in malaria-risk  
areas using effective malaria prevention 
and treatment measures (UNICEF / WHO) 
22a. Percentage of children under 5 sleeping  
 under insecticide-treated bed-nets  
 (UNICEF / WHO) 
23. Prevalence and death rates associated with 
tuberculosis (WHO) 
24. Proportion of tuberculosis cases detected 
and cured under the internationally rec-
ommended TB control strategy DOTS  
(Directly Observed Treatment Short 
Course) (WHO) 
Goal 7:  Ensure environmental sustainability 
Target 9: Integrate the 
principles of  
sustainable  
development  
into country  
policies and  
programs and  
reverse the loss 
of environmental 
resources 
25. Proportion of land area covered by forests 
(FAO) 
26. Ratio of area protected to maintain bio-
logical diversity to surface area (UNEP / 
IUCN) 
27. Use of kg oil equivalent per $1 GDP (PPP) 
(IEA / World Bank) 
(A measure for the efficiency of energy 
use) 
28. Carbon dioxide emissions per capita 
(UNFCCC / UNSD)  
28a. Consumption of ozone-depleting CFCs  
 (ODP tons) (UNEP) 
(indicator included 2002 during Johannes-
burg Summit on Sustainable Development) 
29. Proportion of population using solid fuels 
(WHO) 
(indicator included 2002 during Johannes-
burg Summit on Sustainable Development) 
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(Overview 1: The MDGs, with targets and indicators, continued) 
Goals and targets Indicators  
(with the international organization/s  
responsible for collecting the statistical data) 
Target 10: Halve, by 2015, 
the proportion of 
people without 
sustainable  
access to safe 
drinking water 
and sanitation 
30. Proportion of population with sustainable 
access to an improved water source:  
(a) urban and (b) rural (UNICEF / WHO) 
31. Proportion of population with access to 
improved sanitation: (a) urban and  
(b) rural (UNICEF / WHO) 
(indicator included 2002 during Johannes-
burg Summit on Sustainable Development) 
Target 11: By 2020, to have 
achieved a  
significant  
improvement  
in the lives of at 
least 100 million 
slum dwellers 
32. Proportion of households with access to  
secure tenure (UN-HABITAT) 
Goal 8:  Develop a global partnership for development 
Target 12: Develop further 
an open, rule- 
based, predict-
able, non- 
discriminatory 
trading and  
financial system. 
 (Includes a  
commitment to 
good governance, 
development  
and poverty  
reduction – both 
nationally and in-
ternationally) 
Target 13: Address the spe-
cial needs of the 
LDCs 
 (Includes tariff 
and quota-free 
access for LDCs 
exports; 
Some of the indicators listed below are  
monitored separately for the least developed 
countries (LDCs), Africa, landlocked  
developing countries (LLDCs) 
Official development assistance (ODA): 
33. Net ODA, (a) total and (b) to LDCs, as 
percentage of OECD / Development Assis-
tance Committee (DAC) donors’ gross na-
tional income (GNI) (OECD) 
34. Proportion of total bilateral, sector-
allocable ODA of OECD/DAC donors to 
basic social services (basic education,  
primary health care, nutrition, safe water 
and sanitation) (OECD) 
35. Proportion of bilateral ODA of 
OECD/DAC donors that is untied (OECD) 
36. ODA received in landlocked developing 
countries as a proportion of their GNIs 
(OECD) 
37. ODA received in small island developing 
States as proportion of their GNIs (OECD) 
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(Overview 1: The MDGs, with targets and indicators, continued) 
Goals and targets Indicators  
(with the international organization/s  
responsible for collecting the statistical data) 
enhanced program 
of debt relief for 
heavily indebted 
poor countries 
(HIPC) and  
cancellation of  
official bilateral 
debt; and more 
generous ODA  
for countries  
committed to  
poverty reduction) 
Target 14: Address the  
special needs  
of landlocked  
developing  
countries and  
small island  
developing states  
(through the  
Program of Action 
for the Sustainable 
Development of 
Small Island  
Developing States 
and the outcome of 
the twenty-second 
special session of 
the General  
Assembly) 
Target 15: Deal comprehen-
sively with the 
debt problems of 
developing  
countries through 
national and inter-
national measures 
in order to make 
debt sustainable in 
the long term 
Market access: 
38. Proportion of total developed country 
imports (by value and excluding arms) 
from developing countries and from 
LDCs, admitted free of duty  
(UNCTAD / WTO / World Bank) 
39. Average tariffs imposed by developed 
countries on agricultural products and 
textiles and clothing from developing 
countries  
(UNCTAD / WTO / World Bank) 
40. Agricultural support estimate for OECD 
countries as percentage of their GDP 
(OECD) 
41. Proportion of ODA provided to help 
build trade capacity  
(OECD / WTO) 
Debt sustainability: 
42. Total number of countries that have 
reached their Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries Initiative (HIPC) decision 
points and number that have reached 
their HIPC completion points  
(cumulative)  
(IMF / World Bank) 
43. Debt relief committed under HIPC  
initiative  
(IMF / World Bank) 
44. Debt service as a percentage of exports  
of goods and services  
(IMF / World Bank) 
 
Markus Loewe 
 German Development Institute 22
(Overview 1: The MDGs, with targets and indicators, continued) 
Goals and targets Indicators  
(with the international organization/s  
responsible for collecting the statistical data) 
Target 16: In cooperation  
with developing  
countries, develop 
and implement 
strategies for  
decent and produc-
tive work for youth
45. Unemployment rate of young people 
aged 15–24 years, each sex and total 
(ILO) 
(An improved measure of the target for 
future years is under development by  
the International Labour Organization). 
Target 17: In cooperation with 
pharmaceutical 
companies, provide 
access to afford-
able essential drugs 
in developing 
countries 
46. Proportion of population with access  
to affordable essential drugs on a  
sustainable basis (WHO) 
Target 18: In cooperation with 
the private sector, 
make available the 
benefits of new 
technologies,  
especially  
information and 
communications 
47. Telephone lines and cellular subscribers 
per 100 population (ITU) 
48. Personal computers in use per 100 
population and Internet users per 100 
population (ITU) 
Source: Website of the United Nations Statistics Division: http://millennium 
indicators.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_goals.asp (17 May 2004) 
Note:  
a The poverty gap refers to the money needed to completely erase poverty, if it 
were perfectly targeted and each poor person were given exactly the value of 
his or her income shortfall below the poverty line. 
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1 Introduction 
In September 2000, the Millennium Declaration was adopted at the so-
called Millennium Summit, held in the framework of the 55th General As-
sembly of the United Nations (UN). The summit was attended by the 
heads of state or government of nearly all UN member states. Never be-
fore had a similarly large number of highest-ranking representatives of in-
dependent states come together on one occasion. This, and the fact that all 
of the representatives attending made statements of their own on the Mil-
lennium Declaration, are a clear indication of the importance attached to 
the declaration even before it had been adopted. 
The Millennium Summit is the culmination of a development that began 
after the end of the Cold War and has entailed a paradigm shift in the in-
ternational development debate. The Millennium Declaration, for instance, 
sums up numerous resolutions and declarations of intent, which were 
adopted by the international community during the 1990s and have placed 
good number of new issues and goals on the international agenda.  
In the wake of the Millennium Summit, a joint working group was consti-
tuted with representatives from the UN, the World Bank, the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and other interna-
tional organizations. It extracted a number of measurable targets from the 
Millennium Declaration. The result was a list of eight Millennium Devel-
opment Goals (MDGs) that are further specified by 18 targets and 48 indi-
cators. Most of the goals are set to be implemented by 2015. They include: 
1 the reduction of income poverty and hunger, 
2 the achievement of universal primary education for boys and girls, 
3 the promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women, 
4 the reduction of child mortality, 
5 the improvement of maternal health, 
6 the combat of HIV/Aids, malaria and other infectious diseases, 
7 the observance of ecological sustainability by country policies, and 
8 the development of a global partnership for development. 
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In 2001, the MDGs were approved by the 56th UN General Assembly. The 
international community is thus in possession of a common goal system 
that has been agreed upon by all relevant actors and that is both measur-
able and set to be implemented by a fixed date. The intention is that both, 
the international community as a whole and each individual country, 
should achieve all of the MDGs.  
This study looks into the degree to which the MDGs are relevant for the 
countries of the Middle East and North Africa (the so-called MENA re-
gion), most of which are classified as middle- or, in some cases, even 
high-income countries. It explores specifically whether the adoption of the 
MDGs has already found expression in changed national policies, what 
successes have been made thus far on individual MDGs, and where the 
principle implementation-related problems must be sought. 
It furthermore discusses what relevance the MDGs have for German de-
velopment cooperation (DC): What contributions Germany, as a bilateral 
donor, is in fact making toward the implementation of the MDGs in its 
partner countries, whether and to what extent this contribution is based on 
preliminary conceptual-analytical considerations, how well the contribu-
tion is documented, and what implications all this may have for the future. 
The study shows that the MDGs are highly relevant for the MENA region. 
All MENA countries approved the MDGs in September 2000, but they 
have made only inadequate progress towards implementing the goals since 
then. This goes above all for MDG1 (reduction of income poverty and 
hunger), MDG7 (ecological sustainability of country policies), and several 
targets of MDG8 (good governance, reduction of youth unemployment, 
improved access to modern information and communications technolo-
gies). Substantial deficits, however, have also been noted for the quality of 
education and the social, economic, legal, and political equality of women. 
One of the reasons for this situation, especially in the region’s low-income 
countries, must be seen in both financial bottlenecks and management 
failures. In addition, political decision-makers in the region also lack ade-
quate commitment for the MDG agenda. 
German DC is generally relatively well positioned to support its partner 
countries in the MENA region in their efforts to reach the MDGs. In its 
main priority sectors, “economic reform and market systems develop-
ment,” water management,” and “environmental policy, German DC is in 
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a position to provide important contributions to implementing the MDGs 
that are proving especially difficult for the countries in the region to reach. 
At present, however, neither the partner side nor the donor side is paying 
sufficient heed to the need to analyze and document these contributions: 
Most of the country concept and priority country strategy papers prepared 
by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment / Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Ent-
wicklung (BMZ) provide no information either on the concrete contribu-
tion German DC is providing to implement the MDGs or on the measures 
being used to this end. 
The present study breaks down as follows: 
– Chapter 2 goes at more length into the Millennium Declaration and 
the MDGs and their historical background, looks into the strengths 
and weaknesses of this international goal system, and discusses the 
latter’s significance for German DC. 
– Chapter 3 is devoted to the Millennium process in the MENA coun-
tries. It deals with the question of what significance the indicators de-
signed for the MDGs have in the MENA region and what progress 
the region’s countries have made thus far in reaching the MDGs. 
– Chapter 4 analyzes, from a more general perspective, the extent to 
which the MDGs have influenced national development policies and 
public discourse in the Middle East and North Africa. 
– Chapter 5 looks into the orientation of German DC. It asks what con-
tribution Germany is making toward implementing the MDGs in its 
MENA partner countries, whether and to what extent this contribu-
tion is based on preliminary conceptual-analytical considerations, and 
how well the contribution is referenced and documented.  
– Chapter 6 concludes the study with a number of recommendations for 
the governments of the Middle East and North Africa as well as for 
German DC. 
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2 Millennium Declaration and Millennium Develop-
ment Goals 
2.1 Historical background and genesis of the Millennium 
Declaration 
The Millennium Summit is the outcome of a development that entailed an 
at least partial departure from the so-called Washington Consensus, which 
dominated the international debate during the 1980s and rested squarely on 
neoliberal economic theory (Gsänger 1996a; Eberlei 2000). It found ex-
pression above all in the stabilization and structural adjustment programs 
(SAPs) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank that 
provided for consolidation of the current accounts and budgets of indebted 
developing countries, continuous and noninterventionist monetary and fis-
cal policies, and structural market reforms (market opening, deregulation, 
and privatization). Poverty reduction was largely equated with higher eco-
nomic growth, the assumption being that such growth would, sooner or 
later, benefit the poor through trickle-down effects (Decker 2003, 488). 
In the early 1990s, however, it gradually become apparent that this as-
sumption was, at least in its then current form, not tenable. Indeed, in 
many developing countries – above all in Africa, but also in Latin America – 
poverty had even worsened under the SAPs (Decker 2003, 488; Betz 2003, 
456). As early as the mid-1980s UNICEF, the UN Children’s Fund, voiced 
criticism of the high costs exacted by the SAPs and called for “adjustment 
programs with a human countenance.” This demand was underpinned pro-
grammatically by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
which, in 1990, released its first Human Development Report (HDR), a 
counter piece to the World Bank’s World Development Report. The HDR 
argued that economic growth did by no means automatically come along 
with social development (e.g. on education and health indicators) (UNDP 
2000). The report further noted critically that the development debate was 
largely dominated by a one-dimensional, purely economic understanding 
of poverty. Based on the capabilities approach pioneered mainly by Amar-
tya Sen (Sen 1981; Sen 1999), poverty was now defined as multiple depri-
vation of capabilities, i.e. as a lack of means that are needed to carry out 
the activities one cherishes and to live a life of self-determination (Lipton / 
Ravallion 1995). 
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Overview 2: The decade of world conferences 
Year Conference – Most important results 
1990 The World Summit on Education for All 
(Jomtien) 
– Agenda Education for All (EFA) 
1990 World Summit for Children (New York)  
1992 UN Conference on Environment and  
Development / “Earth Summit”  
(Rio de Janeiro) 
– Rio Declaration 
– Agenda 21 
– UN Framework Convention on  
Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
– Statement of Forest Principles 
– UN Convention on Biological Diversity 
1993 2nd World Conference on Human Rights 
(Vienna) 
– Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action 
1994 World Conference on Natural Disaster 
Reduction (Yokohama) 
 
1994 3rd International Conference on  
Population and Development (Cairo) 
– ICPD Programme of Action 
1994 Conference on Small Island  
Developing States (Barbados) 
–  
1995 World Summit for Social  
Development (Copenhagen) 
– Copenhagen Declaration 
– Copenhagen Programme of Action 
1995 4th World Conference on Women  
(Peking) 
 
1996 2nd UN Conference on Human  
Settlements / ”Habitat” (Istanbul) 
 
1996 World Food Summit (Rom) – Rome Programme of Action 
2000 Millennium Summit (New York) – Millennium Declaration 
2001 World Conference against Racism,  
Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and 
Related Intolerance (Durban) 
– Durban Declaration and Programme of 
Action 
2001 UN General Assembly (New York) – “Road Map Towards the Implementation 
of the Millennium Declaration” (contains 
the MDGs) 
2002 International Conference on Financing 
for Development (Monterrey)  
– Monterrey Consensus: affirmation of the 
MDGs, PRSP process; enlargement of  
the HIPC Initiative (1999 Cologne G8 
summit); increase of ODA 
2002 World Summit on Sustainable Develop-
ment (Johannesburg)  
– Enlargement of the MDG agenda to  
include two more targets concerned  
with sustainable development  
Source: author of the present study 
Note:  The column on the right contains only important results that go beyond the 
issue complex discussed at the conference in question. 
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Five groups of capabilities can be distinguished:  
– economic capabilities (on the basis of income and assets), 
– human capabilities (health, education, and access to food, water, and 
habitation), 
– political capabilities (freedom, voice, influence, power), 
– sociocultural capabilities (status, dignity, belongingness, cultural  
identity), and 
– protective capabilities (protection against risks). 
The HDRs, which have been released annually since 1990, seek to meas-
ure some of these capabilities with the Human Development Index (HDI). 
The HDI is a composite indicator of prosperity that includes, for the popu-
lation of a given country, per capita income (as the key figure for eco-
nomic capabilities) and data on levels of education and health (as criteria 
for human capabilities) (El Masry 2003, 472). 
The disappointing balance of development in the 1980s also led to the call-
ing, in the early 1990s, of a number of international conferences in the UN 
framework that dealt with various aspects of social and ecological devel-
opment (see Overview 2). The first of these conferences was the 1990 
Summit on Education for All in Jomtien (Thailand), which was organized 
by UNESCO; at it the international community defined a number of edu-
cational goals, including an important one calling for access, for all chil-
dren – girls and boys alike – by the year 2000, to a complete course of 
primary education. This conference was followed by the World Summit 
for Children in 1990 in New York and the ‘Earth Summit’ in Rio de Ja-
neiro in 1992, which adopted four landmark declarations. One conference 
of particular importance for what was to come was the 1995 Copenhagen 
World Summit for Social Development. Among other things, the confer-
ence adopted a 10-point Declaration on Social Development that later 
formed the basis of the MDGs. 
These world conferences were as such nothing really unprecedented. Ear-
lier decades had also experienced some international conferences that 
adopted declarations of intent and commitments on various issues. What 
was new, however, was (i) the large number and close sequencing of the 
world summits, (ii) the detailed and binding character of the resolutions 
adopted, and (iii) the high political importance attached to the conferences. 
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Even though this certainly is due at least in part to the end of the bipolar 
international system, it also has to do with the dissemination of new in-
formation and communications technologies, the ongoing process of glob-
alization, and the sense for networked thinking that the latter development 
has entailed: In many countries a consciousness had matured that numer-
ous socioeconomic, ecological, and human rights problems are not acces-
sible to national solutions and are in need of international arrangements, 
and that these problems are marked by a high level of interdependence. 
One reflection of this is the fact that the declarations and agreements 
adopted at the world summits take a holistic view of global problems and 
underline the causal links between them (Gsänger 1996b; Martens 2005; 
Satterthwaite 2004, 8). 
At the end of the decade, there was a large measure of consensus on nu-
merous development-related issues, and it was this that paved the way for 
the adoption of the Millennium Declaration. In particular, the conferences 
served to establish a broad consensus on a common goal system as well as 
on strategic approaches for translating it into practice.  
It should be borne in mind here that this goal system is nothing fully new; 
indeed, it very largely reflects the goals that led, in 1945, to the foundation 
of the United Nations and that are laid out in the UN Charter. However, 
the multidimensional goal system of the new development paradigm con-
trasts in many respects with the one-sided focus of 1980s development 
policy on economic target dimensions (economic growth, income, con-
tainment of inflation). The new consensus was soon to find support among 
a broad alliance of actors: the UN system, the OECD, and, finally, the IMF 
and the World Bank.  
In 1996, the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) 
released its report “Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Devel-
opment Co-operation” (Clemens / Kenny / Moss 2004, 5). In it, the DAC 
took up the central goals defined by the earlier world conferences and pro-
posed a global development partnership geared to achieving these “ambi-
tious but realisable goals” (OECD/DAC 1996, 2) by the year 2015. These  
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so-called International Development Goals2 were to be pursued and im-
plemented by each country on its own. The key consideration here was 
“qualitative factors in the evolution of more stable, safe, participatory 
and just societies. These include capacity development for effective, 
democratic and accountable governance, the protection of human rights 
and respect for the rule of law. We will also continue to address these 
less easily quantified factors of development.” (OECD/DAC 1996, 2). 
In return, the industrialized countries were to offer the developing coun-
tries broad and effective support in their efforts to reach the goals: on the 
one hand by boosting their official development assistance, but on the 
other hand also by improving the coordination of their development coop-
eration both among one another and with the orientation and planning ac-
tivities of the developing countries: 
“Effective international support can make a real difference in achieving 
these goals. This is far from saying that they can be achieved by aid a-
lone. The most important contributions for development, as in the past, 
will be made by the people and governments of the developing countries 
themselves. But where this effort is forthcoming it needs and deserves 
strong support from the industrialised countries. We commit ourselves 
to do the utmost to help.“ (OECD/DAC 1996, 2). 
Then, in September 2000, the Millennium Summit adopted the Millen-
nium Declaration. It consists of eight chapters: The first has the character 
of a preamble, while all others are programmatic in nature. Four chapters 
are devoted to the themes “Peace, security and disarmament” (Chapter 2), 
“Development and poverty eradication” (Chapter 3), “Protecting our 
common environment” (Chapter 4), and “Human rights, democracy and 
good governance” (Chapter 5). Chapter 6 is concerned with “the vulner-
                                                          
2  The International Development Goals are: (i) a reduction by one half in the proportion 
of people living in extreme poverty by 2015; (ii) universal primary education in all 
countries by 2015; (iii) demonstrated progress toward gender equality and the empow-
erment of women by eliminating gender disparity in primary and secondary education 
by 2005; (iv) a reduction by two-thirds in the mortality rates for infants and children 
under age 5; (vi) a reduction by three fourths in maternal mortality, all by 2015; (v) ac-
cess through the primary health-care system to reproductive health services for all indi-
viduals of appropriate ages as soon as possible and no later than the year 2015; (vii) the 
current implementation of national strategies for sustainable development in all coun-
tries by 2005, so as to ensure that current trends in the loss of environmental resources 
are effectively reversed at both global and national levels by 2015. 
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able” and Chapter 7 with “the special needs of Africa”. Chapter 8 finally 
addresses the reform of the United Nations (UN 2000a). 
In Chapters 3 and 4, the Millennium Declaration takes up the International 
Development Goals of the OECD/DAC, coming close to citing them. 
However, because of the massive resistance of the US, one of the Interna-
tional Development Goals (“improved access for all people to reproduc-
tive health services”) was not incorporated into the Millennium Declara-
tion. Instead, another goal was added: To combat and halt the spread of 
HIV/Aids, malaria and other severe diseases (UN 2000a).  
In turn, almost all of the MDGs were derived from these two chapters. 
One reason for this is that most of the goals set out in Chapter 2 (Peace, 
security and disarmament) and Chapter 5 (Human rights, democracy and 
good governance) would be very difficult to operationalize. The latter, for 
example, includes the calls to combat global drug problems and for all 
countries to undertake efforts to improve freedom of the press and to cur-
tail trade in small arms. Another reason was the expected opposition by 
many governments against a codification of these rather political goals.  
In 2002, the MDGs were for the first time affirmed by both the Interna-
tional Conference on Financing for Development (Monterrey, Mexico) 
and the World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg). Fur-
thermore, MDG7 was enlarged to include two targets and several indica-
tors (Bundesregierung 2004, 20; BMZ 2004i; Radke 2002). In September 
2005, all UN member states stressed once more 
“our determination to ensure the timely and full realization of the de-
velopment goals and objectives agreed at the major United Nations 
conferences and summits, including those agreed at the Millennium 
Summit that are described as the Millennium Development Goals, 
which have helped to galvanize efforts towards poverty eradication.” 
(UN 2005b). 
2.2 Significance of the Millennium Declaration 
The Millennium Summit and the world conferences of the 1990s have vi-
tally shaped the course of the international development debate. They have 
led to a paradigm shift that may be outlined here in five keywords: 
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New development consensus: In the course of the 1990s, a certain rap-
prochement came about between the basic positions of the Bretton Woods 
institutions (IMF and World Bank) and the UN system. This paved the 
way for a new development consensus, which is sometimes called the 
“post-Washington consensus”. The Millennium Declaration and the 
MDGs address the need to reduce poverty – labeled as an “unacceptable, 
global problem” – in all its dimensions as the objective of the new consen-
sus. 
Sustainable human development instead of a one-sided focus on economic 
growth: One characteristic feature of the new development consensus is its 
comprehensive concept of poverty, which includes the poor’s lack of hu-
man capital (education, health), political rights (participation, civil rights, 
transparency of administrative and judiciary systems, etc.), and possibili-
ties to manage risks (social protection). The consensus furthermore at-
taches greater importance than past conventions to the sustainability of de-
velopment in its ecological, social, and economic dimensions. Accord-
ingly, since the mid-1990s national and international development strate-
gies have focused increasingly on the promotion of democracy and good 
governance, building and further development of systems of social protec-
tion, and improving environmental and resource protection, without losing 
sight of the need for participation and gender mainstreaming. A liberal 
economic system geared to competition and equal opportunity continues to 
be seen as a central precondition for development and poverty reduction, 
although it is at the same time also emphasized that, if they are to be sus-
tained, competition and equal opportunity may often require targeted gov-
ernment intervention. 
Outcome orientation: Development policy and development cooperation 
are expected to be geared to and measurable in terms of the common goal 
of poverty reduction – as are all other external policies of the industrial-
ized countries. The main concern here is not what inputs are provided by 
individual actors but what impacts these inputs achieve altogether. To 
measure the impacts, the MDGs can be used as indicators (Radele 2004).  
Coherence: In view of the scarcity of the resources available to it, DC 
must, if it is to generate the maximum possible impacts, be coherent, i.e. 
all relevant actors must join forces and subordinate their activities to the 
common goal system. This involves three different dimensions: First, do-
nor DC must be coherent with other external policies. DC should, for ex-
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ample, not be allowed to be counteracted by donor trade or agricultural 
policies harmful to the developing countries. Second, DC must be de-
signed in such a way as to support partner-country policies, although DC 
should be provided only in cases in which partners are unable to meet, on 
their own, these goals which they themselves have formulated (principle 
of subsidiarity). Third, donors should not compete with one another for 
prestigious projects and should instead undertake whatever efforts are nec-
essary to coordinate and harmonize their DC with partner countries 
(Ashoff 2002; Ashoff 2004; Fues 2005). 
Global partnership for development: The industrialized and developing 
countries bear joint responsibility for reaching the MDGs. At the national 
level, the focus is on the responsibility of every individual developing 
country, and each such country must do its utmost to ensure that MDGs 1-
7 are achieved. Donors should provide only support for these efforts. This 
is why the developing countries are expected to define, in a participatory 
process, their own development priorities and approaches and set out them 
out in PRSPs or other national development plans. The donors should, for 
their part, concentrate on providing support for the implementation of 
these plans. The aim here is to free developing countries from their de-
pendence on DC and to assign more responsibility to their political deci-
sion-makers. On the other hand, it is the economically dominant industrial-
ized countries that are chiefly responsible for MDG8 – shaping a global 
framework conducive to development (Baulch 2004; Bundesregierung 
2004; Radke 2002; Wolff 2004). 
2.3 Evaluation of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) 
While the MDGs do offer major chances, they also entail risks. If these 
risks are to be avoided, it is essential to approach the MDGs more as a 
frame of reference than as a rigid corset, and it is also important to bear in 
mind that the goals do not map depict all dimensions of development. The 
risks involved here include in particular the following: 
A too narrow concept of development: The Millennium Declaration 
springs from a highly comprehensive view of development, based on a 
concept of poverty that also includes nonmaterial aspects. Yet these as-
pects are not depicted adequately by the MDGs. None of the MDG indica-
Markus Loewe 
34 German Development Institute 
tors measure political deprivation (lack of human and civil rights, means 
of participation, rule of law, or administrative transparency), social depri-
vation (marginalization of social groups, insufficient cohesion and unify-
ing forces in society), or vulnerability (lack of social protection). In other 
words, it is important to look at the MDGs against the background of the 
Millennium Declaration; otherwise it would be possible to lose sight of 
some very important targets included in the Millennium Declaration but in 
the MDG agenda such as e.g. democratization and good governance or the 
strengthening of the protective capabilities of low-income groups (Hermle 
2005; Martens 2005; Maxwell 2005; Satterthwaite 2003; UN 2005). 
Quantity at the expense of quality: What can be said in general of indica-
tors that are easy to measure applies for the MDGs as well: They lend 
themselves to measuring quantitative aspects of development, not qualita-
tive aspects. This may, for instance, mean that while efforts that are under-
taken to improve school enrolment ratios are successful, the quality of 
education is neglected. It is therefore important not to lose sight of poten-
tial non-quantifiable deficits (Martens 2005; Satterthwaite 2004, 9). 
Optimizing inputs at the expense of efficiency: Even though the MDGs are 
an instruments well suited to establishing a more marked outcome orienta-
tion in development policy, the ongoing international debate about the 
MDGs is rather focused on inputs. Numerous academic studies are con-
cerned with the issue of how far official development assistance (ODA) 
will have to be increased if the MDGs are to be reached by 2015. These 
studies focus e.g. on how many schools will have to be built and how 
many additional teachers to be employed if all boys and girls are to be able 
to attend a full course of primary schooling. Many of the studies fail to 
note that implementing the MDGs hinges not only on more ODA but also 
on a more efficient use of the available funds, the absorptive capacity of 
the developing countries, the administrative and organizational capacities 
of their institutions, and, not least, greater efficiency and transparency in 
the system of DC itself. In fact, increasing ODA may not even be the most 
important of these factors (Baulch 2004; Clemens / Kenny / Moss 2003, 4; 
Fues 2005; Satterthwaite 2004, 12; Wolff 2004). 
Neglect of the process dimension: Another much-discussed topic is what 
countries are likely to reach the MDGs and which are not. It would, how-
ever, be far more important to ask why certain countries are unlikely to 
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reach the MDGs and what measures might be taken to correct the situation 
(Maxwell 2005; Radele 2004). 
Short-term planning is closely associated with another problem. If indi-
vidual countries fully gear their efforts to reaching the MDGs by 2015, 
come what may, the danger is that the success they meet with may not 
prove sustainable. To cite an example, fixation on the year 2015 may in-
duce developing countries to hire more teachers, and to pay their salaries 
with ODA funds, in order to raise school enrolment rates. Even if the 
strategy proves successful, the success will not be sustainable because it is 
not based on structural change. And finally, who is to pay the newly hired 
teachers when the year 2015 has come and gone? It is, in other words, 
more important for developing countries to make progress on the MDGs, 
and, at the same time, not lose sight of the need to ensure sustainability 
from the very start. 
Insufficient underpinning for the idea of sustainability: One development 
that generally deserves to be criticized is that the idea of sustainability, 
which, in a difficult process, earned its place on the international agenda 
during the 1990s, and has now found expression in the Millennium Decla-
ration, has been shunted into the background of the MDG agenda. While it 
is true that the MDG agenda also includes environmental targets, these 
range toward the end of the list under MDG7, and, viewed purely in terms 
of the number of targets involved, they tend to be overshadowed by the 
economic and social targets (Martens 2005). 
Furthermore, environmental and resource protection is only one compo-
nent of sustainable development. It is at least equally important to ensure 
that the idea of sustainability, with all its ecological and economic aspects, 
is firmly entrenched as an action-guiding (i.e. cross-cutting) principle in all 
fields of development policy. What this means is that – put in simple terms 
– when any and all measures are being planned, it is essential to factor in 
the longer-term (positive and negative) impacts (Hermle 2005). 
Neglect of multicausalities: Another risk is that the MDGs may be re-
garded in isolation, with measures designed to implement them being 
taken only in the most obvious sectors. One of the great merits of the 
world conferences of the 1990s was of course that they that they pointed to 
the interdependencies between income poverty, education, health, envi-
ronmental protection, etc. and placed emphasis on cross-cutting issues. 
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Concentrating on individual MDGs may, for instance, lead decision-
makers to equate the implementation of MDG4 (reduction of maternal 
mortality rates) with a need for measures in the health sector (Wolff 2004). 
But empirical studies show that health indicators depend less on supply-
side than on demand-side factors. It has turned out quite often that build-
ing healthcare stations and hiring new medical personnel does not lead to 
the intended results. No use has been made of the additional capacities be-
cause the target group is not properly aware of the need for preventive 
healthcare (especially prenatal/natal and for newborn children) (Clemens / 
Kenny / Moss 2003, 12 ff.). It is simply not possible to use health-policy 
instruments to influence this awareness. Indeed, this awareness correlates 
far better with household prosperity and maternal educational level. Im-
plementation of the MDGs 4–6 may therefore be said to hinge in large 
measure on progress made on MDGs 1, 2, 3, and 7. 
Unrealistic expectations: The ongoing discussion on what conditions must 
be given if the MDGs are to be reached and how much additional funding 
will be required involves the risk that the Millennium process awakens un-
realistic expectations. Numerous developing countries – especially in sub-
Saharan Africa – will probably not reach all of the MDGs, regardless of 
how much ODA flows are increased. The experiences of the past indicate 
that, in the social sectors in particular, development is a protracted and 
complex process that hinges more on structural reforms than on the 
amount of financial resources available. Setting concrete goals is a good 
idea in that it serves to boost the motivation and commitment of relevant 
actors. If, however, there is a widespread belief that all of these goals can 
actually be reached everywhere in the world, this may entail serious con-
sequences. If it turns out in 2015 that the goals have not been reached, DC 
will suffer another credibility setback, and extensive frustration is likely to 
be the result. The citizens of donor countries will have even less under-
standing for the fact than they do at present for the fact that their govern-
ments are spending tax revenues for development-related purposes (Clem-
ens / Kenny / Moss 2003, 1 f.). 
Undifferentiated assessment: In addition, any failure to reach the MDGs 
may have undesirable impacts in developing countries as well. The main 
reason for this is that the MDGs specify the same percentage targets for all 
countries. However, countries in which over half of the population is liv-
ing in absolute poverty are in any case faced with far greater difficulties in 
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halving this percentage than countries in which ‘only’ one in ten of the 
population is forced to live on less than one US$ per day. The reason why 
this constitutes a problem is that development-minded governments that 
have made some successes, but without reaching the MDGs, may find 
themselves delegitimized (Clemens / Kenny / Moss 2003, 31; Satterth-
waite 2003). 
Planning and evaluation conducted on the basis of incomplete or irrele-
vant data: Finally, there is also a risk that the determination of whether or 
not a country has reached to MDGs will be based solely on the indicators 
defined for the purpose. This would problematic in several respects: 
– Some indicators are not equally viable for all countries. For example, 
the MENA region has not had one major forest in the last centuries. 
This means that Indicator 25 of the MDG agenda is largely irrelevant 
for the region.  
– Also, the MDG indicators measure outcome at entirely different lev-
els. For MDGs 4–6 impact indicators have been defined (including 
child and maternal mortality rates) that in fact reveal much about the 
population’s health status. Other indicators, however, including e.g. 
school enrolment rates and completion rates – measure outputs. They 
do not provide any information on outcomes because they do not 
measure the actual quality of education. And they certainly cannot be 
used to determine the impacts of education, which may consist, inter 
alia, in better employment and earnings potentials, in the fact that 
school graduates are better able to exercise their rights and thus lead 
more self-determined lives, or in the fact that education as such may 
be seen as important for a fulfilled life. Finally, some of the environ-
mental indicators are pure input factors, e.g. the proportion of land set 
aside as conservation areas or nature reserves. 
– Also, the data used for some indicators are very fragmentary. For the 
base year, 1990, which is the reference year for most of the targets, 
numerous data are missing for the indicators of MDG 1, 5, 6, and 7. 
All of these risks are manageable. But this of course presupposes aware-
ness about them. Whether the effects on global development generated by 
the agenda turn out to be exclusively positive or in part negative as well 
will depend above all on how the agenda is interpreted by the international 
community in the years to come: 
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“The MDGs might be better viewed not as realistic targets but as re-
minders of the stark contrast between the world we want and the world 
we have, and a call to redouble our search for interventions to close the 
gap.” (Clemens / Kenny / Moss 2003, 1). 
It is, though, absolutely essential not to waste the major opportunities af-
forded by a goal system which has been recognized and welcomed by all 
relevant actors: 
Uniform frame of reference: The MDGs provide, for the first time ever, a 
common goal system for all actors in development policy, one that has 
been agreed on by developing countries, donor countries, and international 
organizations alike and is thus well suited as the basis of a global partner-
ship for development. All of the actors involved are now able to key their 
efforts and contributions to this goal system, and in this way to improve 
their coordination. This not only makes it possible to concentrate forces, it 
also sets the stage for greater continuity in international development pol-
icy – at least up to 2015 (BMZ 2004i). 
Outcome orientation: Furthermore, a good chance exists that DC may now 
opt for a more pronounced outcome orientation. Viewed against the back-
ground of the MDGs, what contributions (inputs) are provided by individ-
ual donors is a matter of secondary importance. The crucial factor is the 
impacts achieved by all relevant actors working together (Maxwell 2005; 
Radele 2004; UNDP 2004b). 
Mobilization of energies and resources: Finally, the commitments under-
taken by the international community at the Millennium Summit can serve 
to encourage and motivate all relevant actors in developing countries – 
governments, civil society, the private sector and donors – to mobilize ad-
ditional resources and redouble their efforts to make progress toward 
reaching the goals (Vandemoortele 2004a). Between 2000 and 2003 the 
overall ODA provided worldwide rose already by almost 10 % per annum 
from US$ 52 to US$ 69 billion in constant prices (Herfkens 2005). 
2.4 The Millennium process 
The fact that the Millennium Declaration is seen as having a new quality 
different from that of previous declarations and commitments becomes 
clear, for instance, when we look at the degree to which the follow-up 
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process has been institutionalized. The UN system has e.g. developed a 
highly diversified set of instruments designed to advance the Millennium 
process at the global and national level: to heighten awareness of the 
MDGs among political decision-makers and the public, to set in train a 
discussion on the implementation of the MDGs, to measure how much 
progress has been made, and to identify possible obstacles. 
At the international level there are four principle instruments are being 
used to promote and support the Millennium process: 
– the annual report of the UN Secretary-General on the state of imple-
mentation of the MDGs; 
– the Millennium Campaign, an organizational unit headed by Eveline 
Herfkens and dedicated to raising awareness for the MDGs; and 
– the Millennium Project, a working group made up of scientists and 
experts and headed by Jeffery Sachs; the project, which reports di-
rectly to the Secretary-General, has the task of acquiring and process-
ing data on best practices suited to implementing the MDGs as well 
as information on the experiences made by selected countries. 
At the national level the country MDG reports are the central instruments 
used to make the MDGs known, to raise awareness for them, to urge poli-
ticians to work to implement them, to monitor the present state of imple-
mentation, to identify deficits, and to come up with approaches to over-
coming such deficits: Like PRSPs, national MDG reports are expected to 
be developed at regular intervals (ideally once a year) by the governments 
of all UN member countries in participatory processes which involve civil 
society and the private sector, assign tasks to all relevant actors, and criti-
cally review the engagement shown thus far by these actors. 
In the national context the MDG country reports are well suited to 
– creating awareness for the MDGs; 
– establishing consensus on (i) appropriate indicators to measure pro-
gress in implementing the MDGs and (ii) action-guiding principles 
for aligning national policies and projects to the MDG agenda; 
– securing for the MDGs an ownership that is sustained by national 
governments, but also civil society and the private sector; 
– mobilizing, at home and abroad, additional resources; 
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– creating crosslinks to other conceptual strategy papers like e.g. 
PRSPs or national development plans; and 
– providing support for the monitoring of the Millennium process 
(Vandemoortele 2004b). 
2.5 Implications for German development cooperation 
In its Programme of Action 2015, a national strategy paper prepared in 
2001, Germany reaffirmed, as one of the first donor countries, the com-
mitments it had made nine months earlier at the Millennium Summit 
(BMZ 2001a). The program was adopted not only by the BMZ but by the 
German government as a whole, and it is therefore binding for all of Ger-
many’s ministries and external policies (Bundesregierung 2004, 1). 
The greatest challenge for the immediate future will be to anchor the spirit 
of the Millennium Declaration and the Programme of Action 2015 at all 
levels of German policy and to provide for more coherence between de-
velopment policy and other external policies, including security policy, 
trade policy, environmental policy, and agricultural policy. These policy 
fields are also expected to contribute to reducing global poverty and im-
plementing the MDGs (Ashoff 2002; Gsänger 2002; BMZ 2004i; BMZ 
2005a; Bundesregierung 2004). 
Above and beyond this, the MDG agenda has three central implications: 
Poverty focus of DC: The priorities, approaches, and instruments of Ger-
man DC must be reviewed with a view to their relevance for the MDGs. 
There is no need for the donor countries to align all of their DC to the 
MDGs. Nor are they expected to provide a contribution to each and every 
MDG. But they should be able to demonstrate that they are, in one way or 
another, supporting the Millennium process in each of their partner coun-
tries, and thereby contributing to the ultimate goal of overall poverty 
eradication. 
Effectiveness of DC: The MDGs are forcing donors to pay more heed to 
the effectiveness of their DC. First, even in the planning phase the donors 
are, in this sense, forced to optimize the inputs they provide. Second, they 
will have to develop evaluation systems to keep track of the impacts of 
their DC. Third, they have to optimize their contributions to MDG8, for 
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which they bear the main responsibility – by, inter alia, increasing their 
ODA and by taking action on trade liberalization and debt relief. 
Alignment and donor coordination in DC: Finally, the need for a more ef-
ficient use of resources also implies that donors must more closely align 
their activities to both partner priorities and their own comparative 
strengths. Their planning should be based on the development priorities of 
partner countries, which means in effect that they should support develop-
ing countries in fields which the latter themselves regard as priorities, even 
though they may be unable to make headway in them without outside sup-
port (principle of subsidiarity). Furthermore, the donors must step up their 
efforts to improve the harmonization of their own DC measures and to co-
ordinate them in such a way as to ensure that every donor takes on tasks in 
which it has comparative strengths (Ashoff 2004; BMZ 2004i; BMZ 
2005a; Bundesregierung 2004; Fues 2005; Gsänger 2002; Radke 2002; 
Wolff 2004). 
3 State of the Millennium process in the countries of 
the Middle East and North Africa 
Compared with other world regions, the MENA countries have, on aver-
age, made sufficient progress only on a limited number of MDGs – at least 
if it is taken into consideration that most of them are middle-income coun-
tries, while South and Southeast Asia as well as sub-Saharan Africa is 
dominated by low-income countries. 
The MENA countries are faced with particular problems in implementing 
MDG1 and MDG7. In this respect the region does not differ substantially 
from other parts of the world. Excepting East Asia and the Pacific region 
(and possibly South Asia), these two goals may not be reached in any de-
veloping region (see Overview 3). 
In addition to this, however, the MENA countries have also made insuffi-
cient progress on MDG2 and on some of the targets of MDG8 (especially 
on good governance, the reduction of youth unemployment and the popu-
lation’s access to information and communications technologies). Other 
world regions have made much more progress on these goals.  
Since 1990, only a few countries in the MENA region have succeeded in 
appreciably reducing the proportion of their populations affected by in-
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come poverty and hunger. In some countries, poverty has even further 
spread. Nor has there been sufficient progress on efforts to increase 
school-enrolment and literacy rates. Many countries of the region still lack 
modern technologies, and all MENA countries are far from reaching the 
goal of environmental sustainability (MDG7) as well as from achieving 
the goal of good economic and political governance (MDG8). 
At the same time, however, the countries of the region have made good 
progress in implementing MDG3. As in other regions – excepting sub-
Saharan Africa – nearly all MENA countries have succeeded in raising 
school enrolment ratios for girls, in this way reducing the gap between the 
educational chances of girls and boys – although this development has not 
yet found expression in improved vocational, political, and legal equality 
for women in the region. 
The MENA countries have also made some progress in the field of public 
health. Many of them have succeeded in appreciably reducing infant, 
child, and maternal mortality rates, which means that they are likely to 
reach MDG4 and MDG5. Only for the three low-come countries in the re-
gion, Mauritania, Sudan, and Yemen, are there reasons to fear that these 
two goals may not be reached by 2015. 
At present not much can be said about MDG6, since there are no reliable 
data available on the number of persons who have been infected or have 
come down with HIV/Aids. One reason for this is that a taboo continues to 
hang over this immune-deficiency disease. All in all, the prevalence of 
HIV/Aids is likely to be lower than in other parts of the world, but the 
number of new infections has risen considerably during the last few years. 
One country in the region has proved particularly successful with regard to 
the MDGs: Tunisia is more than likely to reach at least six of the eight 
goals. It has encountered some difficulties in implementing MDG5 and 
MDG7 – although its main problem is meeting the good-governance target 
in MDG8. As far as human rights, freedom of the press, and the participa-
tion of the population in political decision-making are concerned, the 
situation in Tunisia has even deteriorated since 1990.  
 
 
 
  
Overview 3: State of MDG implementation in the Middle East and North Africa compared with other world regions 
MDG1 MDG2 MDG3 MDG4 MDG7 MDG8 World 
region Income  
poverty  
Hunger School  
enrolment  
Gender  
equality 
in education 
Gender  
equality  
on the  
labor market 
Child  
mortality 
Access to 
safe  
drinking  
water 
Access to  
sanitation  
Good 
governance 
MENA – – – + – + 0 + – 
EAP + + 0 + + + 0 0 + 
EECS – n.a. + + 0 – + n.a. + 
LAC – 0 + + + + 0 0 + 
SA + – – 0 – 0 + 0 0 
SSA – – – n.a. 0 – – – + 
Notes: 
The data available for MDG5, MDG6, MDG7 /Target 9 and most of the targets for MDG8 are not adequate. 
MENA Middle East and North Africa  
EAP:  East and Southeast Asia and the Pacific  
EECA:  Eastern Europe and Central Asia  
LAC:  Latin America and the Caribbean  
SA:  South Asia 
SSA:  Sub-Saharan Africa 
+ Region will reach MDG if the trends from 1990-2001 continue. For MDG8: Average Freedom House Index ranking has improved 
for the countries of the region. 
0 Region can reach MDG if it intensifies its efforts. For MDG8: Average Freedom House Index ranking is stagnant. 
– Region unlikely to reach MDG, since it will prove very difficult to improve appreciably on the 1990-2001 trend. For MDG8: Aver-
age Freedom House Index rating has deteriorated. 
Source: For MDG1–7: BMZ (2004m); ESCWA (2005); UNDP (2003a); World Bank (2004e).   
For MDG8: see Figure 21 
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The situation is similar for Egypt, Libya, Qatar, and Kuwait, each of which 
is very likely to reach four, possibly seven, of the eight MDGs. All four 
countries have their main deficits in good governance (MDG8). 
Major problems in implementing the MDGs have been noted for Algeria, 
Jordan, and Morocco (MDG8, but also MDG1), Bahrain (especially with 
respect to MDG2, and MDG8), and the Palestinian Territories (MDG1, 
MDG7, and MDG8).  
Iran, Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Oman 
are faced with even greater difficulties in reaching most of the MDGs by 
2015 (see Table A1, Annex). 
The prospects of the region’s three low-income countries, Yemen, Sudan, 
and Mauritania, are particularly poor. The way it looks at the moment, Iraq 
and Yemen are likely to miss all eight goals, and Mauritania and Sudan are 
not expected to reach more than one or two of the eight MDGs (Maurita-
nia probably MDG3 and conceivably MDG8, Sudan possibly MDG1 and 
MDG3). 
These findings will be discussed in more detail in the following sections, 
which address all eight MDGs in turn. The statistical data cited stem 
nearly exclusively from international organizations such as UNDP, the 
World Bank, the WHO, and UNESCO. Only in a very limited number of 
cases use has also been made of the data given by the national MDG re-
ports. In very many cases, these data diverge sharply from the figures cited 
by the international organizations. The data presented by the World Bank, 
UNDP, and UNESCO are by no means always in agreement, which goes 
above all for the indicators used for MDG2, MDG5, and MDG7, but the 
international organizations are at least at pains to cite only data that are 
based on similar standards (definitions, classification criteria, and survey 
methods). In other words, these data on different countries are more useful 
for purposes of comparison. Another striking fact here is that the data pre-
sented in national MDG reports show, almost invariably, positive devia-
tions from the statistics published by the international organizations. This 
would seem to indicate that many governments in the Middle East and 
North Africa have succumbed to the temptation to use their MDG reports 
to brighten up the situations in their countries. 
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3.1 Eradicating extreme poverty and hunger (MDG1) 
Most of the countries of the Middle East and North Africa will not reach 
MDG1 if they do not undertake substantial additional efforts in the coming 
years. While it is true that the percentage of the population that is affected 
by hunger or lives on less than 1 US$ per day is lower here than in other 
regions of the world, since 1990 the relevant average regional figures have 
not declined, indeed they have risen. 
Income poverty 
In 1990 only 2.1 % of all people in the MENA region had incomes lower 
than 1 US$ per day in purchasing power parities (PPP). This percentage 
was lower than in all other parts of the developing world, which led UNDP 
to conclude, in its 2003 HDR, that the MENA region had already reached 
Target 1 (to halve income poverty) of the MDGs (UNDP 2003a, 33). 
But implementation of the MDGs also depends on trends, and the trend for 
the percentage share of income poverty among the population of the Mid-
dle East and North Africa has not declined. Instead, between 1990 and 
2001 the figure even rose slightly to 2.2 %. The respective share of in-
come-poor people in 2001 was 3 % in Egypt, 7 % in Lebanon, 2 % in Mo-
rocco, 46 % in Mauritania, and 4 % in Jordan. There are no recent data 
available for the other countries of the region (see Table A2, Annex). 
Furthermore, the one-dollar indicator is appropriate only in a limited sense 
for the MENA region (ESCWA 2005). First, most countries in the region 
are middle-and low-income countries whose wage and price levels are so 
high that people there cannot, even over the short term, live from 1 US$ 
per day (Martens 2005). The practice of converting sums of money into 
PPPs does not do full justice to this state of affairs. Conversion is based on 
a market basket reflecting the composition of a country’s gross national 
product. A market basket of this kind may reflect the consumption patterns 
of the average citizen, but the corresponding basket of poorer households 
is made up quite differently. Poor households mainly consume staple foods 
and other essential goods (Bhalla 2004; Pogge / Reddy 2003a; Pogge / 
Reddy 2003b; Satterthwaite 2003; Zapado 2003). Second, several MENA 
countries have oil resources and are thus able to sell gasoline, heating oil, 
and other oil derivatives at low prices. These play a substantial role in cal-
culating PPPs; and when 1 US$ is converted into a national currency, this 
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in turn results in very low figures indicating that only a very low percent-
age of the population is living in absolute poverty. The problem here is 
that very poor households neither need gasoline (because they are without 
cars) nor purchase heating oil or gas (because they cannot afford to heat 
with gas or oil). 
In a certain sense, every poverty line is arbitrary. This is illustrated by the 
fact that the incomes of many people in the MENA region are only slightly 
below or slightly above the one-dollar-per-day-line, and many are slightly 
above the line in one year and below it in the next. Replacing the one-
dollar-line with a two-dollar-line would therefore make one little sense. It 
would appear more reasonable to use national poverty lines for identifying 
poverty trends. These national lines are as a rule based on empirical stud-
ies that indicate what income a national in fact needs to secure his or her 
survival over the short or long term (Fair 2003; OECD/DAC 1998). 
The drawback of national poverty lines is that it is not possible to calculate 
average regional data based on them. Furthermore, while there are data 
available for far more countries of the region indicating figures for income 
poverty based on national criteria rather than on the one-dollar criterion, 
this is, unfortunately, not the case for all countries of the region.  
Still, based on the data available, we can state that the problem of income 
poverty has shown an upward trend in the region. This is especially true 
for Yemen, where national criteria indicate that in 1990 roughly 30 % of 
the population were living in absolute income-poverty, and 42 % in 2000. 
But the figures for other countries are also noteworthy: In Algeria the 
share of income-poor by national criteria has risen from 12 % (1987) to 
15 % (2000), in Iraq from 30 % (1987) to 45 % (2000), in Morocco from 
17 % (1990) to 19 % (2000), and in the Palestinian Territories from 19 % 
(1995) to 46 % (2000). The only countries in which, according to the fig-
ures available, the share has declined are Egypt (1990: 25 %, 2000: 20 %), 
Iran (1990: 26 %, 2000: 21 %), Mauritania (1995: 50 %, 2000: 46 %), and 
Tunisia (1990: 7 %, 2000: 4 %). The data available for the other countries 
in the region are either inadequate or unreliable (see Table A2, Annex). 
Figure 1 shows that of all the countries, for which we have reliable data, 
only Tunisia is making headway towards reaching Target 1 of MDG1. Be-
tween 1990 and 2000, it was able to cut nearly by half the percentage of its 
income-poor. Egypt and Jordan might also reach Target 1. 
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Figure 1:  Trends in the implementation of MDG1 / Target 1  
 (Halve the proportion of people with less than 1 US$ a day) 3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Designed by the author on the basis of data in Table A2, Annex 
Note:  Countries for which the available data are either markedly contra-
dictory or unreliable are omitted. 
Most of the MENA countries, however, will not reach this target if they do 
not succeed in reversing present trends (ESCWA 2005). This goes in par-
ticular for Algeria, Yemen, Iraq, Oman, and Mauritania, which have been 
classified by UNDP as ‘high-priority countries’ with regard to MDG1 – 
Algeria, Yemen, Iraq, and Oman because they have as yet made no pro-
gress at all in reducing income poverty, and Mauritania because income 
poverty is so widespread in the country that it will be as good as impossi-
ble to further step up efforts to reduce it (UNDP 2003a, 43 and 53). 
 
                                                          
3  This and the following figures show – for reasons of clarity – only relative changes: The 
initial level has been normalized to 0. This is problematic in the way that the diagrams 
do not show what absolute changes have occurred and how large the differences are be-
tween the absolute base values for the individual countries. Still, this form of presenta-
tion is justified in that the MDGs themselves refer to relative changes. 
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Figure 2:  Trends in the implementation of MDG1 / Target 2  
 (Halve the proportion of people who suffer from hunger)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Designed by the author on the basis of data in Table A3, Annex 
Note:  Countries for which the available data are either markedly contra-
dictory or unreliable are omitted. 
But the situation is also critical in the Palestinian Territories, where the 
percentage of the population affected by income poverty has more than 
doubled since 1995 – largely because of Israel’s policy of occupation and 
border closures. It would be possible to reverse this trend, but only if Israel 
withdraws from the Palestinian Territories, opens their external borders for 
the movement of goods and capital, and issues Israeli work permits for as 
many Palestinians as possible – at least during a transitional period. 
Hunger 
As to Target 2 of MDG1, the situation in the MENA countries is even 
worse: On average, the percentage of people that suffer from quantitative 
malnutrition has risen from 6.8 to 8.5 % (see Figure 2). One exception is 
Tunisia, which has already succeeded in halving the proportion of its un-
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dernourished population. Egypt and Syria could also succeed in reaching 
this target until 2015 (see Table A1, Annex). In Egypt, for example, the 
proportion of people suffering from hunger has declined from 5 to 4 % be-
tween 1990 and 2001. 
At the same time, however, at least seven countries in the region are 
unlikely to achieve Target 2 of MDG1. Two of them – Yemen and Iraq – 
have even been categorized by UNDP as “top-priority countries” because 
they have made hardly any progress since 1990 in eradicating hunger 
(UNDP 2003a, 43). Indeed, the proportion of undernourished families in 
Yemen has declined only slightly from 36 % in 1990 to 33 % in 2001, 
while it has risen sharply in Iraq from 7 % (1990) to 27 % (2001). Like-
wise, the indicator has deteriorated in Jordan (from 4 to 6 %), Iran (from 
4 to 5 %), Algeria (from 5 to 6 %), Lebanon (from 2.5 to 3.0 %), and Mo-
rocco (from 6.5 to 7.0 %), while it has slightly improved in Mauritania 
(from 14 to 12 %) and in Sudan (from 31 to 21 %).  
Nor has the region fared much better on the other official indicator for 
Target 2, the prevalence of underweight among children under five years 
of age (see Table A3, Annex). Between 1990 and 2001, this figure has de-
clined in Egypt (from 10 to 4 %), in Tunisia (from 10 to 4 %, as well), and 
in Algeria (from 10 to 6 %), but also in Mauritania (from 48 to 32 % and 
in Sudan (from 34 to 11 %). In some countries, however, it has risen very 
sharply – e.g. in Iraq from 12 to 16 % and in Yemen from 30 to 46 % – 
which means that it is likely that the average figure for the whole region 
has risen as well (UNDP 2003b). 
3.2 Achieving universal primary education (MDG2) 
Since 1990, the MENA region as a whole has not made enough progress 
with respect to educational levels. Many children have never attended a 
primary school, so that, assuming that present trends continue, the region 
as a whole will fail to reach MDG2. In addition, the education provided by 
schools in the region is of poor quality and therefore of only limited use 
for their graduates. Since 1990, only South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa 
have made less progress on MDG2 than the MENA countries. 
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Figure 3:  Trends in the implementation of MDG2 
 (Universal primary education) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Designed by the author, based on data in Table A4, Annex 
 
School enrolment and literacy 
Six countries in the MENA region have good chances of reaching MDG2 
by 2015. Their school enrolment rates rose substantially between 1990 and 
2001 and have now reached levels of over 90 %: the Palestinian Territories 
(88 %), Tunisia (98 %) Algeria (97 %), Qatar (95 %), Jordan (94 %), and 
Egypt (92 %). Syria does also have a net primary-school enrolment rate of 
96 %, but the country has made no progress on this indicator since 1990 
(see Figure 3). 
Morocco, Kuwait and Yemen have also achieved considerable progress 
with respect to MDG 2: The primary-school enrolment rate has risen from 
58 to 75 % in Morocco, from 45 to 66 % in Kuwait, and from 53 to 67 % 
in Yemen. In view of the persistently low rates in these countries, how-
ever, there is reason to fear that they will not be able to maintain their pre-
sent pace until 2015. 
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Generally, it should be borne in mind here that political interventions may 
not be able to do much to improve school enrolment rates. Comparative 
time-series analyses conducted by Clemens, Kenny, and Moss (2004, 15f.) 
indicate that, starting from a given point of time, school enrolment rates 
throughout the world move within a relatively narrow, seemingly naturally 
given corridor (see Figure 4). Regardless of the year in which this devel-
opment commences, school enrolment rates start rising very slowly, when 
the first public schools are opened, in order then to accelerate over the 
course of time. The development slows down again after a period of 100 to 
150 years, when more than 50 % of the children attend school regularly, 
and it entirely looses steam when the goal of 100 % school enrolment has 
almost been achieved. The last 5 to 10 % of children not yet enrolled in 
school are the most difficult to integrate into a school system. In other 
words, it may take years or even decades to close the gap between the day 
on which the enrolment rate has reached a threshold of 90 or 95 % and the 
day on which MDG2 has been fully attained. Many countries can thus be 
seen as having made excellent progress if at least 95 % of all primary-
school-age children are regularly attending school in 2015. 
A total of seven MENA countries will in all likelihood fail to reach 
MDG2. This goes in particular for Iran and the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), where primary-school enrolment rates declined between 1990 and 
2001 from 97 to 75 % and from 94 to 78 % respectively, but also for Su-
dan, Oman, and Saudi Arabia, where, during the same period, primary-
school enrolment rates stagnated at around 45 % (Sudan), 65 % (Oman), 
and 58 % (Saudi Arabia). As reported above, Yemen and Kuwait are also 
unlikely to reach MDG2. On the other hand, Morocco, Bahrain, and Syria 
still have a chance to reach the goal, if but only if they undertake substan-
tial additional efforts (see Tables A1 and A4. Annex). 
This situation is similar for preschool and secondary-school enrolment  
rates. Only in a limited number of MENA countries are these rates rising 
at the rates that would be required to reach MDG2. This is the case above 
all for Egypt, Jordan, and the UAE. In Syria and Bahrain, on the other 
hand, secondary-school enrolment rates have declined, as have preschool 
enrolment rates in Iran, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia (see Table A4, An-
nex). For a good number of MENA countries, data are not available. 
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Figure 4:  Comparative time-series analysis of school enrolment 
rates in different countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The year in which the countries under consideration reached a school  
enrolment rate of 50 % was normalized to 0. 
Source: Clemens / Kenny / Moss (2004, 16), Figure 1 
One indicator for the efficiency of a school system is the primary-school 
completion rate. It covers the proportion of students who start grade one 
and finish school after about six years with a formal certificate. This pro-
portion is relatively high in Egypt, Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, Oman, Tuni-
sia, and the UAE – an indication that these countries’ primary schools are 
in a position to teach their students the required curricula. The primary-
school completion rates of Morocco and Yemen are distinctly lower, al-
though these countries have succeeded since 1990 in increasing their re-
spective rates appreciably – Morocco from 75 to 84 % and Yemen from 
65 to 86 %. If this trend continues, both countries will reach figures of 
over 95 % in 2015 for both targets. The picture is different in Syria, Mau-
ritania, and Sudan, where primary-school completion rates declined, in 
some cases appreciably, between 1990 and 2001 (in Syria from 94 to 
92 %, but in Mauritania from 75 to 61 %; see Table A4, Annex). 
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Illiteracy rates have declined in all MENA countries. At present, the figure 
for Jordan is below 10 %, and the corresponding figures for Bahrain, Iran, 
Qatar, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the UAE are be-
low 25 %. On the other hand, over half the population of Iraq, Yemen, and 
Mauritania can still neither read nor write (see Table A4, Annex), and the 
illiteracy rate for the MENA region as a whole is distinctly higher than the 
average for all developing countries (UNDP / AFESD 2002, 52). 
It is, however, more informative to look at the development of the illiter-
acy rate for youths and young adults, who were at primary-school age only 
a number of years ago. If the present trends continue, nearly all 15- to 
20 year-olds (i.e. at least 95 %) in at least 14 countries of the region will 
be completely literate by the target date. While this is also possible for 
Egypt, it is unlikely for Iraq, Morocco, Yemen, Mauritania, and Sudan 
(see Table A4, Annex). 
Quality of schooling 
It must be noted here that the qualitative shortcomings of formal education 
in the Middle East and North Africa are even more serious than the defi-
cits found for the purely quantitative education indicators discussed to this 
point. These shortcomings are of course far more difficult to identify. Still, 
there is sufficient evidence that the education provided in the region’s pub-
lic schools is not of especially high quality, even by comparison with other 
developing countries. This has been pointed out by the three Arab Human 
Development Reports that have appeared to date (UNDP / AFESD 2002; 
UNDP /AFESD 2003; UNDP /AFESD 2004). The MENA countries have 
given clear-cut priority to expanding their educational systems instead of 
improving their quality / UNDP /AFESD 2003 (Lloyd et al. 2003; Weiss 
2004b, 6). 
In 1995 Kuwait was the only Arab country to participate in the Third In-
ternational Mathematics and Science Study (TRIMSS): The study tested 
the mathematics and science skills of students at the end of their primary 
education (grade eight). Even though Kuwait’s educational system is rela-
tively good by regional comparison, it came in on place 39 only within a 
field of 42 participants. Out of 1000 possible points, the average Kuwaiti 
student received just 292 in mathematics and 430 in science. The interna-
tional average was 513 points in mathematics and 516 points in science. 
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Students in Singapore (which ranked place one) earned 643 points for 
mathematics and 607 points for science (UNDP / AFESD 2003, 55). 
Three other Arab countries – Jordan, Tunisia, and Morocco – participated 
in the TRIMSS follow-up study, which was conducted in 1996. In mathe-
matics they ranked as follows: Tunisia 29th (448 points), Jordan 32nd (428 
points), and Morocco 37th (337 points). Singapore came in first once more 
with 604 points, and South Africa last with 275 points. The ranking was 
similar for sciences, except that in this case Taiwan placed first (ibid.). 
Nor would Arab secondary-school and university students be likely to fare 
better on comparable studies. This may be inferred from a study of some 
2000 masters theses submitted at different Lebanese universities. By re-
gional comparison, Lebanese universities are regarded as relatively good. 
Still, only 16 % of these theses were in line with international standards. 
Most of them were not independent research, and instead of coming up 
with new findings, they tended more to reiterate established doctrines 
(Gardiner 2002; Weiss 2004a, 87). 
Another indicator for the quality of education is the student-teacher ratio. 
In eight MENA countries (Algeria, Iraq, Yemen, Morocco, Mauritania, 
Oman, the Palestinian Territories, and Sudan) the ratio is over 25 primary-
school students per teacher; in Mauritania the figure is as high as 45. Only 
the Gulf states and Libya do well in this regard. In Libya, for instance, a 
primary-school teacher is responsible for only eight students. The corre-
sponding figure for the OECD countries ranges between 10 and 15. We 
find a similar picture for other school levels as well (see Table A4, An-
nex). 
One important reflection of the inadequate quality of education in the 
Middle East and North Africa is the fact that students cannot do much with 
what they have learned (Gardener 2003). Education does little to improve 
the employment chances of workforce entrants, and this, in the end, trans-
lates out into large numbers of unemployed graduates (the issue will be 
discussed in more detail below, under MDG8). The region suffers from a 
serious lack of engineers and scientists and a plethora of graduates in the 
humanities and cultural sciences. In addition, they lack skilled workers 
with practice-oriented training (UNDP / AFESD 2002, 54). Unlike the pic-
ture in other parts of the world, education in the MENA region contributes 
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very little to improving the socioeconomic situation of disadvantaged 
population groups (i.e. to improving their social mobility):  
“Problems of quality and relevance have led to a significant mismatch 
between the labour market and development needs on the one hand and 
the output of education systems on the other. This situation leads to 
poor productivity, a distorted wage structure and a meagre economic 
and social return on education. The prevalence of unemployment a-
mong the educated and the deterioration in real wages for the majority 
of them exemplify this problem. Poor quality has become the Achilles 
heel of education in the Arab world, a flaw that undermines its quanti-
tative achievements.“  (UNDP / AFESD 2002, 54). 
In addition, the knowledge imparted by education and the methods used to 
teach it are not suited to encouraging students to become independent and 
creative. School curricula are taught with frontal methods, and students are 
expected to learn by heart. Critical thinking and the ability to engage in 
discussions are not an aim. Instruction is typically marked by authoritarian 
and patriarchal behavior patterns which leave no room for questions, or 
indeed contradictions, raised by curious students. Students are not taught, 
or even motivated, to focus on what really counts – learning to learn, inde-
pendent acquisition of knowledge, development of creative, problem-
oriented thinking (Gardener 2003; Salehi-Isfahani 2004; Weiss 2004b). 
According to the 2003 Arab Human Development Report, the problems 
start in the phase of informal, preschool child-rearing in the family: 
“The most widespread style of child rearing in Arab families is the au-
thoritarian mode accompanied by the over-protective. This reduces 
children’s independence, self-confidence and social efficiency, and fos-
ters passive attitudes and hesitant decision-making skills. Most of all, it 
affects how the child thinks by suppressing questioning, exploration and 
initiative.” (UNDP / AFESD 2003, 3). 
According to the Arab Human Development Reports, lack of culture of 
lifelong learning keyed to intellectual curiosity, innovative thinking, and 
critical, problem-oriented thinking, and not simply memorizing traditional 
doctrines. What is needed is an ‘enlightened model of knowledge’ that 
rests on independent thought, creativity, and the capacity to interpret and 
judge – and not least on a diversity of methods and opinions (Salehi-
Isfahani 2004; Weiss 2004a, 80 f.). 
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However, a model of this kind would run counter both to the traditional 
patriarchal social structures in the MENA countries and the interests of the 
dominant elites. According to the 2003 Arab Development Report, the 
main reason for the present state of affairs is an implicit alliance between 
the authoritarian regimes and conservative Islamists who have no interest 
whatever in seeing the emergence of the critically thinking citizen: 
“An alliance between some oppressive regimes and certain types of 
conservative religious scholars led to interpretations of Islam, which 
serve the governments, but are inimical to human development, particu-
larly with respect to freedom of thought, the interpretation of judge-
ments, the accountability of regimes to the people and women’s partici-
pation in public life.“ (UNDP / AFESD 2003, 6). 
One consequence is that research and development appear not to be highly 
valued in the MENA countries. Averaged across the region, the MENA 
governments spend not more than 0.2 % of GDP for research and devel-
opment activities (UNDP / AFESD 2003, 6). The equivalent for the coun-
tries of East Asia and the Pacific is 1.5 % (UNDP 2003). Per one million 
residents there are only 317 scientists and engineers in the Middle East and 
North Africa (UNDP / AFESD 2003, 6), while there are 619 and 2554, re-
spectively, in the East Asia and Pacific region and in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia (Word Bank 2004e). Only 0.8 % of all books published 
worldwide appear in one of the Arab countries, which account for 5 % of 
the world population. Turkey alone publishes more books, even though the 
country has only one quarter of the population of the Arab countries. And 
in the Arab countries less than one translation of foreign-language books is 
published per million population and year – the figures for Hungary and 
Spain are 519 and 920, respectively. Moreover, 17 % of all books pub-
lished in the Arab world are religious in content – a far higher percentage 
than anywhere else in the world (UNDP / AFESD 2003, 6). 
3.3 Promoting gender equality and empowering women 
(MDG3) 
The MENA countries have made good progress in improving the educa-
tional chances of girls. Since 1990 nearly all of them have substantially in-
creased the enrolment rates of girls at all stages of their school systems. 
The region as a whole is therefore likely to reach MDG3 (World Bank 
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2004 f.). All the same, the region is still far from any real gender equality 
if the countries that make it up do not undertake substantial efforts to im-
prove the economic, political, and legal situation of women. 
Education 
A good number of MENA countries have already largely reached MDG3. 
In some of them (Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, the 
Palestinian Territories, Tunisia, and the UAE) girls are even in the major-
ity in primary and secondary schools. Algeria and Oman (possibly also 
Iran, Morocco, and Mauritania) will follow suit by the next years. The 
only countries in the region that are unlikely to have reached MDG3 until 
2015 are Yemen, Iraq, and Sudan (see Figure 5 and Table A1, Annex). 
The progress made by Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Mauritania 
between 1990 and 2001 was particularly impressive. This is measured as 
the ratio between school enrolment rates for girls and boys. 100 % means 
that equally large percentages of girls and boys are enrolled in school – but 
without taking into consideration how high these percentages in fact are. 
In Egypt the ratio of the combined enrolment rates for girls and boys in 
primary and secondary schools rose, between 1990 and 2001, from 78 to 
94 %; the corresponding rises for other countries were: Algeria from 80 to 
99 %; Morocco and Mauritania from 82 to 92 and 93 %, respectively; Tu-
nisia from 82 to 100 % (see Table A5, Annex). 
At the same time Jordan, Syria, and the UAE have hardly made any pro-
gress. According to UNDP (2003a), the primary enrolment percentages for 
girls and boys have remained nearly unchanged at levels of roughly 95 % 
(Jordan and Bahrain), 92 % (UAE), 88 % (Syria), and 80 % (Iraq). 
UNESCO has found similar figures for secondary education in Iran. 
The progress made in increasing school enrolment rates for girls has also 
been reflected in declining illiteracy rates for women. If in 1990 the aver-
age literacy rate for young women aged 15 to 25 was 75 % in the MENA 
region as a whole, by 2002 the percentage had risen to 87 %. In Bahrain, 
Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE the figure has now reached levels of 
over 100 %; i.e. the proportion of illiterate women between the ages of 
15 and 25 is lower than for men of the same age cohorts. In Qatar and the 
UAE this even holds for the overall population (see Table A5, Annex). 
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Figure 5:  Trends in the implementation of MDG3 
 (Gender equality in education) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Designed by the author on the basis of data in Table A5, Annex 
 
Yemen (from 34 to 60 %), Oman (from 79 to 98 %), and Sudan (from 
72 to 89 %) have made striking progress in improving the relation between 
the literacy rates for young women and young men between the ages of 15 
and 25. On the other hand, the progress made thus far by Iraq (from 44 to 
50 %) and Mauritania (from 65 to 73 %) must be seen as inadequate. 
Health and life expectancy 
The MENA countries have also made major progress in improving the 
health of women and girls. Between 1980 and 1990, the life expectancy of 
women rose by five years, and between 1990 and 2001 the figure rose by 
another five years (see Table A7, Annex). Maternal mortality rates have 
declined appreciably (see below), and, on average, fertility rates have also 
declined from 6.2 to 3.3 children per woman (World Bank 2004 f.).  
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Labor-force participation and income 
The main problem facing the region is that the improvements that have 
been reached on women’s education and health have not yet found expres-
sion in improved opportunities for employment, income, and labour-force 
participation of women (UNDP / AFESD 2002, 28); Weiss 2004b, 8 f.; 
World Bank 2004 f.). 
The average labor-force participation rate of women in the MENA coun-
tries is lower than the respective rate of all other world regions, and it is 
also far below the level that would be expected in view of the literacy 
rates, life expectancy, and fertility rates of women in the region. Figure 6 
clearly illustrates this. According to these data, the labor-force participa-
tion rate of women in sub-Saharan Africa is roughly as low as in the 
MENA region. However, the diagram shows only the proportion of 
women working outside agriculture. In sub-Saharan Africa, a larger per-
centage of women (and men) are employed in the agricultural sector. As a 
consequence, on the whole, the labor-force participation of women in the 
MENA region is roughly 30 %, while the corresponding figures for Latin 
America (45 %), sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
(60 %), and the Pacific region (75 %) are far higher (ESCWA 2005; World 
Bank 2004 f.). 
Figure 6 furthermore shows that the employment chances of women in the 
MENA region have even deteriorated since 1990. Only in Algeria, Oman, 
and Bahrain has the percentage of women among all nonagricultural 
workers risen, while it has declined in Yemen (from 9 to 7 %), Jordan 
(from 23 to 21 %), Saudi Arabia (from 19 to 14 %), and Morocco (from 
37 to 27 %). The same is probably true for Kuwait and Mauritania, where 
the labor-force participation rate of women has declined markedly since 
1990 (see Table A5, Annex). 
Moreover, on average women engaged in gainful employment in the 
MENA region earn lower incomes than men (Salehi-Isfahani 2000; World 
Bank 2004 f.). Palestinian women are in a relatively good position in this 
regard; on average they earn 73 % of their male colleagues. At the same 
time, the situation in Saudi Arabia and Oman is especially bad, with 
women earning wages and salaries that amount not even to one quarter of 
the average earnings of men (see Figure 7 and Table Table A5, Annex). 
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Figure 6:  Trends in the implementation of MDG3 
 (Gender equality on the labor market) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Designed by the author, based on data in Table A5, Annex 
Notes on the abbreviations:  
MENA  =  Middle East and North Africa 
EAP =  East Asia and Pacific 
EECA = Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean  
SA = South Asia 
SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
One reason for this among others is that an above-average number of 
working women in the MENA countries have jobs that are generally 
poorly paid and are employed in economic sectors in which jobs are being 
shed and wages are declining in relation to average incomes: Most such 
women are employed in the public sector or the manufacturing sector, 
above all in the textile industry. 
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Figure 7:  Income opportunities of women 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Designed by the author, based on data in Table A5, Annex 
Notes on the abbreviations: see under Figure 6. 
 
Political participation 
As regards opportunities for political participation as well, women con-
tinue to be disadvantaged in comparison with men – even in formal terms 
(Weiss 2004b, 8 f.). The World Economic Forum (2005) has made an at-
tempt to quantify how unequal the opportunities of men and women are in 
58 countries of the world. From the MENA region, the study covered only 
Egypt and Jordan – two countries in which the situation of women is still 
much better than in many other countries of the region. The two countries 
still landed in the last and fourth-to-last place among all the countries in-
cluded in the study. Egypt and Jordan did still relatively well on education, 
life expectancy, and general employment opportunities for women. But the 
study came up with an extremely poor assessment of the actual labor-force 
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participation and rights of political participation of women in these two 
countries. 
In most countries of the region women gained the right to vote – if at all – 
only at a very late stage. Indeed, in the Gulf states – with the exception of 
Bahrain – women even today lack the right to vote. But even in the coun-
tries in which women have had the right to vote for some time now, the 
proportion of women members of parliament has remained low. In Egypt, 
for example, women were granted suffrage and eligibility to run for politi-
cal office as early as 1956, and in 1957 the first women were elected to 
parliament. But far from rising, the percentage of women members of par-
liament has declined over the course of decades, even decreasing from 4 to 
2 % between 1990 and 2002. The picture is similar in Yemen, where the 
percentage of women members of parliament declined from 4 to 1 % be-
tween 1990 and 2002. The figures for Algeria, Iran, Lebanon, and Mauri-
tania are also below 5 %. Only in Tunisia and Jordan did the share of fe-
male members of parliament rise between 1990 and 2002 from 4 to 12 % 
and from 1 to 6 %, respectively. But this does not mean that women’s in-
terests have been pushed through by the electorate, it means in effect that a 
larger number of women have been placed on slates of candidates or 
named to contest certain election districts, i.e. that such candidates owe 
their positions to decisions from the top (see Table A5, Annex). 
Women are equally underrepresented in the executive (ESCWA 2005). In 
2000, the cabinets of Algeria, Jordan, Qatar, and Kuwait had not a single 
woman minister. Only in Libya, Mauritania, Syria, and Tunisia did the 
share of female ministers amount to over 10 % (see Table A5, Annex). 
Legal status 
Also, the legal status of women in the MENA countries is inferior to that 
of men. For one thing, in most MENA countries, women face explicit dis-
crimination in the legislation. For another, they are forced to contend with 
informal discrimination in seeking recourse to the law, since they are lim-
ited in their access to administration and the judiciary (Würth 2004, 1 f.). 
Nearly all of the constitutions in the region contain a ban on gender-based 
discrimination. At the same time, however, all of these constitutions (with 
the exception of the Lebanese document) make explicit reference to the 
shari’a as the main source of legislation. This results in constant tension 
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between legislation and interpretation of the law, because the shari’a pro-
vides for ‘equivalent’ but not ‘identical’ rights for men and women. Under 
the shari’a, women have, in practice, inferior rights, particularly as far as 
civil-status and inheritance laws are concerned. Yet, nearly all MENA 
countries have integrated these areas of Islamic law into their national 
laws, while their commercial, contract, public, and social welfare laws go 
back to European roots (Abou-Habib 2003, 67; Elsadda 2004). 
This is why women continue, in many regards, to be explicitly discrimi-
nated against by national law in the countries of the region. This goes in 
particular for women’s rights when they marry, during the course of their 
marriage, when they are divorced, in child-rearing and education, in cases 
of inheritance, in passing on their nationality to their children (see Box 1). 
This discrimination is especially pronounced in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and 
the other Gulf states, and in Iran. Tunisia and Morocco in particular, but 
also to a lesser extent Egypt and Algeria, have gone much further toward 
liberalizing their civil-status law than the other countries of the region (see 
Table A6, Annex, for a number of examples). 
But women also suffer discrimination in other spheres of law. To cite a 
few examples: For example, in some of the MENA countries, women are 
not allowed to run an enterprise or borrow funds from banks without the 
permission of their husband or father; and, in some cases, women are not 
allowed to travel without male escorts. Iranian women are even not al-
lowed to sit next to men at work or in busses (Salehi-Isfahani 2004). 
But just as serious if not more serious is the discrimination against women 
in legal practice, which may deviate substantially from statutory law. One 
reason for this is that beside national legislation and Islamic law (shari’a) 
the customary law of individual tribes or population groups continues to 
play an important role in the administration of justice. As examples here, 
Würth (2004, 11) cites the practices of female genital mutilation still 
common in some countries of the region and ‘honor killings,’ which, while 
officially outlawed and condemned by most Islamic legal scholars, still 
continue to be tolerated in many cases. 
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Box 1:  Discrimination against women in the civil-status codes of 
Arab countries  
Women’s rights when they marry  
Only the Hanafi school of Islamic law permits women to decide autonomously 
on marriage. In the MENA region, it is only Moroccan law that largely reflects 
this doctrine. In other Arab countries, women are in need of a male guardian to 
marry. As a rule, this will be the father or a brother, otherwise the closest male 
relation in patrilinear succession. Women who have been married and divorced 
are in some cases allowed to remarry without a guardian. In many countries 
consent of a male guardian has become a formality that can be bypassed by 
having a court appoint a ‘formal guardian.’ Still, it is important not to underes-
timate the consequences that this guardianship arrangement and the social con-
straints it entails may have on women’s actual freedom of choice in entering in 
marriage. Only in Yemen is marriage concluded not by a women but by a 
guardian acting in her name. 
But in some countries under-age women can be married off by their guardian 
even against their will, indeed sometimes even without their knowledge. The 
reason for this is that the age of marriageability for women is for the most part 
lower than it is for men; in Tunisia and Syria, for example, women are consid-
ered legally marriageable when they have reached the age of 17 and 16 years, 
respectively, while in both countries the age for men is 20 years. But in all such 
countries the legal age of majority and criminal responsibility is 18 years. In 
Yemen, there is no minimum age for women to marry, and only the consumma-
tion of marriage (15 years of age) is regulated by law. 
Only in Tunisia is polygamy prohibited by law, whereas in Morocco it is condi-
tioned explicitly on the approval of a judge and the consent of the first wife. In 
all Arab countries women have the right to demand a marriage contract that lays 
down in detail the marital rights and obligations of husband and wife and may 
e.g. exclude the husband’s option to marry another women. But in practice very 
few women make use of this option. Moreover, a marriage contract does not in 
effect permit a wife to prevent her husband from marrying a second wife. If the 
contract is broken by the husband, the wife is only entitled to petition a divorce 
court to have her marriage dissolved. 
Women’s marital rights 
A woman’s marital rights include an absolute right to support by her husband, 
while the husband has a right to demand obedience from his wife. In some Arab 
countries this explicitly includes a husband’s comprehensive and exclusive sex-
ual rights vis-à-vis his wife.  In Tunisia and Morocco there is no legal provision 
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Box 1 continued:  Discrimination against women in the civil-status  
 codes of Arab countries  
on a wife’s duty to obey her husband. Both men and women are entitled to sue 
to enforce their mutual claims. If a court recognizes a husband’s claim that his 
wife has been negligent in her duty to obey, the husband may refuse his finan-
cial support for her. 
However, the wife’s right to support has drawbacks for her as well, because it is 
often interpreted in the way that there is no need for women to seek gainful em-
ployment. Indeed, in some countries the fact that a wife seeks employment is 
sometimes interpreted as a disobedience toward her husband – as long as the 
husband has not given his explicit approval. This, however, is often difficult for 
husbands for social reasons – a husband’s approval of his wife’s wish to work 
may be interpreted as meaning that the husband is unable to provide adequate 
support for his wife.  
Except for employment or continuation of training, husbands are permitted to 
forbid their wives from traveling unaccompanied abroad or even within the 
country. While women can use marriage contracts to protect themselves against 
such measures, the only option they have if their husbands break the agreement 
is, again, recourse to a divorce court, which may then dissolve the marriage – 
with all the social and economic consequences that this may entail for the wife. 
Right to divorce 
A husband has the right to terminate his marriage at any time, even without the 
consent of his wife and without a need to cite his grounds. He just has to de-
clare, in the presence of his wife, that he repudiates her (ţalaq). In this case, the 
husband remains unconditionally obliged to support his former wife. 
More recent Islamic law has made it possible to apply for a no-contest divorce; 
this takes on the form of a repudiation of the wife by the husband after the wife 
has agreed to pay a certain amount of compensation to the husband (hul’). What 
this means is that the wife is required to pay the husband a certain sum, which 
should as a rule not exceed the value of the wife’s claim to support from her 
husband; in other words, in this case the wife would, in the extreme case, fully 
relinquish her claim to support. 
Without her husband’s consent, the only option a married woman has is to peti-
tion a court to terminate her marriage, i.e. she has the right to sue for divorce 
(taţlīq or tafrīq). However, a divorce court is permitted to grant a divorce peti-
tion only in certain cases, for instance if a husband (i) fails to meet his duty to 
support his wife; (ii) has deceived or willfully deserted his wife; (iii) is serving 
a prison sentence; (iv) has violated a marriage contract (assuming one has been 
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Box 1 continued:  Discrimination against women in the civil-status  
 codes of Arab countries  
concluded); or (v) is married to several wives to whom he does not provide 
equal support. Furthermore, a married woman can at any given time petition a 
court for dissolution of her marriage (fasih) if her husband does not consum-
mate the marriage (e.g. for the reason of impotence). 
However, in nearly all countries of the MENA region the burden of proof for 
both divorce and dissolution of a marriage is on the women concerned. The 
consequence is a large number of protracted and grueling divorce suits, many of 
which are, in the end, decided in favor of the husband for lack of evidence. This 
has induced some countries of the region to adopt simplified divorce proce-
dures. In Egypt e.g. a court can grant a divorce if two court-supervised attempts 
at reconciliation have failed and the wife declares her willingness to renounce 
her claims to support and to restore her dowry (mahr) to her husband. Legisla-
tive reforms in Morocco are headed in a similar direction. In Jordan a similar 
initiative was rejected by the parliament in 2003. 
Right to post-marital support  
Wives who have been repudiated by their husbands are generally entitled to 
three months of post-marital support, unless they were pregnant when they were 
repudiated, in which case they are entitled to support until the child is born. 
Furthermore, in cases of repudiation or divorce, the husband must pay support 
for children whom he has fathered and who are still living with the mother. 
Furthermore, some countries of the region have adopted legislation providing 
for post-marital support payments beyond the traditional three months – but this 
is for the most part referred to as ‘compensation for (arbitrary) repudiation,’ and 
must only be paid if the wife has been repudiated for no fault of her own. 
However, a divorced wife is entitled to retain all of the assets that she has 
brought to the marriage or received from her husband. The principle of separa-
tion of goods is firmly entrenched in Islamic law. Only Tunisian and Moroccan 
law provide for the option of joint marital property.  
Right to child custody 
In matters of child custody Islamic law distinguishes between physical care for 
a child and actual guardianship of a child. Up to a certain age, a child’s care is 
generally in the hand of its mother. This also applies in cases of divorce, as long 
as the mother does not remarry. In that case the father can petition a court to 
have custody of a child removed from the mother and transferred to a close fe-
male relation of the father (or, in a few countries, to the father himself). 
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When it comes to actual guardianship for a child, however, the matter is differ-
ent. In Egypt, for instance, married mothers are not allowed to travel abroad 
without their husband’s consent. Only the husband can apply for a passport for 
his children or register them for school. This may lead to major problems if the 
father e.g. works abroad or has ‘left’ his family. Under Algerian, Moroccan, and 
Tunisian law full child custody reverts to the mother only when the father has 
died. In Yemen, on the other hand, child custody is in this case transferred to 
the father’s closest male relation. 
Right to pass on nationality to children  
In nearly all MENA countries, a child inherits her / his father’s nationality. This 
means that women who are married to foreigners cannot pass on their national-
ity to their children, except in cases where children are born out of wedlock or 
the father is a stateless person. The only exception to this is Yemen. However, 
Jordan and Egypt are planning legislative reforms that would permit mothers to 
pass on their nationality to their children as well. 
The legal arrangements presently in place entail serious consequences for the 
children of foreign fathers. Sometimes they are refused official registration, 
classified as stateless persons, or refused cost-free admission to schools and 
universities or free access to health services or employment in the civil service. 
If such children travel abroad with their parents, they need a visa to return to 
their own country. 
Source: Abou-Habib (2003, 66 f.); Elsadda 2004; Schirrmacher (2004, 12–14); 
Würth (2004, 16–23). 
The provisions of customary law are not always and everywhere disadvan-
tageous for women. In Algeria, for instance, there are tribes whose cus-
tomary law accords to women far greater rights than they enjoy under na-
tional legislation or sharia (Würth 2004, 11). 
The problem is, instead, that women find it more difficult than men to en-
force their claims under customary law. In many countries conflict-
mediation arrangements under customary-law are recognized by the gov-
ernment and judiciary, at least if they do not fundamentally contradict the 
spirit of national law. The problem herby is that women often lack ade-
quate access to informal institutions of customary conflict mediation be-
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cause all these institutions are made up of men only (like e.g. the tribal 
councils of elders in Jordan). 
The situation is similar for national legislation and jurisdiction. In the end, 
it is national parliaments and governments that decide on how best to re-
solve the above-mentioned tensions between the constitutional principle of 
equal treatment and the inclusion in most constitutions in the region of a 
reference to šarīca. These institutions must decide whether or not a law 
discriminates against women. At the same time, though, these institutions 
are composed wholly or chiefly of men. In Yemen, for instance, in 2001 
this led to a situation in which a parliamentary committee introduced a bill 
which would have authorized the police to return back to their husbands 
wives that are living in separation. Conversely, the Jordanian parliament 
has for years now declined to stiffen penalties for the so-called honor-
killings (Würth 2004, 13). 
Many courts are also dominated by men. This goes in particular for the ci-
vil-status courts of individual religious groups. It is true that only the mi-
nority religions (Christians, Jews, Druze) have civil-status courts of their 
own, while the official authorities are responsible for Muslims. But the 
members of these courts are as a rule appointed only after consultations 
with religious legal scholars and tend therefore to be made up of men only 
(Elsadda 2004; Schirrmacher 2004, 10 ff.). 
Finally, women’s access to the judiciary is also hampered by the latter’s 
lack of transparency. Many cases have become known of corruption and 
inequitable enforcement of legal norms and court decisions in numerous 
countries of the region. In addition, women wishing to file a legal suit find 
themselves faced with substantial bureaucratic obstacles. And seldom are 
there lawyers and legal assistant available to aid illiterate persons in filling 
out required forms. All this means that recourse to the law involves nu-
merous uncertainties for anyone seeking it. However, the persons most in 
need of recourse to the law are women, since in matters of civil status men 
are, in cases of doubt, invariably in the stronger position – especially when 
it comes to questions of divorce (see Box 1).  
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3.4 Reducing child mortality (MDG4) 
Most MENA countries have succeeded in reducing infant mortality. Here 
they have made greater progress than e.g. Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia, sub-Saharan Africa or South Asia. As a whole, the region could 
therefore succeed in implementing MDG4, although there continue to be 
marked disparities between single countries. 
Four MENA countries have already reached MDG4: In Egypt child mor-
tality declined between 1990 and 2002 from 104 to 39 per thousand live 
births, while in the Palestinian Territories the corresponding figure de-
clined from 53 to 24. By 2001, Libya had reduced child mortality from 42 
to 19 per thousand, the corresponding figure for Oman being 30 to 13 (see 
Table A7, Annex). Iran, Qatar, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and 
the UAE are also likely to reach MDG4 (see Figure 8). This is also con-
ceivable for Algeria, Bahrain, and Jordan – but only under the condition 
that theses countries step up their efforts. Over the past ten years these 
countries have not made sufficient progress in implementing MDG4, but 
their child mortality rates are already relatively low by international and 
regional comparison (UNICEF 2004, 10). 
On the other hand, it is unlikely that Iraq, Mauritania, Lebanon, Sudan, 
and Yemen will reach MDG4 until 2015. In Iraq, child mortality has even 
risen since 1990 from 50 to 125 per 1000. In Mauritania and Lebanon, the 
figure has remained almost constant at 180 and 35 per 1000, respectively. 
Yemen and Sudan have succeeded in reducing their infant and child mor-
tality rates; however, looked at it realistically, the progress they have made 
does not appear sufficient to reach MDG4 by 2015, especially in view of 
the fact that their child mortality rates stand very high at 114 and 97 per 
1000 live births, respectively (see Diagrams 8 and 9).  
Moreover, there is no reason to assume that the trends of the past 15 years 
will necessarily continue unabated until 2015. Not unlike the case of ef-
forts to raise school enrolment rates, efforts to reduce infant and child 
mortality rates are restricted to a relatively narrow, predefined path. This is 
also pointed out by Clemens, Kenney, and Moss (2004, 20 ff.), who com-
pared the child mortality rates of 176 countries for the years between 1980 
and 2000. They found that this development has a relatively uniform 
course: At first, child mortality rates decline at a relatively rapid pace. 
However, the trend levels off once a threshold of roughly 30–40 per 1000  
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Figure 8:  Trends in the implementation of MDG4 
 (Reduction of child mortality rates) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Designed by the author on the basis of data in Table A7, Annex 
 
live births has been reached. From this point on, the trend line ap-
proaches,at an increasingly decelerating rate, an – apparently natural – 
lower limit value of roughly five per 1000 live births. Figure 10 is taken 
from Clemens, Kenny, and Moss (2004, Figure 5). It shows the available 
figures for 176 countries between 1980 and 2000. The year in which these 
countries reached a level of 35 per 1000 live births was normalized to 
zero. 
Most MENA countries have also made progress in raising their vaccina-
tion rates. In seven or eight of the countries of the region over 95 % of all 
one-year-olds have now been vaccinated against tuberculosis (TBC) and 
measles. Since 1990 the proportion of infants vaccinated against measles 
has risen on average in the region from 84 to 93 % (see Table A7, Annex).  
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Figure 9:  Trends in the implementation of MDG4 
 (Reduction of infant mortality rates) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Designed by the author on the basis of data in Table A7, Annex 
 
 
 
 
Vaccination rates are at present still far too low in Mauritania (where only 
58 % of the one-year-olds are vaccinated against measles and 70 % against 
TBC), in Yemen (79 % against measles and 73 % against TBC), and in 
Sudan (67 % against measles, TBC vaccination rate unknown). 
At the same time, between 1990 and 2002 life expectancy rose in the on 
average from 64 to 69 years. Egypt and Oman have achieved particularly 
impressive successes in this regard, with life expectancy rising from 63 to 
69 years in Egypt and from 69 to 74 years in Oman. Insufficient progress 
has been reported for Iraq (increase in life expectancy from 61 to 63 
years), Iran (from 65 to 69 years), and Mauritania (from 49 to 51 years). 
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Figure 10:  Comparative time-series analysis of the development  
 of the child mortality rates of 176 countries between  
 1980 and 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The year in which the countries under consideration lowered their infant 
mortality rate from 350 per 10,000 live births was normalized to 0 by the 
authors. 
Source: Clemens / Kenny / Moss (2004, 22, Figure 5). 
 
3.5 Improving maternal health (MDG5) 
Nearly all MENA countries are well on their way towards reaching MDG5 
(ESCWA 2005). According to UNSD (2004), maternal mortality rates 
have declined substantially everywhere in the region since 1990: Qatar, 
Kuwait, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia have already implemented MDG5 (see 
Figure 11). Six other countries are very likely to reach the goal during the 
coming ten years: Egypt, Oman, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and Lebanon. 
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Figure 11:  Trends in the implementation of MDG5 
 (Maternal health) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Designed by the author, based on data in Table A7, Annex 
It should, however, be noted in this connection that the data presented by 
UNSD (2004) are based at large on estimates and model calculations. 
These figures are far less viable than most other date cited in this study. 
Based on these statistics, all that can be stated with some certainty is that 
Egypt, Bahrain, the Palestinian Territories, and Morocco are very likely to 
reach MDG5. The data for 1990–2001 indicate that maternal mortality 
per100.000 births declined from 174 to 84 in Egypt and from 332 to 220 
inMorocco. It can furthermore be noted that Qatar and Kuwait have al-
ready reached MDG5. The maternal mortality rates of these two countries, 
7 and five deaths per 100.000 births respectively, are approximately as low 
as they are in industrialized Western countries (see Table A7, Annex). 
Sudan and Iraq, on the other hand, are faced with considerable problems in 
implementing MDG5. The maternal mortality rates in both countries, 590 
and 250 per 100.000 births, continue to be extremely high. This goes as 
well for Yemen, Mauritania, and Morocco, although these countries – 
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unlike Sudan and Iraq – have in recent years markedly reduced their ma-
ternal mortality rates. Tunisia and Algeria, on the other hand, have made 
insufficient progress here, and since 1990 their maternal mortality rates 
have only declined from 75 to 57 (Tunisia) and 170 to 117 (Algeria) per 
100.000 births. The case is similar for Syria, which – if we can believe the 
figures released by UNSD (2004) – has only managed to reduce its mater-
nal mortality from 180 to a figure today of 160. 
Some MENA countries have also achieved successes on the second indica-
tor for MDG5: the proportion of births attended by skilled health person-
nel. This indicator is quite evidently measures inputs, not outputs, but it is 
nevertheless very meaningful. The presence of doctors and skilled mid-
wives may play a crucial role for the course of a birth. Alongside the nutri-
tion of pregnant women, pre- and postnatal health checks, and the avail-
ability of adequate medicines, it is one of the most effective measures to 
reduce both maternal and infant mortality (OECD / DAC 1998). In Egypt 
the number of births carried out by medically trained personnel rose be-
tween 1990 and 2001 from 37 to 61 %, in Bahrain from 94 to 99 %, in 
Mauritania from 40 to 57 %, in Algeria from 77 to 91 %, in Jordan from 
87 to 99 %, and in Tunisia from 69 to 90 % (see Table A7, Annex). 
3.6 Combating HIV/Aids, malaria, and other diseases 
(MDG6) 
Not much can be said about the implementation of MDG6 in the MENA 
because only very limited data are available on the spread of HIV/Aids 
and malaria in this world region. Practically nothing is known, for exam-
ple, about the number of HIV infections in 1990, the reference year. 
HIV/Aids 
UNAIDS and WHO (2004) estimate that in 2004 some 540,000 persons 
were infected with HIV. Even if this figure appears to be high, it means an 
that the prevalence rate is not higher than 0.3 % of the adult population, a 
figure that is lower than the ones noted for all other world regions (see 
Figure 12). Among women between the ages of 15 and 24 years the figure 
was roughly 0.3 %, while the corresponding figure for men of the same 
age group was roughly 0.2 % (UNAIDS / WHO 2004, 65). 
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Figure 12:  Present state of implementation of MDG6 / Target 7 
 (Prevalence of HIV/Aids) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Designed by the author, based on data in Table A8, Annex 
Notes on the abbreviations:  
MENA  =  Middle East and North Africa 
EAP =  East Asia and Pacific 
EECA = Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean 
SA = South Asia 
SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
In addition, over 80 % of all infected persons in the region are found in 
only one country, namely in Sudan. There, at the end of 2003, some 2 % 
of all adults were infected with HIV (a total of some 400,000 persons), 
with infection figures largely concentrated in the country’s southern prov-
inces. HIV prevalence there is approximately eight times higher than it is 
in the capital Khartoum – a phenomenon relatively unusual for developing 
countries (ibid.). This may be due to differences in sexual morals, since 
Khartoum is largely Islamic while the southern provinces are mainly in-
habited by Christians and animists. 
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Compared with other world regions, the number of persons in the MENA 
region reported to have died from Aids-related causes was likewise very 
low – even though this “low” figure translates out into an estimated, ap-
palling total of 28,000 deaths (ibid.). 
One major reason for concern, though, is that some 92,000 inhabitants of 
the region were newly infected in 2004 alone. This amounts to a rise in the 
infection rate of some 15 %. Here, in turn, southern Sudan accounted for a 
substantial proportion of these cases. However, the number of new cases 
has also risen dramatically in recent years in southern Algeria (in the area 
around Tamanraset), in Mauritania, in Libya, and in the Tihama (the 
coastal region) in Yemen (Republic of Yemen 2002a; UN 2004a; UNDG 
2002). In Libya alone, 90 % of all new cases have occurred since 2000 
(UNAIDS / WHO 2004, 66). In Iran the number of new cases is rising by 
an annual rate of 15 % (UNAIDS / WHO 2004, 67), the corresponding fig-
ure for Jordan being 14 % (Jordan MOPIC / UN 2004). In 2000, 1.7 % of 
all prostitutes in Tamanraset (southern Algeria) were infected with HIV. In 
2004 the figure had already risen to over 9 % (UNAIDS / WHO 2004, 67). 
With the exception of Mauritania and Sudan, Aids is still in a very early 
phase in the MENA countries. This means that the region is still in a posi-
tion to use awareness campaigns and other means to combat its spread. 
There are, however, fears that this opportunity may be missed. Many of 
the countries in the region are paying far too little attention to statistically 
recording cases of HIV infection. This deprives them of the possibility of 
identifying the main causes of the spread of Aids, i.e. the most important 
paths of transmission, a step that would be important for selecting instru-
ments adequate to combating the immunodeficiency disease there. 
Three factors are responsible for this faulty response to the disease. First, 
the statistical and analytical capacities in the MENA countries are gener-
ally not very effective. Second, the region continues to be dominated by 
the idea that HIV/Aids cannot spread in places where no drugs are con-
sumed and where sexuality is restricted to morally unobjectionable activi-
ties. Furthermore, the illusion is widespread in the region that Islam pro-
vides protection against HIV/Aids. Third, the fact that it is widely assumed 
among the general population that HIV/Aids is linked with drug addiction, 
homosexuality, and unsteady sexual partnerships or sexual unfaithfulness 
often means that persons who suspect they might be infected with HIV 
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fear, indeed do not dare, to take an HIV/Aids test. They are reluctant to 
look up a doctor for fear that they may find themselves publicly labeled 
and marginalized. 
In fact, HIV/Aids is far more widespread than average among drug addicts 
and prostitutes – while the figures for homosexuals are only slightly above 
average. In Morocco, where only 0.2 % of all adult men and less than 
0.1 % of all women are infected, the rates for prostitutes and prison in-
mates are 2.3 % and 0.8 %, respectively. In Libya 90 % of all newly in-
fected persons are drug addicts. In Iran 4 % of all drug addicts are in-
fected. On the other hand, no more than 1 % of all homosexuals appear to 
be infected in any country of the region – with the possible exception of 
Sudan (UNAIDS / WHO 2004, 67).  
Thus far most infections have resulted from the use of contaminated sy-
ringes. The government of Iran has evidently recognized this fact and has 
authorized all of the country’s pharmacies to dispense sterile syringes and 
needles free of charge. Libya on the other hand restricted their sale in the 
late 1990s, and this has led to a sharp rise in the use of contaminated sy-
ringes. In the neighboring country of Tunisia, where every infected person, 
regardless of nationality, is eligible for free retroviral treatment, has sub-
sequently noted a rapid increase in the number of persons infected with 
HIV (ibid.). 
There is, however, reason to fear that the region will, in the coming years, 
be faced with a surge of new cases that are transmitted mainly through 
sexual contacts. A second wave of infections would mean increased risks 
chiefly for prostitutes, but also for the spouses of infected persons. In Iran 
50 % of all drug addicts are married and 30 % have occasional extramari-
tal sexual intercourse. 
Even today the number of persons infecting themselves through unpro-
tected heterosexual intercourse is on the rise. The reason for this is that the 
topic of Aids continues to be taboo in the MENA countries and for this 
reason far too few people take appropriate preventive measures. In one of 
Sudan’s southern provinces (Rumbek), where HIV/Aids is especially 
widespread, a survey found that not even 2 % of those who engage in oc-
casional sexual intercourse with different partners used a condom. Only 
20 % even knew what a condom is and what it is used for. Even in the 
Egyptian capital Cairo only one third of sexually active persons have ever 
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used a condom. And an even more serious fact is that very few prostitutes 
take adequate protective measures. A study conducted in Kermanshah 
(Iran) found that all prostitutes working there – and their customers – are 
well informed on the use of condoms, but more than half of the prostitutes 
interviewed had never used one. The main reason cited fir this was the 
high price of condoms (UNAIDS / WHO 2004, 65 ff.). 
Malaria and other diseases 
Malaria is endemic in eight countries of the MENA region: Sudan, Mauri-
tania, Yemen, Algeria, Morocco, Iraq, Iran, Iran, and Syria. In Egypt, Jor-
dan, Lebanon, and the Palestinian Territories malaria was eradicated long 
before 1990. In the Gulf states, Libya, and Tunisia the disease has never 
posed a significant threat (see Table A8, Annex). 
Malaria is particularly widespread in Sudan and Mauritania. More than 
one in ten inhabitants of these two countries contracted malaria in 2000, 
and one in every thousand dies of the disease (the figure for children being 
as high as 0.5 %). There are no signs whatever that either of these coun-
tries has made any success since 1990 in combating this disease; and in 
Mauritania at least the number of new infections is still growing (UNDG 
2002). 
However, malaria also appears to have begun to spread again in Yemen 
and Algeria. The areas affected in Yemen include above all Tihama – due 
mainly to its low elevation, its proximity to the African continent, and the 
dense shipping traffic in the area – and the region around Aden (Republic 
of Yemen 2003). In Algeria it is the southern provinces that are mainly af-
fected (UN 2004a). However the risk of dying of malaria in Yemen or Al-
geria is still far lower than it is in Sudan or Mauritania. In 2000 only 22 
people died of this disease or its effects per 100,000 inhabitants, while the 
corresponding figures for Mauritania and Sudan were 108 and 70, respec-
tively (see Table A8, Annex).  
Morocco and Syria have made progress here. In Morocco the number of 
new cases declined between 1990 and 2001 from 7 to 1 per 100,000 in-
habitants. In Syria the figure is now close to zero; in Mauritania and Su-
dan, on the other hand, the number of cases was over 10,000 in 2001; in 
Yemen the figure rose between 1990 and 2001 from 1263 to 1532; and 
even in some of the Gulf states a relatively high share of the population 
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contracted malaria in 2001: 27 per 100,000 population in Oman and 32 per 
100,000 in Saudi Arabia. The reason for this is the relatively high number 
of migrant workers in the Gulf states. These people may already have the 
disease when they arrive or they may return infected when they travel 
home on vacation leave (ESCWA 2005). 
Some countries in the region are also affected by leishmaniasis (Aleppo 
boil, kala-azar), a disease which is also transmitted by mosquitoes. These 
countries mainly include Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Iraq, and Sudan, al-
though the disease also broke out again in Syria a number of years ago, 
where attempts to get it under control have not yet proven successful. In 
2001 the number of new cases countrywide was 135 per 100,000 popula-
tion (Syrian Arab Republic 2003). 
By international comparison, tuberculosis constitutes a minor health risk in 
the MENA region. Only three countries are seriously affected by the dis-
ease: Mauritania (per year 209 new infections and 51 deaths per 100,000 
inhabitants), Sudan (142 new cases and 51 deaths per 100,000), and Iraq 
(89 new cases and 27 deaths per 100,000). No information is available on 
how the disease has developed in these three countries in recent years (see 
Table A8, Annex). 
The incidence of tuberculosis is in decline in most countries of the region. 
This can be shown clearly for Jordan, Lebanon, and Morocco, although 
there is also information available that indicates the same trend for Egypt, 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia (PARC 2002; Kingdom of Bahrain / 
UN 2002; Jordan MOPIC 2004; UN 2003a; UN 2002b; UN 2003b). 
Hepatitis B and C continue to be endemic in all countries of the region. In 
recent years Syria and Egypt appear to have been faced with particular 
problems with these diseases (Syrian Arab Republic 2003; PARC 2002). 
Finally, the Palestinian Territories experienced an epidemic of viral men-
ingitis in 1997. The infection rate was 117 per 100,000 population, a fig-
ure that was reduced to 22 per 100,000 population by 2002. However, bac-
terial meningitis continues to spread (UN 2002a). 
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3.7 Ensuring environmental sustainability (MDG7) 
MDG7 has three targets that are only very loosely interconnected and that 
may, in some areas, even result in goal conflicts. The focal point here is 
Target 9, i.e. to “integrate the principles of sustainable development into 
country policies and programs and reverse the loss of environmental re-
sources.” Target 10 sets out to “halve, by 2015, the proportion of people 
without sustainable access to safe drinking water and sanitation.” Tar-
get 11, finally, provides for efforts to achieve a significant improvement in 
the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers worldwide. 
Environmental protection 
Target 9 is one of the few points on the MDG agenda that has not been 
quantified as such. In order to be able to measure progress in the imple-
mentation of the target, six indicators were chosen which were thought to 
be able to model the broadest possible spectrum of environmental policy. 
The first indicator – proportion of land area covered by forests – is not par-
ticularly relevant for the countries of the MENA region. With the excep-
tions of Sudan, Morocco, and Lebanon, none of these countries has had 
any major forest cover since the period of classical antiquity. Nor is it 
likely that the region’s forest cover will grow appreciably in the future. 
However, one alarming fact is that, according to World Bank data (World 
Bank 2004e), Sudan’s forest cover declined from 30 % to roughly 26 % of 
the country’s overall land area between 1990 and 2001. 
On the other hand, the MDG agenda lacks an indicator designed to meas-
ure soil degradation. Soil degradation poses a major environmental threat 
precisely for the MENA countries, one that will entail serious problems for 
the region’s future social and economic development. 
However, the other five indicators included in the MDG agenda show that 
the MENA countries will have to undertake substantial efforts if they are 
to implement MDG7 by 2015 (ESCWA 2005). 
The percentage of land set aside as conservation areas in the MENA re-
gion has grown since 1990 from roughly 2 to over 10 %. The main reason 
for this, though, is that during the 1990s Saudi Arabia set aside 38 % of its 
land area as a nature reserve. Only Oman and Saudi Arabia have placed 
more than 10 % of their land area under protection (see Table A9, Annex). 
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Figure 13:  Trends in the implementation of MDG7 / Target 9  
 (Reduction of carbon dioxide emissions) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Designed by the author, based on data in Table A9, Annex 
 
But one far more important consideration here is that in the MENA coun-
tries rededication of land areas as nature reserves is often a purely legal 
act. Many conservation areas that have been created in recent years lack 
appropriate administrative and financial resources and adequate official 
commitment for the protection and maintenance of the land areas in ques-
tion. Very few people in the region, and only a minority of its politicians, 
have developed a marked awareness of the fact that biospheres constitute a 
value as such (UN 2004a; Jordan MOPIV / UN 2004; UN 2003a). 
Air and water in the MENA region are increasingly exposed to man-made 
pollutants. One symptomatic development in this regard is the dramatic 
rise in carbon dioxide emission. On average, they have increased by 50 % 
since 1990 and 2001, i.e. by 3.8 % per annum. The rate of increase has 
been especially dramatic in Egypt, Qatar, Lebanon, and Yemen. Between 
1990 and 2001 carbon dioxide emissions in Qatar rose from 28 to 92 cubic 
tons per inhabitant, a more than threefold increase. Only Mauritania, the 
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UAE, Algeria, and Libya have managed to reduce their carbon dioxide 
emissions since 1990 (see Figure 13 and Table A9, Annex).  
Even in their efforts to reduce chloro-fluoro carbon (CFC) emissions, the 
MENA region has made far less progress than other parts of the world. In 
2001 Syria, Lebanon, and – above all – Iran and Libya even emitted far 
more CFC than they did in 1990. In Libya CFC emissions rose to levels 13 
time above the level of 1990. Only Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Algeria, and Ku-
wait have managed to reduce their CFC emissions to rates comparable 
with those of the industrialized Western countries (see Figure 14). 
At the same time, most countries in the MENA region have been success-
ful in their efforts to improve energy efficiency. Electricity consumption 
has increased considerably almost everywhere in the region, with average 
2001 consumption figures reaching levels three times as high as those 
noted for 1990. Overall energy consumption, however, grew at rates below 
GDP growth, which means that today the value-added per kilogram of oil 
 
 
Figure 14:  Trends in the implementation of MDG7 / Target 9  
 (Reduction of CFC emissions) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Designed by the author, based on data in Table A9, Annex 
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equivalent consumed is higher than in 1990. With other words: for each 
unit of GDP, less energy is used (see Figure 15). 
As regards international conventions, Tunisia may be seen as a role model. 
Not only has it (like all the other MENA countries) ratified the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and the Rio Biodiversity Convention 
(1992), it has also signed and ratified the Cartagena Protocol and the Kyo-
to Protocol. Other than Tunisia, a smaller number of MENA countries 
have at least signed these two protocols (Egypt, Algeria, Iran, Yemen, and 
Libya). Iraq, the Palestinian National Authority (PA), and Sudan have not 
even signed the Framework Convention on Climate Change or the Biodi-
versity Convention (see Table A9, Annex).  
Sustainable access to safe drinking water and sanitation 
Goal conflicts may emerge between Target 9 and Target 10 of the MDG 
agenda. This scenario would e.g. be given in the following case: While a 
 
 
Figure 15:  Trends in the implementation of MDG7 / Target 9  
 (Increase in energy efficiency) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Designed by the author, based on data in Table A9, Annex 
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country is already fully utilizing its renewable water resources, nowhere 
near all of its population has access to safe drinking water – a situation 
typical of many MENA countries. The risk that this situation entails is that 
such countries may tap fossil groundwater reserves to supply their popula-
tions. The measure would certainly contribute to reaching Target 10 (ac-
cess to safe drinking water), but it would not be consistent with Target 9 
(improvement of environmental and resource protection). 
Efforts to implement Target 10 must therefore seek to ensure that the 
measures taken are in every respect sustainable. Otherwise improvements 
in access to drinking water may be of short duration (i.e. possibly until 
2015, after which date a country’s renewable water resources may be ex-
hausted). As an alternative to the use of groundwater reserves, thought 
should therefore be given to improving water management or – if need be 
– to desalinization of sea water. 
There is a considerable amount of contradictory and misleading informa-
tion available on the implementation of Target 10 in the MENA region. In 
particular, the data published by UNDP (2003a; 2003b; 2004a) and those 
from the World Bank (2004e) are in some cases marked by sharp discrep-
ancies. In addition, on many countries of the region no information is 
available at all and in most countries implementation of Target 10 is meas-
ured only quantitatively. The statistics indicate only whether e.g. a house-
hold is connected to a water source or – in rural areas – whether there is a 
well or public water tap with safe water in the immediate vicinity. Often 
too little attention is paid to whether or not the well or the public water tap 
are in fact regularly supplied with water and what quality this water has. 
In any case, many MENA countries will have difficulties in reaching Tar-
get 10. Since 1990 too many of them have made too little progress in im-
proving their population’s water supply. In Jordan the proportion of house-
holds connected to the public water supply even declined slightly between 
1990 and 2001 – even though it remained at a high level (declining from 
97 to 96 % of the population). The data available indicate that the supply 
situation has deteriorated in rural areas in particular (see Table A10, An-
nex). Even so, Jordan could – thanks to its relatively good initial data – 
reach Target 10 of the MDG agenda within the period envisioned, assum-
ing it loses no time in taking the measures needed. 
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Figure 16:  Trends in the implementation of MDG7 / Target 10  
 (Access to safe drinking water) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Designed by the author, based on data in Table A10, Annex 
Note: Countries for which the available data are either markedly contradictory 
or unreliable are omitted. 
 
It is above all Egypt, Bahrain, Lebanon, Syria, and the Palestinian Territo-
ries that have made good progress in improving their population’s water 
supply. All five countries have already more or less reached Target 10 – at 
least if we use number of water-mains connections as a measure. Between 
1990 and 2001 the latter rose from 94 to 97 % in Egypt, from 67 to 80 % 
in Syria, and from 81 to 90 % in the Palestinian Territories. According to 
the official statistics, Bahrain and Lebanon have even reached a supply 
level of 100 % of the population (see Table A10, Annex).  
Sudan has also made great progress. If it was able to maintain its present 
pace, it could halve, by 2015, the number of household without access to a 
water source. However, in view of the country’s size and the many and di-
verse problems facing it, this seems unlikely. 
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Figure 17:  Trends in the implementation of MDG7 / Target 10  
 (Access to sanitation) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Designed by the author, based on data in Table A10, Annex 
Note: Countries for which the available data are either markedly contradictory 
or unreliable are omitted. 
Mauritania, Libya, Oman, and Yemen are also unlikely to reach Target 10. 
Thus far they have not succeeded in significantly improving the access of 
their population to safe drinking water (see Figure 16). Mauritania, Libya, 
and Oman have therefore been classified “top-priority countries” by 
UNDP (2003a). The situation in Iraq is probably very similar.  
The data available on Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE are too 
sparse to permit any assessment of trends in the improvements of access to 
water since 1990.The second indicator for Target 10 is the share of house-
holds with sustainable access to sanitation. The goal is to halve the propor-
tion of people who do not have improved sanitation in their houses.  
Saudi-Arabia, Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan have already reached this goal. 
In Saudi-Arabia and Lebanon, according to international statistics, all in-
habitants have access to sanitary facilities, and Egypt and Jordan have 
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been able to halve, between 1990 and 2001, the proportion of households 
without sanitation. The respective shares have dropped from 13 to 2 % in 
Egypt and from 2 to 1 % in Jordan (see Figure 17 and Table A10, Annex). 
Oman, Syria, and Tunisia will also reach Target 10 if they manage to con-
tinue their present path until 2015. In Oman the proportion of people with 
access to improved sanitation has risen from 84 % in 1990 to 92 % in 
2001, in Syria from 55 to 72 %, and in Tunisia from 76 to 84 %.  
Some other countries in the MENA region will, however, most probably 
not be able to halve the proportion of people without access to improved 
sanitation until 2015. Especially the three low-income countries Sudan, 
Yemen, and Mauritania have made until now only very limited progress 
towards this goal. The share of households with sanitary facilities has risen 
only slightly from 58 % (1990) to 62 % (2001) in Sudan, from 32 to 38 % 
in Yemen, and from 30 to 33 % in Mauritania. These three countries are 
therefore listed as top-priority countries by UNDP as far as this specific 
target is concerned.  
Living conditions of slum dwellers: improved sanitation and secure tenure 
Target 11 is in fact also a fully independent target. There is a clear link be-
tween Targets 10 and 11, but the improvement of the living conditions of 
slum dwellers (Target 11) is at utmost indirectly correlated with the goal 
of environmental sustainability (Target 9). The indicator used for Tar-
get 11 is the share of people with access to secure tenure and the implicit 
goal is to halve the share of those who do not have secure tenure. 
As to the MENA region, there are practically no data available on the pro-
gress achieved so far towards this goal. For most countries, nothing is 
known about the number and living conditions of slum-dwellers, although 
their share on the total population is probably very small with the possible 
exceptions of Sudan and Mauritania. 
Only for three of the MENA countries can we say anything about their 
prospects to reach Target 11 of the MDG agenda until 2015. These coun-
tries are Jordan, the Palestinian Territories, and Morocco. The proportion 
of people without secure tenure decreased, between 1990 and 2001, from 
28 to 24 % in Jordan, and from 16 to 14 % in the Palestinian Territories. In 
Morocco, the respective share was 12 % in 1990; how it developed since 
then is however unknown (see Table A10, Annex). 
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3.8 Developing a global partnership for development 
(MDG8) 
The MDG agenda breaks up the goal of a global partnership for develop-
ment (MDG8) into a large number of targets, which are, however rela-
tively vague in their formulation. Most of them have been quantified or as-
signed target dates. Some were specified by measurable indicators, but 
even these indicators cover only small sections of what the respective tar-
gets actually refer to. In addition, only one of the 16 indicators for MDG8 
is effectively linked to a concrete time-horizon like all the indicators for 
MDGs 1–7 (see Overview 1). 
This section deals only with some of the targets and indicators of MDG8. 
Its focus is on aspects that can be verified on the national and not only the 
global level (i.e. for which data are available for individual countries). 
This includes: 
– the development of an open, rule-based, and nondiscriminatory trad-
ing and financial system (Target 12); 
– the issue of good governance at both the global and the national level 
(which is generally seen as an aspect of Target 12); 
– the ODA provided to the least-developed countries (LDCs) (which is 
an aspect of Target 13) and the cancellation of their official bilateral 
debts (Target 15); 
– the development and implementation of strategies for decent and pro-
ductive work for young people (Target 16); 
– the provision of affordable essential drugs for the population in de-
veloping countries (Target 17); and  
– the improvement of access to modern information and communica-
tions technologies for all people worldwide (Target 18). 
It is important, though, to bear in mind that the main responsibility for the 
implementation of MDG8 is generally attributed to the donor countries. 
Rule-based, nondiscriminatory national trading and financial systems 
Target 12 of the MDG agenda provides for the development of “an open, 
rule-based, predictable, nondiscriminatory trading and financial system” 
(see Overview 1). It thus refers primarily to the international trading and 
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financial system. However, if the developing countries are to benefit from 
such a system, their own trading and financial systems will also be open, 
rule-based, predictable, and nondiscriminatory.  
Many of the countries in the MENA region are far removed from meeting 
this condition. Their financial and product markets are clearly overregu-
lated and protected against potential market entrants by legal regulations 
and informal barriers. The actors affected by this include both foreign sup-
pliers and potential competitors of established domestic firms. Anyone in-
terested in investing or producing goods in these countries must be pre-
pared to submit to protracted, complicated, and cumbersome approval 
processes that entail high costs and risks. Until the end of the process it is 
impossible to predict whether or not an application will be approved. And 
even then, new stumbling blocks may turn up or be placed in the path of 
an investor (Loewe et al. 2006; UN 2004a, 33). In addition, intellectual 
property rights are not adequately protected. Competition laws are either 
weak or simply ignored – assuming that there are any in the first place. In 
legal disputes it is difficult to predict how courts will decide, i.e. whether 
they will apply the law and in what ways they may interpret them. All this 
means uncertainty and high transaction costs. The result is that in many 
MENA countries hardly any investments are made in productive capital 
assets. Savings are invested almost exclusively in real estate or financial 
capital, or they are moved abroad (Bennet 2003; World Bank 2003). 
The main beneficiaries of these opaque bureaucratic structures are a small 
group of persons with good connections to political decision-makers. Most 
applicants are simply unable to predict whether or not the administrations 
responsible will approve their applications. Decisions often depend to a 
very large extent on an applicant’s situation, social status, and personal 
connections (GTZ 2003, 4; Loewe et al. 2006). 
In view of the fact that within the authoritarian context given in the 
MENA countries, all political institutions are dependent on centers of 
power, there is no instance that could review whether nor not decisions are 
in conformity with given rules, or indeed that could correct and penalize 
infractions of these rules. Corruption is widespread, political and legal de-
cision-making processes are cumbersome, and economic actors are unable 
to rely even on written legal norms (Loewe et al. 2006). The Arab Human 
Development Reports point in unmistakable language to these governance 
deficits (UNDP / AFESD 2002; UNDP /AFESD 2004).  
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The MDG agenda does not contain an indicator that measures how open, 
transparent, rule-based, and nondiscriminatory the trading and financial 
systems of individual developing and industrialized countries in fact are. 
Indicators from other sources therefore have to be used in this study. 
One set of such indicators is offered by the World Bank. It was developed 
by a team from the World Bank Institute under the leadership of Kauf-
mann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) and consists of six composite in-
dicators, which measure (i) voice and accountability, (ii) political stability, 
(iii) government effectiveness, (iv) the regulatory quality, (v) the rule of 
law and (vi) the control of corruption in almost every country of the world 
(Bennet 2003; Kaufmann / Kraay / Zoido-Lobaton 1999). 
According to the World Bank indicator for market regulation, only the 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and South Asia (SA) are doing on 
average a little worse than the MENA countries. At the same time, the 
markets in Latina America and the Caribbean and in East Asia and the Pa-
cific region are much less or at least better regulated. 
Within the MENA region, the density of market regulation is especially 
high in Libya and Syria, but other countries, such as Sudan, Yemen, the 
Palestinian Territories, Algeria, and Egypt are not doing much better. 
Saudi-Arabia, Morocco, and Tunisia are do also still fall short of the inter-
national average. The situation is better in Oman, Jordan, and Kuwait. 
According to the World Bank indicator for the control of corruption, the 
MENA region is doing better than sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and 
East Asia and the Pacific. The problem is, however, that this indicator 
measures the use of bribes rather than other forms of corruption such as 
favouritism, which are much more common in the MENA countries. Nev-
ertheless, what Figure 18 shows on intra-regional differences is most 
likely right: Sudan, Yemen, Libya, and Syria are probably the most corrupt 
countries in the region, while significant improvements have taken place 
in some other countries such as Oman, Jordan, and Kuwait. 
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Figure 18:  Trends in the implementation of MDG8 / Target 12  
(Regulation of the trading and financial systems, based 
on World Bank indicators)  
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Figure 18 cont’d: Trends in the implementation of MDG8 / Target 12  
Source:  
For the indicators: see Kaufmann / Kraay / Zoido-Lobaton (1999) 
The date used are taken from the website of the World Bank Institute at: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2004/tables.asp (27 June 2006). 
Abbreviations:  
MENA  =  Middle East and North Africa 
EAP =  East Asia and Pacific 
EECA = Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean  
SA = South Asia 
SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa 
Notes on the indicators:  
The indicators may take on values ranging from -2.5 (very poor) and +2.5 (very 
good). They are made up of numerous indicators from 13 different research insti-
tutions, NGOs, and commercial rating agencies (including UNDP, the World 
Competitiveness Yearbook, Gallup International, Freedom House, the Heritage 
Foundation, the Economic Intelligence Unit, and Standard and Poor’s). The 
World Bank Institute staff who designed the indicators emphasize themselves 
that these indicators can be used at best to come up with trends, since the indi-
vidual components are based on subjective expert assessments. 
 
Still, entrepreneurs in all Arab countries – including, e.g. Jordan – point to 
inefficiency and corruption in administrations, overregulated markets, a 
lack in the rule of law, and complicated government approval procedures 
as major problems with which they have to contend – in addition to other 
factors like difficult access to capital or inadequate workforce qualifica-
tion. They indicate, though, that they have less problems with inflation, 
crime, infrastructure, and stability (Loewe et al. 2006; Lopez-Claros / 
Schwab 2005, 179 ff.). 
The fact that the markets in the region are anything but open, and nondis-
criminatory is also evident in the low volume of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) flowing into the MENA countries – although, of course, numerous 
other factors of course also pay a role here. Only a fraction of global FDI 
goes to the MENA region (UNDP AFESD 2003, 102). In no other part of 
the world – except sub-Saharan Africa – is the volume of FDI anywhere 
near as low as here. In Eastern Europe and Central Asia the figure amounts 
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to 3.5 % of GDP, in Latin America and the Caribbean 2.7 %, in East Asia 
and the Pacific 2.6 %, and in South Asia 2.4 % – while the corresponding 
figure for the MENA is no higher than 0.6 % (UNDP 2004a). In fact, FDI 
to MENA countries has even declined since 1990. The level of FDI is es-
pecially low in the Gulf states, Yemen, the Palestinian Territories, and 
Libya. In these countries it accounts for less then 0.1 % of GDP, and it 
therefore not presented in the diagram. On the other hand, Tunisia has at-
tracted remarkably high levels of FDI, with figures rising from 0.6 % of 
GDP in 1990 to 3.8 % in 2001. In contrast to the regional trend, FDI has 
also risen in Syria, Morocco, Mauritania, and Lebanon (see Figure 19). 
Good governance 
The “Road Map Towards the Implementation of the United Nations Mil-
lennium Declaration” (UN 2001) points out explicitly that Target 12 also 
implies a commitment to good governance both, at the national and at the 
 
 
Figure 19: Trends in the implementation of MDG8 / Target 12  
 (Openness of the financial systems)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: By the author, based on data provided by UNDP (2004a) 
 The abbreviations are explained under Figure 18. 
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international level. Unfortunately, no indicators have been defined to 
measure progress in implementing this goal.  
Indicators from other sources will therefore have to be used here. Here  
again, the World Bank composite governance indicators are a good bet. In 
what follows, we will look into the indicators for (i) voice and account-
ability and (ii) the rule of law (see Figure 20 and Table A12, Annex). 
Figure 20 clearly indicates that by international comparison the MENA re-
gion has by far the worst record on general liberties, popular voice, politi-
cal participation and government accountability (Bennet 2003; Schlum-
berger 2004; UN 2004a; World Bank 2003). It is followed only with a 
large gap by South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. The countries in east 
Asia and the Pacific region are on average doing much better, and the 
Latin American and Caribbean countries do even have positive marks. 
Within the MENA region, differences are not very big. According to the 
World Bank indicator, the situation is especially poor in Sudan, Libya, 
Syria, and Saudi Arabia, but the other MENA countries follow closely. 
Not one single of them does well on voice and accountability. 
The MENA region does somewhat better on the World Bank indicator for 
the rule of law. On average, the countries in East Asia and the Pacific and 
in Latin America and the Caribbean rank much higher than the MENA 
countries, but the South Asian and sub-Sahara African countries are doing 
worse (see Figure 20).  
According to the World Bank indicator for the rule of with large discrep-
ancies do exist within the MENA region. Again, Sudan, and Yemen, rank 
last, followed by the Palestinian Territories, Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, 
and Syria. Oman, Kuwait, Jordan, and Tunisia, on the other hand, have a 
rather good record. 
The drawback associated with the World Bank governance indicators is 
that they were developed only in 1996 and can therefore not be used to 
measure changes since 1990 (Betz 2003, 457). For this purpose, we can 
use the Freedom House Index, which, however, does not distinguish be-
tween different aspects of governance, but focuses exclusively on its core 
dimension, i.e. democratic participation and civil liberties.  
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Figure 20:  Trends in the commitment to good governance 
 (based on World Bank indicators)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source and notes: see Figure 18 
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Figure 21:  Trends in the commitment to good governance 
 (based on Freedom House Index)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes on the Abbreviations: see Figure 18. 
Source: designed by the author, based on data published by Freedom House.  
See http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/FIWrank7305.xls (27 June 
2006) 
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According to the Freedom House Index, the MENA region is the only 
world region (with the possible exception of Central Asia) in which – far 
from improving since 1990 – the political situation has in fact deteriorated 
(see Figure 21). The unweighted median of the indicator values for the in-
dividual countries in the MENA region has risen between 1990 and 2000 
from 5.7 to 5.8 (on the Freedom House Index, the lower a country’s rating, 
the more liberal it is). At the same time, the median values for sub-Saharan 
Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, and Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
have improved radically. The average score of the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries has also improved, but less markedly. South Asia is 
the only region whose rating has stagnated. Within the MENA region, the 
political situation has improved in Kuwait, Yemen, Jordan, Mauritania, 
and Oman but it has worsened in most other MENA countries. 
Cancellation of official bilateral debt and provision of additional ODA 
Target 13 is relevant for only three of the MENA countries. It calls for the 
provision of additional ODA to low-income countries as well as for the 
cancellation of their external debt. Within the MENA region, only Mauri-
tania, Yemen, and Sudan are concerned by this goal (see Figure 22).  
Mauritania and Sudan are so-called heavily indebted poor countries 
(HIPCs) and thus principally eligible for debt relief within the framework 
of the HIPC initiative that was initiated at the 1998 G8 summit in Cologne 
and ultimately adopted at the Monterrey Conference in 2002. The precon-
dition for such debt relief is that the eligible country (i) prepares a poverty 
reduction strategy paper (PRSP) that meets the criteria of the World Bank 
and the IMF, (ii) applies for at least one year the strategies set out in the 
paper, and (iii) carries out macroeconomic, sectoral, and institutional re-
forms. Mauritania was the sixth country worldwide that has qualified for 
the HIPC initiative. It was granted debt relief amounting to 1 US$.1 billion, 
roughly half of its foreign debt (UNDG 2002, 7). Sudan, however, has thus 
far failed to meet the conditions set down for debt relief. 
Yemen has also prepared a PRSP, even though it was never given any 
prospect of debt relief. The country has managed to reduce its foreign debt 
appreciably in the course of the 1990s, a development in which relatively 
high ODA, but even more so the country’s oil exports, has played a major 
role. Some major oilfields were discovered in Yemen in the early 1990s. 
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Figure 22:  Trends in the implementation of MDG8 /  
 Targets 13 and 15 (Solution of debt problems) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Designed by the author, based on the data in Table A11, Annex 
Note: Countries for which no data are available have been omitted.  
The LDCs in the MENA region are underlined 
 
Aside from Mauritania and Yemen, it is above all Jordan and the Palestin-
ian Territories that benefit from generous ODA (respectively have bene-
fited from it during the last ten years, i.e. before the Hamas won the 2006 
parliamentary elections in Palestine). Most of the other countries in the 
MENA region have seen their ODA inflow drop dramatically in the course 
of the 1990s. This goes in particular for Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Sudan, and 
Morocco. Figure 23 shows that ODA transfers to the MENA region are 
coming more and more to be concentrated on the region’s LDCs (and to 
the Palestinian Territories, which is due to fact that Figure 23 does not 
show the most recent trends after the election in Palestine). One exception 
is Sudan, which – thanks to its present regime as well as to the civil war 
raging there – now receives less ODA than 15 years ago. 
Productive employment for youth  
Target 16 is to develop and implement – in cooperation with developing 
countries – strategies for decent and productive work for young people.  
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Figure 23:  Trends in the implementation of MDG8 / Targets 13  
 and 15 (More generous ODA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Designed by the author, based on the data in Table A11, Annex 
Note:  Countries for which no data are available have been omitted.  
The LDCs in the MENA region are underlined 
 
The indicator for this target is the unemployment rate among 15- to 24-
year-olds.  
Productive employment for youth  
Target 16 is to develop and implement – in cooperation with developing 
countries – strategies for decent and productive work for young people. 
The indicator for this target is the unemployment rate among 15- to 24-
year-olds.  
For most MENA countries no information is available on progress made 
towards this target, but the very few data that have been published are 
alarming. In Egypt, the official unemployment rate among 15- to 24-year-
olds rose from 26 to 34 % between 1990 and 2001, and in Bahrain from 6 
to 13 %. In 1990 youth unemployment in Algeria had already reached a 
level of 39 %, which has most probably risen since then, because the over-
all unemployment has also increased sharply. The situation in Morocco is 
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similar: there 31 % of the 15- to 24-year-olds were jobless in 1990. In 
2001, the country had a youth unemployment rate of 37 %, the figure for 
Mauritania was 45 %, and for Syria 73 %. No data exist for the 1990 situa-
tion in these three countries. On average, roughly 50 % of the 15- to 24-
year-olds in the MENA region are likely to have been without work in 
1990 and the figure has most probably risen since then (see Table A11, 
Annex). 
Unemployment in general is very widespread in the MENA region. Ali 
and Elbadawi (2000) estimate that one person out of five potential labor-
force participants in the region is unemployed. At the end of the 1990s the 
official unemployment rate in Tunisia, Syria, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and 
Oman was roughly 15 %; 20 % in Morocco and Lebanon, and over 25 % 
in Algeria, Libya, and Yemen. The smaller Gulf states have official unem-
ployment rates of something between 3 and 8 %. In fact, however, it is 
likely that a far larger share of the labor force is looking for work. In Bah-
rain e.g. the percentage is apt to be closer to 16 than 3 %. Likewise, in Jor-
dan the unemployment rate is likely to be above 30 % rather than 14 %, as 
official statistics say. In Egypt, it is closer to 25 than to 12 %, and the Pal-
estinian Territories are assumed to have a rate of more than 50 %, not the 
18 % officially stated (Loewe 2004, 430). 
During the 1990s a high number of jobs were created in the MENA region. 
The growth elasticity of job creation was 0.7. This means that the growth 
in the number of jobs per percentage point of economic growth was 0.7. A 
similarly high ratio was otherwise noted only for Latin America. The fig-
ure for the European Union was 0.3, for the US and for South and East 
Asia (without China) 0.4, and for China 0.1 (Gardner 2003). 
All the same, unemployment in the MENA countries rose appreciably dur-
ing the 1990s: from an average of 15 % in 1990 to 20 % in 2001. On aver-
age the number of jobs rose by 2.6 % per annum; but at the same time, the 
labor force was growing by 2.9 % per annum. The reason for this is that 
cohorts with high birth rates were entering the labor market. Birth rates 
are, however, now showing a downward trend, which means in effect that 
population growth is declining in nearly all countries in the region. This 
new trend, however, has not yet translated into lower labor force growth 
rates. This will happen only in some years, and the decline will, at least 
initially, be slow. Until then, millions of school graduates will be entering 
the labor market, and the labor force of all MENA countries will grow 
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from 110 million persons in 2005 to 160 millions in 2015. In other words, 
some 5 million new jobs have to be created each year until the in order to 
keep unemployment rates at least at their present levels (ibid.). 
Access to essential medical drugs 
In its World Health Report 2000 (WHO 2000) estimates the proportion of 
people in various countries with access to essential medical drugs at af-
fordable prices. These estimates are presented in Figure 24. Accordingly, 
nearly the entire population of Algeria, Jordan, Libya, and the Gulf states 
have access to affordable medical drugs, the figures for Egypt, Lebanon, 
Oman, and Syria are only 80-90 %, and those for Yemen, Morocco, Mau-
ritania, and Tunisia are no higher than 50-70 %. The figure estimated for 
Sudan even ranges between 0-50 % (Loewe 2004c; see also Table B3). 
Access to modern technologies 
The MDG agenda measures the access of the population of developing 
countries to modern technologies on the basis of two indicators: (i) tele-
phone lines and cellular subscribers per 1000 population and (ii) personal 
computers per 1000 population. A third indicator, which is also often used, 
is the number of Internet users per 1000 population. 
The MENA countries have not done well on any of these indicators. While 
their average values for the three indicators are higher than those reached 
by sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, the MENA region is at a far higher 
level of economic development than these two other world regions. East-
ern Europe, Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and East Asia 
and the Pacific have recorded far higher values.  
In the MENA region, only 152 telephone lines exist per 1000 population 
(land lines and cell phone subscriptions together). The corresponding fig-
ure for Eastern Europe and Central Asia is 376, for Latin America and the 
Caribbean 324, and for East Asia and the Pacific 207. The Gulf states do 
relatively well on this indicator; their values range from 213 in Oman to 
956 in the UAE. Lebanon (407), and Jordan (295) have also got a com-
paratively dense communication infrastructure. The values for the region’s 
three low-income countries, however, as well as for Algeria (64), Libya 
(118), and Syria (115) are very poor (see Table A11, Annex). 
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Figure 24:  Trends in the implementation of MDG8 / Target 14 
 (Access to affordable medical drugs) 
 
 
Source: By the author, based on estimates presented by WHO (2000) 
 
As far as the number of personal computers in use per 1000 population is 
concerned, the MENA region (32) ranks below Eastern Europe and Cen-
tral Asia (52) and Latin America and the Caribbean (59), but ahead of East 
Asia and the Pacific (19). Good figures are reported from the Gulf coun-
tries (ranging from 32 in Oman to 164 in Qatar), Lebanon (56), and Jordan 
(33), while the figures for Morocco (14), Algeria (7), Egypt (16), and 
Syria (16) are just as poor as those for the three low-income countries 
Yemen (2), Mauritania (10), and Sudan (14) (see Table A11, Annex). 
The situation is similar for the use of the Internet (see Figure 25). The av-
erage number of web users per 1000 population in the MENA region as a 
whole is 16, which is far less than the figures for Eastern Europe and Cen-
tral Asia (43), Latin America and the Caribbean (59), and East Asia and 
the Pacific (41). Relatively good figures for Internet access per 1000 popu-
lation have been noted for the UAE (315), Bahrain (203), Kuwait (88), 
Lebanon (78), and Qatar (66), although the figures for Egypt, Algeria, 
Yemen, Libya, Mauritania, and Syria are all lower than 10 (see Table A11, 
Annex). 
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Figure 25:  Trends in the implementation of MDG8 / Target 18 
(Access to modern information and communication 
technologies) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abbreviations: see Figure 18. 
Source: by the author, based on the data in Table A11, Annex 
 
4 Acceptance of the MDGs in the Middle East and 
North Africa 
The question now is whether the MENA countries have embraced the 
MDGs as development goals of their own: 
– How well known and accepted is the MDG agenda in the region? 
– To what extent are the region’s political decision-makers willing to 
commit themselves to implementing the MDGs? 
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– Are the goals reflected in national development plans and have they 
had any influence on the actual orientation of policy? 
There is some evidence indicating that most rulers in the MENA region 
are not especially committed to implementing the MDGs. 
It is, however, not possible to answer these questions with any degree of 
certainty for lack of sound evidence. Official documents and commu-
niqués are not particularly reliable in that they do not necessarily reflect 
the actual opinions and intentions of those responsible for them. They may 
be bound up with strategic goals. They are often addressed to specific cir-
cles – e.g. populations or constituencies, certain interest groups within a 
given country – or to the international community. In these cases they 
serve to boost the internal or external legitimacy of individual govern-
ments, i.e. their intention is to cast government policy in a favorable light 
among the populace or to curry favor among external donors (or both at 
the same time).  
Even proven facts are not necessarily hard evidence. One indication that 
the MDGs have met with acceptance might e.g. be that a demonstrable 
change of political course has taken place in favor of social and ecologi-
cally compatible development or that trends for certain MDG indicators 
have accelerated significantly since the Millennium Declaration. In itself, 
however, this is not solid evidence for any acceptance of the MDGs or 
commitment on the part of political decision-makers to implementing 
them. Neither changes of political course nor social or environmental pro-
gress need necessarily be due to the Millennium Declaration. Such pro-
gress might have come about even in the absence of the declaration – and 
been triggered by quite different factors. A country may e.g. have reached 
a certain phase of development at which its social and economic indicators 
improve for reasons that have little to do with politics, or it may be reaping 
a harvest sown in earlier decades.  
4.1 Level of awareness and acceptance of the MDG 
agenda 
Formally, all countries of the MENA region have accepted the MDGs. In-
deed, they themselves have set the goals, together with all other UN mem-
ber states, at the Millennium Summit in New York.  
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It has often been claimed by critics that the MDGs were developed without 
any involvement of the developing countries, by an undiluted donor club, 
the OECD. How, then, could they be expected to develop ownership for 
the MDG agenda!? It is even claimed that the OECD enticed the develop-
ing countries to accept the goals by adding MDG8 to the OECD-DAC’s 
seven International Development Goals. It is further claimed that this eighth 
goal, for which the donors are chiefly responsible, is far less concrete than 
the others. It is also noted that the UN did not even vote on the MDG 
agenda, but that it was only presented to the General Assembly in 2001. Fur-
thermore, it is said that the MDG agenda takes up only the goals formulated 
in two of the four central chapters of the Millennium Declaration. 
None of this does anything to change the fact that the MDGs are contained 
in the Millennium Declaration itself and that the declaration was adopted 
and expressly welcomed by all UN member countries. The fact that many 
of the targets and objectives of the declaration are not contained in the 
MDG agenda is no obstacle to implementing at least the MDGs.  
All MENA countries were represented by high-ranking persons at the Mil-
lennium Summit in New York. Not only did all MENA representatives 
vote for the Millennium Declaration, they explicitly welcomed the declara-
tion in individual statements. Indeed. Algeria, Iran, Yemen, Jordan, Qatar, 
the Palestinian Authority, Sudan, and Tunisia were represented by their 
heads of state. Mauritania was represented by its prime minister, Saudi 
Arabia by Crown Prince cAbdullah, Libya by the Secretary of the People’s 
Congress, and the UAE by Emir Fujaira. Egypt, Bahrain, Kuwait, and 
Syria, on the other hand, were represented by their foreign ministers, 
Morocco by Prince Moulay Rachid, and Oman by the cultural affairs 
minister. Finally, Iraq sent only its deputy foreign minister to the summit, 
and Lebanon was represented by the chairman of its UN delegation. 
Statements were furthermore made by the secretaries-general of the Arab 
League and the Islamic World Conference (see Table A15, Annex). 
During other opportunities as well, the leaders of the MENA countries have 
referred time and again to the Millennium Declaration and the MDGs, ex-
plicitly welcoming them. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the 
region have also expressed highly positive opinions of the Millennium 
Declaration. They see in the MDG agenda a list of the same demands they 
have been addressing to their governments for many years (ANND 2004; 
Farag 2004; Satterthwaite 2004). 
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Whether and to what extent the political decision-makers in the region are 
in fact committed to the MDGs continues to be uncertain (DFID 2004; 
Hermle 2005). The goals may prove quite opportune for rulers of countries 
that have already made good progress in implementing them. These rulers 
can cite the fact that they are likely to reach most MDG within the given 
timeframe, both to their own population and to the international commu-
nity, as an additional argument for the legitimacy of their regimes. The 
situation is, however, different for rulers for whom pursuit of the MDGs is 
bound up with major problems and high opportunity costs. If they are in 
fact serious about the MDGs, they will have no choice but to spend a 
higher share of government revenues to implement them. In this case the 
funds may be lacking in other areas where they may be needed urgently 
for power-strategic reasons. Such governments are therefore not very 
likely to be interested in seeing their citizens learn all to much about the 
MDG agenda and start discussing it. And they are also apt to do their best 
to ensure that their citizens are not properly informed about the MDGs. 
What this means is that government information policy may provide a – to 
be sure vague – indication of the degree to which rulers in the region are 
aware of and accept the MDGs. Whether or not these rulers are in fact in-
terested in informing their population on the MDG agenda is reflected not 
least in how often and how exactly they refer to the agenda in their official 
pronouncements and how much room they accord in them to the details of 
the implementation processes in their countries. 
For this reason, we have evaluated, for the purpose of this study, the offi-
cial websites of governments in the MENA region. Four countries were se-
lected as an example: two each from the Maghreb and the Mashriq, two 
monarchies and two republics, and two countries with marked French and 
with English influence. These countries are: Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and 
Jordan. The assessment was based on the following criteria:  
– How many sites contain the keywords “Millennium Goals”, “MDGs”, 
or “Millennium Declaration”? 
– How intensively are these sites dealing with the issue? 
– Do they address the national implementation of the MDGs? 
The results are sobering. A search with Google turned up over 400,000 hits 
using the extensions “.gov.ma” for Morocco, “.nat.tn” or “.ministeres.tn” for 
Tunisia, “.gov.eg” for Egypt, and “.gov.jo” for Jordan. But on all these 
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sites we found only 143 hits for the search terms “Millennium Goals”, 
“MDGs”, or “Millennium Declaration” (for Egypt 77 hits in a total of 
197,000 pages; for Jordan 20 hits in 68,000 pages, for Tunisia three hits in 
37,000 pages; and for Morocco 43 hits in 106,000 pages). 57 of these hits 
were doubles and 14 hits referred to websites pages that no longer exist. 
The remaining 72 pages (including 37 from Egypt, eight from Jordan, 
three from Tunisia, and 24 from Morocco) only mention the MDGs or the 
Millennium Declaration in passing. Only 22 such pages deal mainly with 
the Millennium process (21 from Egypt, one from Jordan, and not one sin-
gle page from Tunisia or Morocco), and only 13 of these pages (all of 
them from Egypt) deal with national development.4  
                                                          
4  The Google search was conducted on 12 Dec. 2004. The search term used for Egypt and 
Jordan was (MDGs OR millennium goals OR millennium declaration site:.gov.eg/jo). 
For Morocco and Tunisia the corresponding term was (OMD OR ODM OR objective 
millénaire OR déclaration millénaire site:.gov.ma/tn). 
The search under Egypt turned up 147 hits; 29 were doubles, 11 pages were no longer 
available, and 70 pages had no references to the MDGs, i.e. the terms sought, (millen-
nium) and (goals), simply happened to be on the same site. 16 of the pages found only 
mentioned the MDGs in passing. Five appeared in connection with the World Summit 
on the Information Society 2002, two were associated with the Earth Summit 2002 in 
Johannesburg, and one had to do with the Millennium Summit itself. 
Only 13 sites dealt with the Millennium process in Egypt itself. Nine of these sites dealt 
with the 4th annual conference of the Egyptian National Council for Women on the 
topic “Women and the Millennium Development Goals,” which took place in Cairo 
from 13-16 March 2004. One hit was a ppt-presentation on environmentally sustainable 
development (MDG7). Two sites contained speeches by Suzanne Mubarak, the wife of 
the president, and one contained a press release by the Egyptian foreign ministry. 
The search on Jordan turned up 29 hits, ten of which were doubles, two were no longer 
available, and nine had no relevance to the MDGs (see above). Seven sites made pass-
ing reference to the MDGs. Two of them dealt with water-management issues, four 
were print versions of speeches held by the king on development in the Arab world, and 
one contained a speech held by Prince Talal at the World Summit on the Information 
Society 2003. Finally, one hit, from the Jordan Department of Statistics, referred to a 
working group concerned with efforts to standardize statistics on development indica-
tors (including the MDG indicators). 
The search on Tunisia turned up nine hits. Two of these pages mentioned, in passing, 
the Millennium Declaration and one referred to the MDGs. None of the others made any 
reference to the MDGs (see above). 
Finally, the search on Morocco turned up 124 hits, 18 of them doubles. One page was 
no longer available and 81 had no relevance to the MDGs. The remaining 24 pages 
mentioned the MDGs only in passing. Eight of them were print versions of speeches 
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Many observers confirm the impression that the population of the MENA 
countries is largely unfamiliar with the MDGs. In contrast to other devel-
opment-related issues such as e.g. the EUROMED free-trade area, the 
MDGs play as good as no role in the public debate.5 The Palestinian Au-
thority is even reported to have openly expressed its disinterest in a debate 
over the MDGs. Even scientists and NGOs actively concerned with MDG-
relevant issues (such as health, social welfare, microcredits, or women’s 
empowerment) have yet to hear anything about the MDGs. The same goes 
even for many ministerial officials and – above all – politicians at the mu-
nicipal or province level (GTZ/ KfW 2005c, 2). While leading government 
officials are of course familiar with the MDGs, they are for the most part 
only superficially informed about the background and details of the MDG 
agenda. Indeed, in these circles more time is devoted to discussions on the 
Arab Human Development Reports.6  
NGOs in the MENA region mainly blame the information policy of the re-
gion’s governments for this state of affairs (ANND 2004; Farag 2004; 
WFUNA / NSI 2004, 10 ff.). They also complain about being excluded 
just about everywhere from participation in preparing national MDG re-
ports. In some countries they learned only from third-party about the find-
ings of these reports. In fact, though, UNDP (2003) recommends that 
                                                                                                                         
made by the king, six speeches by the foreign minister, four speeches by the health min-
ister, three were international declarations, and two were foreign ministry press releases.  
5  An additional, second Google search was conducted on this question. The search looked 
into all Jordan and Egyptian websites pages for the exact combination ‘millennium de-
velopment goals’: (“millennium development goals” site:.eg) and (“millennium devel-
opment goals” site:.jo). For Jordan the search found 31 sites – without any doubles – 
that could still be accessed. Thirty of them mentioned the MDGs only in passing. One 
site dealt explicitly with the MDGs. 
But these combinations did turn up 93 hits on Egyptian websites – without any doubles 
on one site. Although 61 of these pages dealt with the MDGs only in passing, 28 of 
them were centrally located and dealt with them relatively intensively. 13 of these pages 
were in the government domain, 8 on the UNDP website, three with other UN organiza-
tions, six with Al-Ahram Weekly, and two with the Economic Research Forum for the 
Arab Countries, Iran and Turkey. 
6  Various websites refer to this problem, such as e.g. http://www.ckc-undp.org.jo/ 
newsletter/newsletter.htm (12 Dec. 2004), which has also been confirmed by representa-
tives of German development cooperation (see the list of interview partners in the An-
nex). In talks with various scientists from the region, the author also found that many of 
his interviewees were not aware of the MDGs. 
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MDG reports be worked out by governments in cooperation with civil so-
ciety and representatives of international organizations and bilateral do-
nors (ANND 2004; Fariz 2003; WFUNA / NSI 2004, 15 f.).  
Egypt and Morocco may differ somewhat from the other MENA countries 
in this regard; but this too is assessed very differently by different observ-
ers. Some persons interviewed in connection with this study claimed that 
the governments of Egypt and Morocco have again and again spoken of 
the MDGs in addresses to their populations, noting that the media in both 
countries report more or less frequently on the national MDG implementa-
tion (GTZ / KfW 2005b). Others, though, denied this categorically. 
4.2 Commitment of the MENA governments to the MDGs 
Whether and to what extent political decision-makers are really committed 
to the MDG agenda is of course the crucial question here – not least for 
decisions on the role that development cooperation (DC) can play in the 
implementation of the MDGs. DC can of course not achieve much if its 
partner governments are not really committed to tackling the problems in-
volved. Unfortunately, we cannot say much about this because we have no 
hard evidence but only rather vague indications.  
One such indication is whether a country has already presented a national 
MDG report and whether this report was prepared by the country itself. 
For reasons of national ownership, all developing countries are actually 
expected to prepare their own national MDG reports – with international 
organizations at best providing advisory and technical support.  
Thus far 13 of the 20 MENA countries have prepared MDG reports – and 
Egypt has already presented its second one (see Table A14, Annex). A re-
port on Sudan is in preparation. The same cannot be said of Iraq, of Libya 
or of the four Gulf countries Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE. The re-
ports on Iran, Syria, and Yemen were issued by the national governments. 
Egypt commissioned a government institute to prepare the national report. 
But the reports on Algeria, Mauritania, the Palestinian Territories, and 
Saudi Arabia had to be prepared by a UN institution. The Palestinian Au-
thority has even been reported not to have any interest in preparing and re-
leasing a national MDG report. 
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Additional indications are presented in the national MDG reports. Accord-
ing to the guidelines drawn by the United Nations Development Group 
(UNDG 2003) every national MDG report should assess the quality of the 
so-called “supportive environment” for the implementation of every single 
MDG in the respective country. What this means is the level of motivation 
and commitment of the relevant actors (i.e. the government, but also civil 
society) to implementing the MDGs. The only reports that contain no such 
assessment are the Algerian and Tunisian ones.  
The assessments of the other MDG reports differ substantially. The sup-
portive environment in Egypt, Bahrain, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Syria 
has in general been assessed rather positive, while the assessments for 
Mauritania, Iran, Yemen, Lebanon, and the Palestinian Territories have 
been more negative (see Table A13, Annex). 
These divergences can in part be explained. The MDG reports with a more 
or less critical tenor have as a rule been prepared by UNDP or another 
neutral institution. The reports presented by Morocco, Syria, Bahrain, and 
Egypt, however, have been prepared by the respective national govern-
ment or by a quasi-governmental research institutions. The rulers of these 
countries are of course interested (for reasons of internal and external le-
gitimacy) in seeing the MDG reports present their commitment to imple-
menting the MDGs in a positive light.  
However, it is difficult, on intuitive grounds, to accept the fact that Saudi 
Arabia, whose MDG report was released by UNDP, should have received 
a better assessment than any other MENA country, especially in view of 
the fact that the kingdom has shown substantial deficits in implementing 
several of the MDGs. 
There are also contradictions between the assessments of various observ-
ers of developments in the MENA countries. Some praise in particular the 
commitment of the governments of Syria, Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco to 
the MDGs while others note that all statements made by politicians of 
these countries are nothing more than lip service. 
4.3 Influence of the MDG agenda on national policy 
It is also not yet possible to say definitively to what extent the MDG agen-
da has led to policy changes in the MENA countries. It is true that they are 
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producing a growing number of strategy papers that contain goals very 
similar to individual MDGs, but this may also be due to chance. In addi-
tion, we do know whether these strategy papers are taken seriously and to 
what extent they are being translated into practice (Hermle 2005). 
The MENA countries, for sure, will not be able to fully ignore the Millen-
nium process. The MENA countries have now realized that they will have 
to come to terms with the discussions and international comparisons in-
spired by the MDG agenda. However, the individual MENA countries are 
dealing quite differently with this challenge. In essence, we can identify 
two basic modes of response: 
A first group of countries welcomes the MDGs, but not without emphasiz-
ing that they have, basically always, pursued the MDGs. Their govern-
ments announce – it might be said, already with a certain pride – that they 
see no reason to modify their policies in view of the MGD agenda. This 
group of countries includes above all Syria and Tunisia, but also, perhaps 
to a lesser extent, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco. 
In part at least, these countries are not all that wrong in arguing along 
these lines. Tunisia especially can rightly claim that it has, already in the 
past, achieved some noteworthy successes in MDG-relevant areas. Its 
government has, for example, managed to reduce income poverty substan-
tially by a prudent social policy which it insisted on retaining against the 
resistance of the IMF and the World Bank (Hamza 2002; UN 2003b). The 
country also laid the foundation for its present, very active women’s pro-
motion policy in the 1960s (Morrison / Friedrich 2004). And Egypt and 
Morocco, several years ago, put the measures in place that have ultimately 
led to an appreciable rise in school-enrolment and literacy rates in these 
two countries (PARC 2002; Royaume du Maroc 2003). 
In other cases, though, the only explanation for the complacency of the 
governments concerned is a deliberate failure to take cognizance of the 
conditions actually given in their countries. One extreme example here is 
Syria. In the introduction to its national MDG report, the Syrian govern-
ment let it be known that “Development in Syria takes place in a demo-
cratic system which protects freedom, equality, justice and human rights. 
The system was built [...] on political and economic pluralism.“ (Syrian 
Arab Republic 2003, 4) Elsewhere it claims: “Syria’s development experi-
ence is characterized by the provision of free and democratic education at 
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all educational stages [...]. In this way, the country provides education to 
the entire population.“ (Ibid: 4) The Jordanian MDG report claims: „The 
Government of Jordan has been paying attention to environmental issues 
since the 1960s.“ (Jordan MOPIC / UN 2004, 48) Morocco notes: “Le 
message délivré par sa Majesté le Roi Mohammed VI [...] à New York en 
Juin 2001, et l’inauguration par sa Majesté de l’Hôpital de Jour, pour la 
prise en charge des cas de VIH/SIDA [...] prouvent l’engagement politique 
au plus haut niveau dans la lutte contre le SIDA au Maroc.“ (Royaume du 
Maroc 2003, 36)  
None of these countries deny that they need to step up their efforts in indi-
vidual areas. However, the governments are not prepared to acknowledge 
publicly that even more incisive policy changes are called for. After all, 
this would amount to acknowledging that mistakes and failures have been 
made in the past.  
There are also indications that the governments of the MENA countries 
have nevertheless been influenced by the MDG agenda (and/or by the Mil-
lennium Summit and the world conferences that preceded it). For some 
years now they have been preparing a growing number of development 
plans and strategy papers whose goals largely coincide with individual 
MDGs (above all MDGs 4, 5, and 7) – even though the MDGs are rarely 
referred to explicitly (GTZ / KfW 2005d; see also Overview 4). According 
to some observers, this goes in particular for Morocco, and this is the rea-
son why the Sachs Report (Sachs 2005) cites the country as a potential 
candidate for fast-tracking, i.e. as a country that meets the conditions for 
major investments geared to an accelerated implementation of the MDGs 
(GTZ / KfW 2005b). 
On the other hand, it is questionable whether and to what extent these 
planning documents have led to changes in political practice. Some reports 
on Tunisia indicate that government representatives at different levels and 
in different fields very often make reference to individual MDGs, affirm-
ing their will to implement the goals. Tunisia is also reported at least to be 
very serious about its five-year national development plans. Other observ-
ers, though, have a more differentiated assessment of this state of affairs. 
In their opinion, even the statements made by the Tunisians are at least in 
part no more than lip service. It is furthermore noted that it is easy for the 
Tunisians to show commitment since they are in any case on the way to 
reaching most of the MDGs. 
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Overview 4: Strategy papers of selected MENA countries that may have 
been prepared under the influence of the MDGs or the world 
conferences of the 1990s  
Country  Strategy papers and the goals they set out  
Egypt: – National Health Plan 2000–2010: Improvement of rural 
health infrastructure, promotion of family planning and safe 
contraception, restriction of the spread of HIV/Aids, reduc-
tion of maternal mortality rates by 50 %  
– Poverty Reduction Strategy (2004): Reduction of income 
poverty  
Agenda for the empowerment of women (in preparation) 
– Strategy for education-sector reform (in preparation): Pro-
motion of girls’ education, increased government expendi-
tures for education  
Jordan: National Strategy for the Environment (1992) 
National Agenda 21 (2000) 
– National Population Strategy 2000–2005: Reduction of fer-
tility, child, and maternal mortality rates, improvement of 
medical attendance for births, increase in the average mar-
riage age of women as well as intervals between births, pro-
motion of safe methods of contraception  
Lebanon: – National Multi-sector reproductive health program (n.d.): 
Improvement of the health of (expecting) mothers 
– National HIV/Aids Program (n.d.): Improvement of 
HIV/Aids prevention and medical care for Aids patients  
– Code of Environment (2002): Expansion of natural reserves, 
reforestation, lowering of fuel consumption and car emis-
sions, improvement of water and wastewater management  
Morocco: – Charte de l’éducation et de la formation (1999): Increased 
school enrolment and literacy, improvement of schooling  
– Plan de développement économique et social 2000–2004: 
Promotion of women and their participation in economic life, 
improvement of access to medical drugs, improvement of  
rural healthcare, decentralization of the healthcare system, 
development of a national health-insurance system  
– Plan Stratégique National de lutte contre le SIDA 2002–
2004: Aids prevention, reduction of Aids prevalence rates by 
50 %, improved treatment of Aids patients  
– Plan d’Action National pour l’environnement (n.d.): Envi-
ronmental protection, improvement of resource management  
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Overview 4 continued: Strategy papers of selected MENA countries that may 
have been prepared under the influence of the MDGs or the world confer-
ences of the 1990s  
Country  Strategy papers and the goals they set out  
Palestinian  
Territories: 
– National Plan of Action for Palestinian Children (1995): 
Translation of the Declaration of the World Summit for 
Children into national goals  
– National Health Strategic Plan 1999–2003: Improvement of 
the quality of the healthcare system, improved healthcare 
with a special focus on reproductive health and the health of 
children and youths  
– The Five-year Education Plan 2000–2005: Development of 
capacities in the education sector, improvement of school 
curricula, improvement of school enrolment rates for girls  
Syria 
Tunisia: – Stratégie Nationale de développement durable / Agenda 21 
national (1995): Improved water management, protection of 
biodiversity, desert protection, air pollution control  
– Stratégie Nationale pour la réduction de la mortalité mater-
nelle (1999): Accelerated reduction of maternal mortality  
rates (first positive effects already visible) 
Source: Egypt: PARC (2002).  Jordan: Jordan MOPIC / UN (2004).   
Lebanon: UN (2003a).  Morocco: Royaume du Maroc (2003).  Pales-
tinian Territories: UN (2002a).  Syria: Syrian Arab Republic (2003).  
Tunisia: UN (2003b) 
 
As far as Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Morocco are concerned, observers note 
that what is lacking is less official ambition in formulating goals than re-
solve when it comes to translating them into practice (ESCWA 2005; 
PARC 2002; Republic of Yemen 2003; UN 2003a; UN 2003b). As early 
as in 2003 e.g. the Moroccan government presented a national MDG re-
port, repeatedly emphasizing the great importance it attaches to the Mil-
lennium process in Morocco. But the implementation process is proceed-
ing at a far slower pace than many observers would have expected (GTZ / 
KfW 2005b). To cite an example, Morocco’s recent literacy program was 
very slow in getting underway. The case is similar in Jordan, where sev-
eral initiatives aimed at improving the legal status of women ran out of 
steam before they had reached their objectives. In many cases official 
planning documents are prepared purely for strategic reasons and are 
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meant primarily for the eyes of donors. In other words, they contain what 
the donors are interested in reading.  
Another typical development is that in 2004, four years after the Millen-
nium Summit, the Egyptian government, together with the World Bank, 
presented a poverty reduction strategy which, in the 53 pages of which it 
consists, not once mentions the MDGs and continues to view poverty 
merely as income poverty. The nonmonetary aspects of poverty (lack of 
education, health, participation, etc.) are not even addressed in the paper 
(Egypt / World Bank 2004).  
Much the same can be said of a World Bank Poverty Report on Morocco 
(World Bank 2004g) which mentions the MDGs only in a footnote, like-
wise equating poverty with income poverty. 
The second group of countries includes Yemen in the Middle East and Al-
geria and Mauritania in North Africa. It is certainly not by chance that two 
of these countries are low-income countries and that they have prepared 
PRSPs. All three countries are typified by a public discourse that is quite 
transparent by regional comparison, and all three are – though for different 
reasons – highly dependent on the benevolence of donors.  
The countries of the second group have explicitly translated all of the 
MDGs into national development goals. They furthermore differ from the 
countries of the first group in that they engage in far more self-criticism. In 
official communiqués and documents the governments of these countries 
state relatively frankly what strategic errors and omissions they have made 
in the past and what major policy changes they see as necessary. Their 
strategy papers contain long lists of highly precise and very ambitious 
goals, which also include the MDGs.  
One particularly typical case here is Mauritania, which presented a PRSP as 
early as 2001. All of the MDGs are addressed in it, although the PRSP in 
some cases goes far beyond the targets set out under the MDG agenda. To 
cite an example, under the PRSP, the proportion of income-poor as a per-
centage of the population is set to be reduced from 57 % in 1990 to 19 % by 
2015 – and not ‘only’ to 28 %, as targeted in MDG1. Furthermore, the PRSP 
provides for an upper limit of 1 % of the overall population for the country’s 
HIV prevalence rate. And another of its PRSP goals is to lower the illiteracy 
rate to 0 % by 2015 – an objective that appears highly unrealistic in view of 
today’s illiteracy rate of nearly 60 % (UNDG 2002). 
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Overview 5:  The MDG agenda and Yemen’s official development 
goals: a comparison  
MDGs Yemen’s official development goals  
MDG1 – Reduce the share of income poor by national criteria from 
47 % in 1990 and 42 % in 1998, to 36 % in 2005 and to  
2 % in 2015 (PRSP; five-year plan). 
– Halve the proportion of people without secure access to food 
from 18 % (1998) to 9 % (2015) (PRSP). 
– Reduce the share of people living on less than 1 US$ per day 
from 11 % (1998) to 5 % (2015) (PRSP). 
– Reduce the proportion of underweight children from 46 % 
(1997) to 35 % (2015) (PRSP). 
MDG2 – Increase the enrolment rate in primary education (PRSP). 
– Increase the completion rate in primary education to 100 % 
(2015) (EFA-FTI; Strategic Vision 2025). 
– Increase government spending on education by 10 % 
(PRSP). 
MDG3 – Overcome gender disparities in primary education by 2015 
(PRSP). 
– Increase girls’ primary-school enrolment rates to 69 % 
(2005) (PRSP). 
– Increase the proportion of literate women to 48 % (2002) 
(EFA-FTI). 
– Increase the proportion of women among the working  
population to 23 % (2001) (PRSP). 
MDG4  – Reduce infant mortality to 60 per 1000 live births in 2005, 
and to 27 in 2015 (PRSP). 
– Reduce child mortality to 82 per 1000 live births in 2005, 
and to 37 in 2015 (PRSP). 
– Provide access to primary healthcare for at least 80 % of the 
rural population by 2005 (Public Health Sector Strategy). 
MDG5 – Reduce maternal mortality from 850 (1995) to 213 per 
100,000 births (PRSP). 
MDG6 – Halt the spread of HIV/Aids by 2005 (National Aids  
Program). 
– Halve the number of annual new HIV cases by 2010 (Public 
Health Sector Strategy). 
– Increase the use of safe contraceptives (National Aids  
Program). 
– Reduce the number of malaria cases (National Malaria 
Framework). 
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Overview 5 continued:  The MDG agenda and Yemen’s official development 
goals: a comparison 
MDG7 – By 2015, connect 100 % of all urban households to the  
public drinking-water supply (PRSP). 
– Increase the proportion of the rural population with access to 
safe drinking water from 25 % (1998) to 50 % (2015) 
(PRSP). 
– Increase the share of households with sewage disposal from 
7 % (1998) to 60 % (PRSP). 
MDG8 – Provide for good governance and administration as a means 
to ensure that available resources are used optimally and all 
members of society are able to participate in political  
decision-making processes (PRSP). 
– Improve the quality of governance and security (five-year 
plan). 
– Extend the percentage of paved roads from the present 9 % 
of all roads to 11km per 1000 km2 (PRSP, five-year plan). 
Source: By the author, based on Khan / Chase (2003, 2, Table 1); supplemented 
with data from Republic of Yemen (2002); Republic of Yemen (2003) 
 
Yemen’s strategy papers also show the clear-cut influence of the MDGs. 
While the country’s 1996–2000 five-year plan focused on economic 
growth and efforts to secure the country’s economic stability, the 2001–
2005 five-year plan specifies poverty reduction and sustainable develop-
ment as priority goals. Yemen has also prepared a PRSP, even though it 
has no prospects of being granted debt relief under the HIPC initiative. Its 
PRSP notes only in passing that the goals it sets out are in conformity with 
the MDG agenda (Republic of Yemen 2002). The country has nowhere 
explicitly embraced the MDGs as national development goals. However, 
nearly all of the MDGs are contained implicitly in the country’s PRSP or 
in other national strategy papers (see Overview 5). 
However, the action taken by Mauritania, Algeria, and Yemen still lags 
further behind the ambitious targets set than the first group of countries 
named above. In some areas Mauritania has already taken the measures 
provided for in its PRSP (e.g. in implementing the Plan Directeur Na-
tional pour la santé in the health sector). In other areas, though, the gov-
ernment is still lagging behind its planning targets. Thus far neither the 
Programme d’Action National pour l’environnement et le développement 
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durable of 2003 nor the Plan d’Action National pour la nutrition of 1995 
have been implemented (UNDG 2002; GTZ / KfW 2005c). 
The case of Algeria is similar. Its 2001–2003 central development plan re-
fers to all of the MDGs as important national goals. The country has made 
appreciable progress in its efforts to reform the education sector and in-
crease school enrolment rates. On the other hand, the country has yet to re-
form its 1984 civil-status law, to implement a program designed to im-
prove waste management, and to pass the legislation needed to translate 
international environmental conventions into national law. While the 
country’s goods and factor markets have, formally, been opened and liber-
alized, informal structures continue to scare off both domestic and foreign 
investors. The procedures and decisions of administration and judiciary 
continue to be protracted, complicated, opaque, and hence have a clear-cut 
anti-business bias (GTZ / KfW 2005a; UN 2004a). 
5 Orientation of German development cooperation 
The 2004 German government report on the contribution provided by Ger-
many to implementing the Millennium Development Goals states: “The 
MDGs and the Millennium Declaration constitute the binding orientation 
framework for German development policy.” (Bundesregierung 2004, 1). 
The German government, it goes on, provides “concrete measures de-
signed to reach the MDGs in relevant countries, and it supports initia-
tives designed to improve the framework for development, as called for in 
the Millennium Declaration.” (Ibid: 1; emphasis in original). The report 
continues: “The joint international goals, including the MDGs, serve as a 
guideline for the BMZ’s medium-term policy formulation.” (Ibid: 3). 
In this chapter we will look into whether and to what extent the aims de-
fined by the BMZ and the whole German government as a whole are re-
flected by the practice of Germany’s development cooperation (DC) with 
partner countries in the MENA region. We will focus successively on 
(i) the geographic and (ii) the sectoral orientation of German DC, (iii) the 
measures supported by it within individual sectors, (iv) the political dia-
logue with partner governments, and (v) the progress made until today in 
implementing MDG8, for which the donors bear principal responsibility. 
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The conclusion will be that, viewed against the background of the MDG 
agenda, both the geographic and the sectoral orientation of German DC 
can be seen as reasonable and appropriate. The German government has 
also come to concentrate more and more on implementation of the MDGs 
as an issue in government-level negotiations with its partner countries. 
But the German contribution to MDG8 must be assessed more critically. 
In addition, there is also room to improve the Germany’s contribution to 
the implementation of the other goals in the MENA region. German DC 
should concentrate more than in the past on countries and sectors that are 
characterized by (i) significant problems that have to be solved, (ii) the po-
litical will of the partner country to solve these problems, and (iii) the in-
ability of the partner country to solve the problem because of financial, 
technical, or administrative reasons. 
The most important deficit, however, must be seen in the conceptual foun-
dation and documentation of German DC. The BMZ’s country concepts 
and priority strategy papers devote hardly any attention to the MDGs and 
the German DC’s contribution to their implementation. Many of the goals 
that are mentioned in these documents are in line with the thrust of the 
MDG agenda, but the papers are not clear about this. Many of them do not 
even explain how the measures supported by German DC serve to imple-
ment the higher-level goals with which they are associated. This is also not 
looked into ex post, and thus far German DC has not been subjected to an 
MDG-specific impact analysis in even one partner country. 
5.1 Country concentration 
Viewed against the background of the MDGs, Germany’s country pro-
gramming within the MENA region may on the whole be assessed as rea-
sonable and appropriate. The only point that would call for discussion is 
the classification of Morocco and Egypt as priority partner countries. In 
addition, it might make sense to intensify the German DC with Mauritania, 
presupposing that such a decision is taken solely from the perspective of 
the MDGs. This issue will be addressed in more detail in what follows. 
Even if a given developing country is faced with major deficits in implementing 
the MDGs, DC does not necessarily have to be expanded, because quite a num-
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ber of reasons can be responsible for the country’s insufficient progress: The 
success of any country in pursuing the MDGs depends on three kinds of factors.  
The first is the urgency to solve the existing problems of the country, i.e. 
the dimensions of the social problems depicted by the MDG indicators. It 
has already been noted in Chapter 3 that e.g. enrolment rates in primary 
education are much easier to raise by a few percentage points when they 
have not exceeded levels of around 50 % than in the case that nearly every 
child is already enrolled in primary school.  
The second factor is the country’s capacities to solve its problems, i.e. the 
ability of the relevant actors within the country to take adequate measures 
against these problems. These capacities are determined by the availability 
of financial resources, but also by the know-how, the political creativity, 
and the administrative-organizational capacities of the relevant actors.  
The third factor finally is the country’s disposition or readiness to solve its 
problems, i.e. the will and resolve of the relevant political decision-makers 
to seek and find solutions and act (Lampert 1994, 145; Loewe 1999; 
Loewe 2000a, 7; Loewe 2004c, 394). 
This constellation of factors gives rise to an economic and a political dilemma. 
The economic dilemma is that countries which are characterized by a very 
high urgency to solve their problems are usually at the same time lacking  the 
capacities needed to solve these problems. Most of them are in an early phase 
of development where problems are still very severe but financial, administra-
tive and organizational capacities to solve them are also still limited. 
The political dilemma, on the other hand, is given when the main actors in a 
country have the capacities to solve existing problems, but are – for whatever 
reasons – not ready to do so – because, for example, they prefer to spend gov-
ernment revenues for other purposes (e.g. to fill their own pockets). 
If the economic dilemma is noted for a developing country, then there is 
good reason to engage in DC with it. The main point of DC is to help de-
veloping countries to escape from just this economic dilemma: to support 
them in precisely the areas in which they are faced with very serious 
stumbling blocks to their development, bottlenecks that they are virtually 
unable to overcome on their own. 
The case is a different one when a developing country is faced with the po-
litical dilemma, when, in other words, a developing country’s government 
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is able but not willing to solve the problems facing its population. In this 
case DC will not be able to accomplish much, because it depends – as the 
term indicates – on the existence of a partner which perceives the prob-
lems at hand, shows interest in tackling them, and is willing to contribute 
whatever it can to solving them.  
In other words, the optimal conditions are given when a developing coun-
try is faced with a very high urgency of problem-solution, when its gov-
ernment is highly disposed to tackle these problems, and when at the same 
time its capacity to solve existing problems is markedly low. A model like 
the one presented in Overview 6 might be used to review the extent to 
which such conditions are given in any of the partner countries of German 
DC. The overview presents a hypothetical case, which does not resemble 
any real country. As a consequence, the goal orientation subscribed to the 
German DC at present is also entirely hypothetical. The third to seventh 
column reflect the partner country’s urgency, capacity, and disposition to 
solve its problems. The last column, finally, makes proposals for a reorien-
tation of German DC with the model partner country. 
In looking at the urgency and capacity to solve given problems, we have to 
distinguish here between two different aspects. We can speak of a high ur-
gency to take measures against a problem if the country’s absolute MDG indi-
cator values are especially low (if e.g. a large proportion of the population is 
suffering from hunger). Against the background of the MDGs, however, we 
can also speak of a high urgency to solve a problem if – regardless of initial 
levels – the relative change in a country’s indicator values is unsatisfactory (if 
e.g. its child mortality rate has not improved much over the past years). 
The capacity of a country to solve its own problems, on the other hand, de-
pends on (i) the capacities and possibilities of its institutions, but also (ii) the 
capacities and possibilities that have been opened to the country through its 
DC with the donors. The point of factoring in this last aspect is to prevent 
German DC from becoming active in countries or sectors where many other 
donor countries are already providing support while at the same time over-
looking countries and sectors that are neglected by all other donors as well. 
  
 
Overview 6: Model for comparing the urgency, capacity and disposition of the partner governments of German  
development cooperation to solve the development problems of their countries 
Urgency  
to solve the problem  
Capacity  
to solve the problem 
Model country  
Present  
orientation 
of German 
DC Absolute 
level of  
MDG  
indicators  
Relative im-
provement 
of MDG 
indicators 
Administra-
tive and  
financial 
capacities  
Engagement 
of other  
donors  
Disposition 
(commit-
ment) of 
government 
to solve the 
problem 
Possible 
future  
orientation 
of German
DC 
MDG1 (income poverty) +++ moderate (0) high   (+) small   (+) strong   (–) strong   (+) + 
MDG1 (hunger) 0 moderate (0) high   (+) moderate (0) strong   (–) moderate (0) 0 
MDG2-3 (education) + high   (+) moderate (0) moderate (0) weak   (+) strong   (+) +++ 
MDG3 (gender) + high   (+) high   (+) high   (–) weak   (+) strong   (+) +++ 
MDG4 (child mortality) 0 high   (+) low   (–) moderate (0) moderate (0) moderate (0) 0 
MDG5 (maternal mort. 0 high   (+) moderate (0) moderate (0) strong   (–) moderate (0) 0 
MDG6 (HIV/Aids) 0 low   (–) moderate (0) moderate (0) strong   (–) strong   (+) 0 
MDG6 (malaria) 0 low   (–) moderate (0) large   (–) moderate (0) strong   (+) 0 
MDG7 (environment) +++ moderate (0) moderate (0) small   (+) weak   (+) moderate (0) + 
MDG7 (drinking water) +++ moderate (0) moderate (0) small   (+) strong   (–) moderate (0) 0 
MDG7 (sanitation) +++ moderate (0) moderate (0) small   (+) moderate (0) moderate (0) +++ 
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Overview 6 continued:   Model for comparing the urgency, capacity and disposition of the partner governments of German 
development cooperation to solve the development problems of their countries 
Urgency  
to solve the problem  
Capacity  
to solve the problem 
Model country  
Present  
orientation 
of German 
DC Absolute 
level of  
MDG  
indicators  
Relative im-
provement 
of MDG 
indicators 
Administra-
tive and  
financial 
capacities  
Engagement 
of other  
donors  
Disposition 
(commit-
ment) of 
government 
to solve the 
problem 
Possible 
future  
orientation 
of German
DC 
MDG8 (open markets) + high   (+) low   (–) small   (+) strong   (–) moderate (0) 0 
MDG8 (governance) 0 high   (+) high   (+) large   (–) weak   (+) weak   (–) 0 
MDG8 (unemployment) +++ high   (+) high   (+) moderate (0) strong   (–) strong   (+) + 
MDG8 (medical drugs) 0 moderate (0) low   (–) moderate (0) moderate (0) moderate (0) 0 
MDG8 (technologies) 0 high   (+) high   (+) moderate (0) strong   (–) weak   (–) 0 
Notes: 
+ Strong reason for engagement of German DC (columns 2 and 8: DC takes place / might take place). 
0 Less strong reason given for engagement of German DC (columns 2 and 8: DC does not / should not take place). 
– No good reason given for engagement of German DC. 
Source: By the author  
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Four countries in the MENA region are faced with an especially urgency 
to solve their socioeconomic problems: Yemen, Sudan, Mauritania, and 
Iraq. Chapter 3 has already pointed out that since 1990 these four countries 
have made very little progress in implementing the MDGs: On the one 
hand, their values on the MDG indicators have not improved much in rela-
tion to their initial levels. On the other hand, the absolute values for these 
countries are also very low. On some MDGs, the situation is somewhat 
similar in Egypt, Algeria, Iran, Jordan, Morocco, the Palestinian Territo-
ries, and Syria,– though nowhere near to the same extent as in the three 
countries named above. 
Yemen, Sudan, Mauritania, the Palestinian Territories and Iraq have very 
low capacities in solving problems, as well. Yemen, Sudan, and Maurita-
nia lack, first of all, the financial resources needed both to implement 
measures geared to implementing the MDGs and to acquire the expertise 
required for the purpose. In the Palestinian Territories and Iraq, however, 
the main bottleneck is not a lack of financial means. Instead, the scopes of 
these two countries are restricted by political givens: (i) the Israeli occupa-
tion and the uncertain legal status of the Palestinian Authority in the case 
of the Palestinian Territories; (ii) and the continuing presence of US troops 
there and the country’s security situation in the case of Iraq. 
Chapter 4 was unable to fully answer the question whether and to what ex-
tent the rulers in the MENA region are disposed to effectively solve the 
problems of their countries. We can, however, assume that most of them 
have no interest whatever in implementing all of the MDGs. This goes, 
above all, for the issue of good governance (an aspect of MDG8), but in 
part also for MDG1 (eradication of extreme poverty and hunger), MDG3 
(gender equality), MDG7 (environmental sustainability), and MDG3 (im-
proved school education). 
Therefore, we limit ourselves at large to assessing the urgency and capaci-
ties within the different MENA countries to solve their socioeconomic 
problems when we analyze in what follows the country programming of 
German DC with the MENA region.  
Within the MENA region, Germany cooperates mainly with four priority 
partner countries (Egypt, Yemen, Morocco, and the Palestinian Territo-
ries) and – to a lesser extent – with five partner countries (Algeria, Jordan, 
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Mauritania, Syria, and Tunisia).7 DC with Iran and Sudan are under con-
sideration for the future (see Table A16, Annex). 
The intensive engagement of Germany’s DC with Yemen and the Palestin-
ian Territories would appear reasonable from the perspective of the MDG 
agenda and against the background of the criteria and considerations out-
lined above. Both countries are hampered by limited capacities to solve 
problems, and Yemen at least is faced with a very high urgency to solve its 
problems as well. By regional comparison, Yemen’s government also 
shows, at least in tendency, an above-average disposition to solve socio-
economic problems (see Chapter 4). 
This line of argument would also speak in favor of classifying Sudan, Iraq, 
and Mauritania as priority partner countries of German DC.  
But the MDG agenda is not – and should not be – the only criterion used 
to define the orientation of DC. The German government has good, though 
different, reasons for not cooperating with Sudan, Iran, and Iraq: poor hu-
man rights situation, insufficient protection of minorities, lack of internal 
security, violations of the norms of international law, etc.. 
Yet none of these arguments would speak against expanding German co-
operation with Mauritania. On the contrary, viewed from the perspective 
of the MDG agenda, many good reasons exist for making Mauritania a 
priority partner country of German DC: it suffers a far higher urgency and 
more limited capacities to solve its problems than most other MENA, and 
                                                          
7  In June 2000 the BMZ decided to improve the effectiveness and significance of German 
DC by moving toward a policy of regional and sectoral concentration. For one thing, the 
ministry reduced the number of its cooperation partners from an original 118 to 70 
countries, 32 of which have been declared partner countries, 30 of which now have the 
status of priority partner countries, and eight of which are regarded as potential partner 
countries for the future. For another, with a view to enhancing the significance of devel-
opment cooperation, German DC was restricted to one of a total of 10 so-called sectors 
in the partner country and three sectors in each priority partner country. 
Sectors in this sense are (i) democracy, civil society, and public administration; 
(ii) peace-building and crisis prevention; (iii) education (excl. vocational training); 
(iv) health, family planning, HIV/Aids; (v) drinking water supply, water management, 
wastewater and waste disposal; (vi) food security and agriculture (incl. fisheries); 
(vii) environmental policy, protection and sustainable use of natural resources; (vii) eco-
nomic reform and market systems development; (ix) energy (incl. energy efficiency and 
renewable energies); (x) transportation and communication (see BMZ 2004a). 
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the Mauritanian government’s disposition to become active is at least not 
lower than that of other governments in the region.  
At the same time, it is not entirely clear from the perspective of the MDGs 
why Morocco and Egypt should keep their present status of priority part-
ner countries. Both are middle-income countries that have far greater ca-
pacities to solve their own problems than e.g. Yemen or Mauritania, and 
their problems are not quite as urgent to be solved as those of some other 
countries in the region (see Chapter 4). 
The reasons again why Algeria, Jordan, Syria, and Tunisia do not have the 
status of priority partner countries are convincing. Just like Egypt and Mo-
rocco, they are middle-income countries with moderate socioeconomic 
problems and average capacities to solve them. The intention of the BMZ 
is to restrict DC with these four countries to only one sector in each coun-
try, although in practice this is only the case in Jordan and Syria. In both 
countries, the priority field of German DC is the water sector. In Tunisia, 
German DC takes place in two sectors (environmental policy; economic 
reform and market systems development, and in Algeria, it even extends to 
three sectors (environmental policy; the water sector; economic reform 
and market systems development). One could ask why Tunisia is still re-
ceiving support in the form of DC at all. The fact that Tunisia is likely to 
reach almost all of the MDGs would be a convincing argument for discon-
tinuing DC support for the country. One reason for not proceeding this 
way is that termination of DC with a country like Tunisia might seem to be 
a punishment for the development successes the country has achieved, and 
this could prove to be a negative incentive for the commitment of other 
countries. Furthermore, DC with countries already on the road to success 
can sometimes achieve more than DC with poor countries that are far more 
reliant on external support, even though they are without the requisite in-
stitutional structures and their politicians may lack commitment.  
5.2 Definition of sector priorities 
Against the background of the MDGs, the sectoral orientation of German 
DC with the MENA countries can also be seen as very largely reasonable. 
In its priority areas German DC is in a position to provide important con-
tributions to the achievement of the MDGs. However, it is not engaged in 
all fields that are crucial for this purpose. 
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The priorities set by the German government for its DC with the MENA 
region include above all two sectors: ‘economic reform and market sys-
tems development’ (“WiRAM”), and ‘drinking water, water management, 
and sewage/waste disposal’ (“water”). Germany cooperates with a total of 
nine countries from this regions: with seven it cooperates in the field 
“WiRAM”, with six in the water sector, and with five in the protection of 
resources, the nature and the environment. The education, health, and rural 
development sectors are defined as priority areas of German DC only in 
one MENA country each. The promotion of good governance is a priority 
area in two MENA countries; in addition, it is the object of a regional pro-
ject of cooperation with Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia (see Table A16, 
Annex). 
In fact, it is neither possible nor permissible to equate DC in individual 
sectors with a contribution to implementing specific MDGs. DC in the 
education sector, for instance, may help a partner country to reach MDG2 
and MDG3. At the same time, though, it may also contribute to imple-
menting other goals, such as e.g. MDG4, MDG5, or MDG6, by strength-
ening the awareness of students for the need for preventive measures de-
signed to maintain and improve health or facilitate access to medical 
drugs; and it may contribute to MDG1 by improving the employment and 
income opportunities of school graduates, in this way helping to reduce in-
come poverty, hunger, and unemployment; or it may contribute to MDG7 
by awakening an understanding for the need to deal more carefully with 
the environment and with scarce natural resources. 
Likewise, DC can also can also contribute to reaching one of the MDGs 
when it is not conducted in a sector that appears immediately relevant to 
that goal. It is e.g. conceivable that efforts to implement MDG4, MDG5, 
and MDG6 could fail less for a lack of health infrastructure than for the 
demand for it. Even if rural regions are sufficiently supplied with health 
services, it is possible that the population may not make use of them be-
cause most households lack adequate awareness of the significance of ap-
propriate preventive healthcare or because they are too poor to seek medi-
cal treatment, which might force them to miss work. What would in this 
case hold more promise than DC for expanding or reforming the health-
care system is measures that would contribute to enhancing health aware-
ness among the population. 
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Nevertheless, what follows will attempt to check the priorities set by Ger-
man DC in the MENA region against the present state of the Millennium 
process in the individual partner countries, the aim being to go on from 
here to formulate propositions on a different future orientation of German 
DC towards sectors as viewed from the perspective of the MDG agenda. 
The following assumptions were made for this purpose: 
– The MDG agenda is a consistent system of goals that are closely in-
terrelated (Satterthwaite 2004). This means that measures conceived 
to help implement one MDG usually have positive impacts on several 
of the other MDGs as well. It is therefore important to distinguish be-
tween direct and indirect effects. What follows will start out by focus-
ing on the direct effects of DC. Indirect effects of DC are not unmis-
takably indicated by its sectoral orientation. Only a detailed portfolio 
analysis of individual priority areas could provide the necessary in-
formation for that. 
– As a rule, DC in the health sector entails direct effects on MDGs 4, 5, 
and 6 – although these impacts may differ substantially in their sig-
nificance. Indirect effects are possible mainly for MDG1, MDG2, and 
MDG3. 
– Much the same can be said for DC in the education sector, which 
contributes principally to implementing MDG2 and MDG3, although 
it may also have indirect effects on all other MDGs.  
– DC in the environmental sector is of course keyed to MDG7 / Tar-
get 9. Whether this also entails positive impacts on other goals is a 
question that can be answered only for concrete cases. The most like-
ly assumption would be more or less long-term effects on MDG1. 
– It is less clear which goals are furthered by DC in the water sector. It 
has already been pointed out in Chapter 3 that in the water-poor 
MENA countries a conflict may arise between the goal of providing 
accesses to drinking water for as much of the population as possible 
(Target 10) and the goal of making sustainable use of available water 
resources (Target 9). As it has itself stated, German DC remains 
committed to the goal of sustainability in the water sector (Arce 
2004). It is therefore assumed below that German DC in this sector 
too provides a direct contribution not only to Target 10 but also to 
Target 9 (however great this contribution may in fact be). Further-
more, there is good reason to expect significant indirect impacts on 
MDG4 and MDG5, since improved access to drinking water as a rule 
translates out into improved health and, above all, lower child mortal-
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ity rates. Whether DC in the water sector also contributes to other 
MDGs depends on the concrete shape given to the measures it uses. 
There is, though, evidence that in most cases positive indirect effects 
are achieved over the short or long run for nearly all of the MDGs 
(Bliss 2004; Neubert / Horlemann 2005). 
– It is more difficult to state with any degree of certainty which MDGs 
may be positively affected by DC measures in the WiRAM priority 
sector. A good number of very different measures are subsumed un-
der WiRAM, and they may be targeted directly on poverty reduction, 
restructuring and improvement of the functioning of markets, en-
hancement of competition in markets, or privatization of publicly 
owned enterprises. In other words, the indirect purpose of these 
measures is to boost growth and to reduce poverty. Success here will 
depend above all on whether the measures taken (i) are appropriate to 
the situation in the partner country in question, (i) are keyed to actual 
problems, and (iii) are implemented consistently. Nevertheless, the 
following reflections are based on the assumption that in its WiRAM 
priority sector German DC may, at least in general terms, provide a 
direct or indirect contribution to reducing income poverty (Target 1). 
If this in fact succeeds, there is good reason to anticipate positive ef-
fects on the proportion of the population suffering from hunger. In 
addition, the concrete measures taken by German DC in the priority 
sector of WiRAM also aim, in all MENA countries, at reducing un-
employment and improving the market-regulation picture. 
Overview 7 is based on these assumptions. It compares the priorities of 
German DC in the MENA region with the state of the Millennium process 
in the individual partner countries. 
The overview first looks at the economic problem solving-capacity of 
these countries, distinguishing between low-income countries (Yemen, 
Mauritania) and middle-income countries (Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, Leba-
non, Morocco, the Palestinian Territories, Syria, Tunisia). In addition, it 
lists separately the potential priority partner countries and partner coun-
tries of German DC in the MENA region (Iraq, Iran, Sudan). It omits the 
countries which, thanks to their high per capital incomes, are in possession 
of very pronounced capacities to solve their problems of their own and are 
therefore not seen as potential partner countries for German DC.  
 
  
Overview 7:  MDG orientation of German DC with the countries of the Middle East and North Africa  
 MDG 1 
MDG 
2 
MDG 
3 
MDG
4 
MDG
5 
MDG 
6 
MDG 
7 
MDG 
8 
 
In-
come 
pov-
erty 
Hun-
ger 
Basic 
educa-
tion 
Gender 
(educa-
tion) 
Gender 
(em-
ploy-
ment) 
Child 
mor-
tality 
Ma-
ternal 
mor-
tality 
HIV/
Aids 
Ma-
laria 
Envi-
ron-
ment 
Drink-
ing 
water
Sani-
tation
Open 
mar-
kets 
Gov-
ern-
ance 
Youth 
unem-
ploy-
ment 
Medi-
cal 
drugs
ICTs 
Low-income countries (only partner / priority partner countries) 
Yemen  x   x   x x x      x  
Mauritania x x      x          
Middle-income countries (only partner / priority partner countries) 
Egypt  x   x x x           
Algeria  x   x x x           
Jordan       x   x        
Lebanon                  
Morocco  x x      x    x     
Palest. Terr.  x   x x x   x        
Syria x x x x  x x   x        
Tunisia     x x x   x        
Potential partner / priority partner countries  
Iraq                  
Iran                  
Sudan                  
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Overview 7 continued:   MDG orientation of German DC with the countries of the Middle East and North Africa  
Source:  Table A1 in Annex; BMZ (2004a) 
Notes:  
Black background:  MDG will probably not be reached under the given framework conditions. 
Gray background:  MDG may possibly be reached.    
White background:  MDG like to be reached. 
   In priority countries German DC is in a position to provide a direct contribution to implementing the MDG in question.  
 Discontinued projects, projects outside the priority sectors, or regional projects contributing to implementing the respective MDG.
x German DC is in a position to provide an indirect contribution to implementing the MDG in question. 
Palest. Terr.: Palestinian Territories 
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Overview 8:  Ongoing German DC measures in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, 2004 
WiRAM Primary education  Health  Water Environment  Governance 
Egypt:  
Promotion of small 
and medium-size  
enterprises (SMEs) in 
the informal and  
formal sector;  
promotion of adapted 
financial services; 
job-creation;  
vocational training 
Algeria: 
Improvement of 
competitiveness via 
promotion of SMEs 
new business startups 
(esp. women);  
promotion of associa-
tions; vocational 
training reform 
Yemen: 
Adapted vocational 
training and financing 
for informal SMEs; 
financing of the coun-
try’s social fund; 
Egypt:  
Decentralized con-
struction and funding 
of schools; 
German university  
Yemen: 
Institutional capacity-
building at all levels;  
community dev’t;  
teacher training;  
promotion of girls’ 
education;  
construction and 
equipment of schools 
and school authorities  
Jordan:  
Primary school con-
struction;  
improvement of 
school buildings in 
informal town  
districts and refugee 
camps 
Yemen: 
Policy advice on  
sector reforms;  
decentralization and 
budget planning; 
awareness-raising ac-
tivities; institutional 
capacity-building;  
advanced manage-
ment training, chiefly 
for women;  
provision of health 
and family-planning 
infrastructure  
Morocco:  
Healthcare system 
decentralization;  
reproductive health / 
support for national 
anti-Aids campaign 
PT:  
Hospital equipment; 
rehabilitation of  
social infrastructure; 
Egypt:  
Poverty-oriented  
water provision;  
organizational re-
forms; optimized irri-
gation management; 
maintenance of water 
quality; 
Algeria: 
Integrated water 
management, incl. 
groundwater protec-
tion; treatment of 
drinking water; 
organizational devel-
opment;  
agricultural irrigation 
Yemen: 
Affordable drinking-
water supply and 
sewage disposal; 
awareness-raising 
work on wasteful use 
of water;  
Egypt: 
Legal advice on envi-
ronmental standards 
for air and water con-
servation; construc-
tion of wind and wa-
ter power plants  
Algeria:  
Environmental legis-
lation; integrated  
environmental  
management;  
monitoring systems; 
local environmental 
protection;  
awareness campaigns 
Yemen: 
Waste removal and 
disposal;  
affordable sewage 
disposal  
Jordan: 
Waste disposal;  
wind-energy park 
Algeria, Morocco,  
Tunisia: 
Regional projects 
“good governance” 
(regional dialogue on 
participation, plural-
ism, transparency, 
government account-
ability; support for 
civil society and  
government reform 
processes) 
Mauritania: 
Support for decen-
tralization / promo-
tion of local authori-
ties and self-deter-
mination, flanking 
support for municipal 
elections; 
development of  
corruption-free  
administrations; 
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Overview 8 continued:   Ongoing German DC measures in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, 2004 
WiRAM Primary education Health  Water  Environment  Governance 
promotion of cham-
bers of industry and 
commerce;  
promotion of women 
as a cross-cutting 
task;  
advisory services for 
government planning 
and supervision  
Lebanon:  
Vocational-training 
system promotion  
Morocco: 
Advisory services for 
professional and trade 
associations;  
trade promotion; 
SME promotion;  
improvement of the 
vocational training;  
promotion of social 
dialogue 
Mauritania 
Advice for the PRS 
process 
Morocco:  
Promotion of  
functional literacy in 
connection with 
WiRAM measures 
PT:  
Labor-intensive  
construction and  
rehabilitation of 
school buildings  
promotion of juvenile 
health based on 
school awareness-
raising campaigns 
sustainable water  
basin management; 
policy advice on leg-
islation and water-
tariff systems  
Jordan: 
Sewage disposal and 
treatment; preserva-
tion of groundwater 
quality; irrigation 
management  
Morocco: 
Drinking-water sup-
ply in small towns 
and rural areas; drink-
ing-water protection 
areas; irrigation man-
agement  
PT: 
Policy advice on  
water and develop-
ment of an institu-
tional framework; 
improvement of water 
management; 
Morocco: 
Industrial environ-
mental protection  
(air and water);  
reduction of resource 
consumption;  
policy advice on anti-
desertification meas-
ures, protection of 
biodiversity, resource 
protection, develop-
ment of national 
parks, and protection 
of water catchments 
areas; promotion of 
renewable energies;  
municipal environ-
mental protection  
Mauritania:  
Sustainable fishery; 
promotion of NGO 
anti-desertification 
work;  
biodiversity project 
Senegal; national 
parks administration 
strengthening of the 
National Assembly 
and the state auditing 
authority; 
improvement of the 
employment opportu-
nities and the legal 
and political rights of 
women  
PT: 
Capacity-building for 
ministries and the  
national statistics  
office, NGOs, and 
municipal administra-
tion -priority sectors; 
promotion of democ-
racy, human rights, 
water consumption 
and management, 
women and young 
people; 
promotion of munici-
pal self-government  
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Overview 8 continued:   Ongoing German DC measures in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, 2004 
WiRAM Primary education Health  Water  Environment  Governance 
PT: 
Labor-intensive 
measures in infra-
structure expansion, 
conceived as measure 
to reduce unemploy-
ment and poverty;  
promotion of associa-
tions and businesses;  
improvement of the 
vocational training 
system  
Tunisia: 
SME promotion 
based on credit and 
advisory services;  
development and ex-
pansion of the ‘dual 
system’ of vocational 
training  
  elimination of water 
losses; wastewater 
treatment and  
disposal for agricul-
ture; provision of 
drinking water  
Syria: 
Sewage and waste 
disposal: elimination 
of leaks in water-
supply and sewage 
disposal systems, 
conceptual advice on 
water management  
Tunisia: 
Management of irri-
gation;  
water supply in un-
dersupplied regions; 
wastewater treatment 
plants  
PT: 
Institutions and infra-
structure for a waste-
disposal system;  
construction of 
wastewater treatment 
plants  
Tunisia: 
Institutional capacity-
building; strengthen-
ing of regional struc-
tures; support for co-
ordination between 
government, munici-
palities, NGOs, etc.;  
dev’t of a waste-
disposal system;  
industrial environ-
mental protection (air 
and water conserva-
tion, reduction of re-
source consumption) 
Syria: 
Policy advice;  
National Planning 
Commission 
Source: BMZ (1997); BMZ (2000a); BMZ (2002b); BMZ (2002c); BMZ (2002d); BMZ (2003a); BMZ (2003b); BMZ (2003c); 
BMZ (2004b); BMZ (2004c); BMZ (2004d); BMZ (2004e); BMZ (2004f.); BMZ (2004g); BMZ (2004h); BMZ (2004j); 
BMZ (2004k); BMZ / Ägypten (2003); BMZ / Algerien (2003a); BMZ / Algerien (2003b); BMZ / Marokko (2000/; BMZ / 
PA (2004a); BMZ / PA (2004b); BMZ  / Tunesien (2003); GTZ / KfW (2005a); GTZ / KfW (2005b); GTZ / KfW (2005c); GTZ / 
KfW (2005d) 
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The overview then indicated the urgency of problem-solution as regards 
the individual MDGs in the countries listed. The shaded boxes indicate 
that a country is faced with major problems in implementing one of more 
MDGs. This makes it clear for the reader which MENA countries are es-
pecially reliant on external support, and in which sector this support is 
needed: For Iraq and the low-income countries Yemen, Mauritania, and 
Sudan, this is the case in nearly all sectors; only in Iran is the situation 
somewhat better. But it is possible to identify clear-cut priorities for the 
remaining MENA countries. All of them have major problems in imple-
menting MDG1 (alleviation of poverty and hunger) and several targets of 
MDG8 (good governance, reduction of youth unemployment, access of the 
population to modern technologies). Most of these middle-income coun-
tries also have deficits with regard to MDG7 (environmental protection) 
MDG3 (political and social equality for women), and quality of primary 
school education – an aspect that the overview does not show clearly be-
cause no clear-cut indicators have been developed for it.  
The entries in the boxes of Overview 7 show, in keeping with the assump-
tions made above, the MDGs to which German DC is in a position to pro-
vide contributions within its priority sectors. However, the disposition of 
individual partner countries and priority partner countries to solve prob-
lems could not be shown in the overview since this would have impaired 
the clarity of the presentation – and because no reliable data are available.  
The comparative presentation clearly shows that German DC with the 
MENA region is conducted primarily in sectors in which it is in a position 
to contribute to reaching MDG1 and MDG7 in particular. Thus far most of 
the MENA countries have made insufficient – or no – progress on these 
two goals. On the other hand, German DC is hardly engaged at all in sec-
tors like e.g. health, where it could contribute above all to reaching MDG4 
and MDG5, two goals that the MENA countries might well achieve. 
However, Overview 7 also shows that as a donor Germany has only a lim-
ited level of engagement in sectors marked by a high urgency to solve ex-
isting problems. Only in a few countries, for instance, is German DC sup-
porting measures aimed at 
– promoting democracy and good governance (one target of MDG8; 
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– improving the access of private households and microenterprises to 
modern information and communications technologies (one target of 
MDG8); 
– promoting gender equality and empowerment of women (MDG3); 
and 
– improving the quality of primary schooling in the region. 
The Arab Human Development Reports that have appeared thus far argue 
that the most serious impediments to the development of the Arab coun-
tries must be sought in these four areas (UNDP / AFESD 2002; UNDP / 
AFESD 2003; UNDP / AFESD 2004; see also Chapter 3). 
If we look at Overview 7, focusing on the individual countries there, we 
come to a similar conclusion. In all of its partner countries German DC is 
engaged almost exclusively in sectors in which little real progress has been 
made in reaching the MDGs. While German DC is, of course, not active in 
all areas marked by deficits, it is striking that in most partner countries 
these same fields have been ‘left out’: governance, gender equality, infor-
mation and communications infrastructure, and quality of education. 
There are only two countries that deviate from this rule. In them German 
DC is likewise not engaged in other sectors marked by a high urgency to 
solve problems. These countries are Jordan and Mauritania. In Jordan, 
German DC is not providing a direct contribution to reaching MDG1, even 
though income poverty and hunger continue to be major problems there. 
Mauritania, on the other hand, is forced to rely on external support to 
reach nearly all of the MDGs, including MDGs 1–6, to which German DC 
is providing – at best – indirect contributions.  
However, no donor country is obliged to support all of its partners in im-
plementing all of the MDGs. Indeed, there are good arguments for a sec-
toral focus. The first would be that every donor country should become 
engaged only in sectors in which it has comparative strengths. The second 
is that donor specialization of this kind would facilitate the coordination 
and harmonization of DC in that each donor would in this case be active 
only in a small number of sectors, and this would require only a limited 
number of donors to coordinate their activities in each sector. The third is 
that individual donors can in this way boost the effectiveness and visibility 
of their DC by restricting their efforts to a limited number of sectors, and it 
is in this case easier to monitor and document their DC contributions. The 
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fourth is that donors can more easily follow, and gain influence on, the 
strategies of their partner countries when they are active in only a limited 
number of sectors, which they are then free to deal with more intensively. 
And fifth, having to negotiate with only a few donors in each sector also 
eases the burden on partner countries.  
Moreover, it may be wholly rational for donors to refrain completely from 
engagement in given sectors, even though levels of urgency to solve prob-
lems may be very high in them. The reason for this is that development 
problems may have very different causes. It is, for instance, conceivable 
that a developing country would be entirely able to solve a given problem 
on its own, and that it simply lacks the willingness to do so. In situations 
of this kind DC is neither called for nor reasonable. 
It may e.g. be assumed that at least the middle-income MENA countries 
have capacities sufficient to improve their population’s access to modern 
information and communications technologies. And to do so they need 
neither financial nor administrative support from donors. They have, how-
ever, evidently set other priorities. Whether or not it makes sense to en-
gage in DC in the sector information and communications technologies 
will depend on how reasonable these priorities may appear to be.  
The question is quite similar when we look at the three other sectors 
named above, in which there is at present very little DC, namely the sec-
tors governance, gender equality, and quality of education. It is entirely 
conceivable that DC could at least facilitate or accelerate reforms in these 
three sectors. However, there are doubts as to whether the governments of 
the MENA countries are in fact interested in such reforms. These being 
sensitive sectors, it is essential that this question be answered before any 
thought is given to DC in the sectors governance, gender, or education. 
DC conducted against the express will of the rulers in partner countries 
will tend to be more or less powerless DC, and it may even entail negative 
impacts. On the other hand, these are three very important sectors, and DC 
cannot simply dodge engagement in them by pointing to the inadequate 
disposition of partner countries to solve their socioeconomic problems. In 
government-level talks, donors must regularly and persistently address the 
problems encountered in these three sectors, emphatically calling for re-
forms. Furthermore, it is essential for donors to look for subsectors in 
which partner countries have no objections to reforms and to DC and 
which hold promise of at least partial improvements. If need be, though, 
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donors should consider retrenching their DC with such countries – pre-
cisely because democracy and good governance, gender equality, and 
quality of education are of great importance for a country’s development 
and for the wellbeing of its population. 
5.3 Measures engaged in by German bilateral DC 
The greatest problem involved in German DC with the MENA countries 
is, however, that there is no adequate documentation of its actual or its in-
tended impacts. The available strategy papers provide insufficient concrete 
information on how German DC intends to contribute to implementing the 
MDG agenda in the region. Nor is there any information available on 
whether German DC is in fact providing this contribution, since, at least to 
date, no MDG-specific impact analyses have been conducted in a country 
of the region.  
The sectoral orientation of German DC permits us to draw conclusions 
only on its potential contribution to implementing the MDGs. To come up 
with reliable information on the contributions German DC is in fact mak-
ing, it is necessary to take a detailed look at the portfolio of the measures 
in which it is engaged at the levels below its individual priority sectors. 
For this purpose the present study has subjected the BMZ’s country con-
cepts and priority strategy papers (PSPs) to an exact analysis.  
The country concept papers and PSPs are the central instruments of the 
BMZ for planning and steering German DC. The country concept papers 
are used to outline the situation in the partner countries: They specify the 
main development problems and potentials, the course of Germany’s en-
gagement to date, and the contributions of other donors. Based on this 
analysis, they derive and justify the future orientation of German DC. The 
PSPs build on these country concepts. They specify deficits in a given sec-
tor and point to development bottlenecks in other sectors that may affect 
the sector in question, analyze the (potential) contributions provided by the 
partner country itself, whatever development plans it may have for the pri-
ority sector in question, and the contributions provided by other donors for 
development in this sector. This is used to derive what individual measures 
are given support by German DC. One intention here is to clarify what 
strategic approach is used by German DC in the sector in question, 
whether and to what extent the individual measures are interlinked and re-
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sult from a cross-cutting project-support concept, how a structure-building 
impact may be achieved through concentration, and whether and to what 
extent German DC has managed to intensify the sectoral dialogue (Roden-
berg 2001, 1). 
A BMZ guideline of October 20008 on the preparation of PSPs further-
more points out that the papers are expected to illustrate whether and to 
what extent the measures taken in a given priority sector contribute to 
reaching the goals of German DC. Since April 2001, when the German 
government adopted its Program of Action 2015, the chief priority sector 
has been poverty reduction (based on a broad understanding of poverty). 
There are, under the umbrella defined by the overarching goal, other goals, 
including social and economic development (pro-poor growth, social eq-
uity, decent living conditions), political development (stability, peace, hu-
man rights, democracy), ecological development (environmental and re-
source protection), and the cross-cutting tasks of participation, gender 
equality, and sustainability (Rodenberg 2001, 2). 
The present study examined the BMZ’s MENA country concepts and 
PSPs with a view to determining whether and to what extent they outline 
the engagement of German DC for the global goal of poverty reduction 
with specific reference to the concrete contributions it is providing toward 
reaching the individual MDGs. The strategy papers have in this connection 
been examined with a view to their relation to the questions listed in 
Overview 9; in other words, all strategy papers were expected to provide 
answers to these questions. There is no other place where German DC out-
lines more concretely and in more detail the contributions it is providing to 
help implement the MDG agenda in its partner countries (BMZ 2005a). 
In analyzing the available strategy papers9, it was noted that the goals and 
approaches of German DC are broadly congruent with the MDG agenda 
and that the measures that German DC promotes in the MENA region may 
in fact contribute to its implementation, which is, however, not sufficiently 
documented. On the other hand, the partner countries, which bear the main 
responsibility here, should also provide documentation on the measures 
they have taken to reach the MDGs, and which may be supported by DC. 
                                                          
8  Cited verbatim in Rodenberg (2001, 31–38.). 
9  All of the strategy papers evaluated in this connection are cited in Table A16, Annex. 
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Even a first, purely quantitative evaluation of the strategy papers demon-
strates that the MDG agenda plays hardly any role at all in the strategic 
planning process of German DC. Country reports were available for seven 
of the total of nine partner countries / priority partner countries of German 
DC in the MENA region. In addition, a country brief was available on an 
eighth country (Mauritania). In not one of these papers was found any ref-
erence to the MDGs or to the Millennium Declaration. Country concept 
papers have been prepared only for the four priority partner countries of 
German DC. Two of these likewise lack any reference to the MDGs, and 
the third addressed the MDG agenda only in passing. Only the country 
concept for Yemen goes into the MDG agenda in a central passage and at 
some length. The experience made in evaluating the available PSPs or PSP 
drafts turned out to be much the same. Ten of 13 papers10 do not even ad-
dress the MDGs and only one of them convincingly derives the goals and 
measures of German DC from partner-country development plans, which 
in turn make reference to the MDG agenda (see Table A17, Annex). 
The second, qualitative evaluation of the PSPs did little to temper the im-
pression made by the first, purely quantitative evaluation. It shows that 
even within its priority sectors, German DC is aligned in such a way as to 
be able to contribute significantly to implementing the MDG agenda. 
Many of its goals are largely congruent with individual MDGs, and the 
measures it supports appear to be target-oriented. However, the papers nei-
ther make reference to the MDGs nor outline plausibly the anticipated 
chains of cause and effect between individual measures and the results  
aimed for by German DC and the overarching goals of German DC. In 
many of these papers this problem could probably be corrected without 
any major difficulties. In any case, though, German DC is, at least as far as 
the present form of its strategy papers is concerned, missing an excellent 
opportunity to appropriately outline and present the contribution it is actu-
ally making to implementing the MDG agenda. This can be shown with 
reference to the questions listed in Overview 9: 
 
                                                          
10  There should actually be 20 PSPs for all countries of the region. But when the evalua-
tion was conducted, six of them were not yet available and a seventh had been prepared 
but was not available. 
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Overview 9:  Questions as to the MDG relevance of DC strategy papers  
Do they deal with the state of the MDG process in partner countries? 
― Do they point out clearly where the major deficits and problems lie in efforts to  
implement the MDGs? 
― Do they analyze these deficits and problems? 
― Do they explain why a partner country is unable to solve its problems on its own? 
Do they point out clearly the MDGs to which German DC is seeking to provide a 
contribution?  
― Do they point concretely to the goals pursued by German DC? 
― Do they state why it is precisely these goals that are being pursued? 
― Do they specify the MDGs / individual MDGs as goals of German DC? 
― If the answer is no: What measure of conformity is there between the concrete goals 
of German DC in a partner country and the MDGs? 
― Are these the MDGs that present especially urgent difficulties for a partner country? 
― If not: Do they explain why the German contribution to implementing a given MDG 
may nevertheless be important for a partner country? 
Do they plausibly explain the anticipated cause-and-effect relation between the  
approach and/or the measures of German DC and the MDGs / its other goals? 
― Do they explain the assumptions and the approach on which German engagement is 
based? 
― Do they explain whether and how the approach used by German DC is contributing  
to reaching the MDGs aimed for? 
― Do they present a sufficiently detailed description of the measures in which German 
DC is engaged? 
― Do they derive these measures from the conceptual approach of German DC?  
― Do they explain why precisely these measures are reasonable and appropriate – and 
why others might not do as well? 
― Do they convincingly outline the cause-and-effect relation between the measures and 
the goals of German DC? 
Do they explain why an engagement of DC is both called for and reasonable?  
― Do they explain why a partner country is unable to take such measures on its own / 
without external support? 
― Do they note whether or how German DC is assisting a partner country in  
overcoming the crucial bottlenecks facing its efforts to reach the MDGs? 
― Do they explain what comparative advantages German DC has in conducting given 
individual measures? 
Do they explain whether and why German DC may also pursue goals other than the 
MDGs? 
― Is German DC (also) pursuing other goals in addition to the MDGs? 
― Do they explain why they see these goals as reasonable? 
Source: By the author  
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– State of the MDG process: Most of the PSPs deal relatively precisely 
with the progress a partner country has made in recent years in MDG-
relevant sectors. Many of them also cite figures for MDG indicators. 
However, only one paper notes specifically that it is dealing with an 
MDG-relevant sector or an indicator from the MDG agenda. Fur-
thermore, most of these papers do not express adequately which de-
velopment problems are more serious than others and what factors 
these problems may be due to. 
– Goals of German DC: Nearly all of these papers define the specific sec-
toral goals of German DC, and in most cases they largely coincide with 
individual MDGs. These are almost without exception MDGs that a 
partner country is experiencing serious difficulties in implementing. 
This, however, is not stressed. Even in cases where the priorities of 
German DC largely coincide with the thrust of the MDG agenda, the 
relevant MDG is not mentioned. Furthermore, few papers justify why 
German DC is pursuing one particular goal instead of other goals 
which a partner country may be having similar problems reaching.  
– Links between goals and measures of German DC: Most PSPs not 
only specify the goals of German DC, they also describe relatively 
precisely the approach involved and the measures supported by Ger-
man DC. There is no question here that nearly all of these measures 
are helpful and appropriate for a partner country. But only in a small 
number of cases is the anticipated causal nexus between the measures 
and the goals of German DC outlined in sufficient detail. The as-
sumed cause-impact chains are often long, and most of the papers fail 
to deal with crucial links of these chains. This often means a lack of 
clarity as to the mechanisms which concrete DC measures use in pur-
suit of relatively highly aggregated goals. Rodenberg (2001, 12) came 
to a similar finding in her analysis of a far higher number of PSPs on 
partner countries in all parts of the world. As regards the goal of con-
tributing to alleviating poverty, she notes in an exemplary passage: 
“While PSPs often mention poverty reduction straight off as a refer-
ence point, e.g. in the form of a reference to a country’s PRSP pro-
cess, there are no further references to it when it comes to deriving 
support strategies and concrete approaches. They remain at the level 
of the sectoral analysis. Only rarely do they succeed in outlining, in a 
coherent strategy, poverty orientation from the analysis to the given 
initial situation […], from the means / mechanisms used […] to di-
rect forms of participation.” (Rodenberg 2001, 13). 
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Furthermore, only in relatively few cases do these papers state why 
German DC is supporting certain measures instead of others that 
might just as well contribute to reaching the goals set, i.e. why the in-
struments selected are assumed to be superior to others. This can give 
rise to the impression that instead of being derived from the goals of 
German DC, the measures receiving support have been defined a pos-
teriori, as a means of creating a strategic framework broad enough to 
cover a number of individual DC projects. Rodenberg (2001, III) 
comes out in favor of formulating PSPs without any unduly unspe-
cific statements of the following kind: “… provides a contribution to 
the country’s economic development and thus contributes to reducing 
poverty.” 
– Meaningfulness of and need for a German engagement: Numerous 
PSPs on MENA countries fail to explain why a given partner country 
is especially reliant on external support for the measures being con-
ducted by German DC, i.e. where, precisely, they see a bottleneck in 
partner capacities that can be bridged with the aid of German DC. 
And seldom do these papers state precisely whether and to what ex-
tent Germany, as a bilateral donor, has comparative advantages over 
other donors and what these advantages consist of. Many papers get 
no further than the assertion that there are such advantages.  
– Goals not congruent with the MDG agenda: In most countries of the 
MENA region German DC also pursued goals that, while they may 
not run counter to the MDGs, are nevertheless not congruent with 
them. For instance, one aim pursued by German DC together with the 
Maghreb countries is to improve the latter’s international competi-
tiveness and in this way to ‘get them in shape’ for the Euro-
Mediterranean free-trade area. There can hardly be any objections to 
additional goals or reference systems.11 Most PSPs plausibly state 
why they may be regarded as reasonable goals and how the measures 
supported may contribute to achieving these goals. However, German 
                                                          
11  Alternative reference systems of German DC with the MENA countries would include 
e.g. (i) the goal system of the EU’s Mediterranean policy and policy of good-neighborly 
relations, set out in the Barcelona Declaration, the Common Strategy, and the agree-
ments on a Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area; (ii) the Arab Human Development Re-
ports; and (iii) the Broader Middle East Initiative (BMENA). These systems differ mar-
kedly in the terms of the weight they assign to individual goals and their degree of con-
cretization and the obligations they entail, but not in terms of their rough orientation. 
What this means is that they are, in the end, congruent; see Erdle / Trautner (2005); Pos-
selt / Buchmüller (2005a). 
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DC should be far more frank and assertive in dealing with this issue. 
It should clearly admit, and own up to, fact that several of the mea-
sures it supports have no reference to the MDGs. This would create 
more transparency, without detriment to the matter itself. 
However, documenting what German DC in fact contributes to the interna-
tional goal system would require more than establishing clear-cut links be-
tween the PSPs and the MDG agenda. Since the documents in question are 
planning papers that are formulated ex ante, they can provide information 
only on the anticipated (supposed) impacts of German DC. Whether these 
impacts have in fact materialized can only be determined ex post, on the 
basis of appropriate MDG-specific analyses (Neubert 2004). 
Although it is entirely feasible to conduct such targeted impact analyses of 
German DC’s contributions to implementation of the MDG agenda at the 
national level (idem), thus far no systematic analyses have been performed 
in any partner country of German DC. The fact that other donors have not 
made much progress here either is no excuse. However, at present the 
BMZ’s MDG representative is working together with the MDG coordina-
tors of the German implementing agencies to “align the planning and 
monitoring of development programs and measures to the MDGs” (Bun-
desregierung 2004, 5). In this connection there are also plans to align the 
BMZ country concepts and priority strategy papers more closely to the 
MDGs with a view to improving the poverty relevance of German pro-
grams and projects (Bundesregierung 2004, 6). 
5.4 Policy dialogue 
The German government regularly addresses the MDG agenda in the 
framework of its political dialogue with the governments of partner coun-
tries in the MENA region. However, no efforts are made in that context 
what consequences the partner country governments might have to face if 
their efforts in implementing the MDGs prove inadequate. For their part, 
these partner governments do their best to avoid addressing the issue. 
At present the BMZ has no guidelines governing whether and in what lan-
guage the MDG agenda or the state of the Millennium process should be 
addressed in government-level consultations and negotiations with partner 
countries. There is such standardized official language regarding both the 
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German government’s Program of Action 2015 and certain other issues, 
including e.g. anti-corruption efforts, human rights, etc. 
But this situation may perhaps even have its good sides: Simply delivering 
standardized formulations may well give partners the impression that what 
they are hearing is nothing more than a dispassionate exercise in diplo-
macy. It may make more sense to frankly address the specific deficits in a 
partner’s approach to implementing the MDGs, clearly expressing the fact 
that Germany is serious about the mutual obligations assumed in connec-
tion with the Millennium Declaration and intends to factor them into the 
planning for its future engagement in given partner countries. 
And the German side now in any case, and without any agreed official 
language, regularly addresses the MDGs in many government-level con-
sultations and negotiations – at least vis-à-vis the governments of its part-
ner countries in the MENA region.12 To cite an example, the Moroccan 
side was, in effect, informed that in view of the ‘Major Event’ in the fall of 
2005 both sides should be interested in using their cooperation as a plat-
form to provide a contribution to implementing the MDGs – and in stating 
this openly. Often however, this simply involves using the formula that the 
German government has, in its Program of Action 2015, translated the 
MDG agenda into national goals, and that it expects a similar sign of own-
ership for the MDGs from its partners as well.  
On the other hand, none of the persons interviewed for this study reported 
that representatives of partner governments had, in any official talks, even 
mentioned the MDGs. Some interview partners even stated that in some 
cases representatives of Arab of governments were extremely annoyed 
when either of the MDGs (e.g. implementation of them in the partner 
country in question) were addressed. Apart from governance issues, this 
was also reported to be the case when the topic of quality of schooling and 
school curricula was addressed.  
                                                          
12  According to Claudia Arce (KfW), Dr. Michael Grewe (BMZ), Sabine Riegert (BMZ), 
Dr. Eefje Schmid (BMZ), Georg Schüller (BMZ), and Dr. Bernhard Trautner (BMZ), 
this has been the case at least in recent government-level consultations/negotiations with 
Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, the Palestinian Authority.  
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5.5 Implementation of MDG8 
The balance of German policy with respect to implementing MDG8 is a 
mixed one. On the one hand, Germany is strongly committed to the inter-
ests of the developing countries. On the other hand, Germany still has 
much work to do in adapting the scope and orientation of its ODA to the 
commitments made in recent years.  
The industrialized countries bear the chief responsibility for most of the 
targets of MDG8. There are limits to what bilateral DC can do to reaching 
them. All of German’s external policies are therefore called upon to do 
their part. More than in the case of all other MDGs, MDG8 calls for co-
herence between all of the external policies of the donor countries, mutual 
coordination between them, and complementarity between their policies 
and the policies of developing countries. The member countries of the 
European Union (EU) must also take steps to ensure that their polices are 
coherent with the policies pursued by the Commission.  
Accordingly, Germany’s contribution to reaching MDG8 cannot be ana-
lyzed for individual developing countries or regions (e.g. for the Middle 
East and North Africa; it instead must be viewed exclusively in the larger 
context, i.e. with all its impacts at the global level. 
In some sectors Germany has made crucial contributions to ensuring that 
progress is in fact made in implementing MDG8. This goes in particular 
for international environmental policy and debt relief for heavily indebted 
poor countries (HIPCs): 
– Debt relief (Targets 13 and 15): The German government, which has 
since repeatedly come out in favor of accelerating and enlarging the 
debt-relief process, played an instrumental role in bringing about the 
HIPC Initiative adopted by the G7 at the 1999 Cologne debt summit. 
In the MENA region Mauritania has benefited from the initiative. 
Above and beyond the HIPC Initiative, Germany has cancelled its bi-
lateral debt with a good number of countries, which means that today 
most HIPCs are without debt with Germany. The main beneficiaries 
in the MENA region have been Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, which have 
been relieved of a substantial share of their German debt (Bundes-
regierung 2004, 15). 
– Good global governance (Target 12): Germany has come out em-
phatically for an efficiency-oriented reform of the UN system. It has 
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in particular contributed to advancing the cause of global public envi-
ronmental goods. The German government is still involved in the fur-
ther development of the UN forest dialogue, the Cartagena Protocol, 
and the Kyoto Protocol. It furthermore played an instrumental role in 
having the linked issue of poverty and the environment placed on the 
agenda of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, in work-
ing for a better balance between the interests of the industrialized and 
developing countries in the international system, and in creating fo-
rums (like the G20, which goes back to a German initiative) that  
serve to enhance the participation of developing and newly industrial-
izing countries in the international debate (Fues 2005). 
– Access of developing countries to essential medical drugs (Tar-
get 17): The German government also played an important role in en-
suring that developing countries would be provided, within the 
TRIPS framework, better and cheaper access to vital medical drugs –
above all for HIV/Aids (Bundesregierung 2004, 18). 
Figure 26:  Orientation of German development cooperation towards 
developing countries with good governance in comparison 
with other donors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Baulch (2004); Nunnenkamp (2004, Figure 1) 
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– Focus on partner countries with frameworks conducive to develop-
ment: Since the mid-1990s Germany has come to focus far more on 
cooperation with countries with good political governance. German 
DC with such countries amounts to an average of 1 US$.3 per capita 
and year, while the figure for countries with poor governance is only 
US$ 0.8 per capita and year (see Figure 26). However, as the exam-
ples of Denmark, the US, and Japan show, it would be entirely possi-
ble to set more clear-cut accents (Nunnenkamp 2004). 
In other areas, though, Germany has yet to meet its obligations – above all 
as far as the aim of raising its ODA is concerned: 
– Increasing German ODA (Target 15): German ODA payments have 
not risen during the 1990s; they have even declined from US$ 93 per 
German inhabitant in 2000 to US$ 62 in 2004. If, in the mid-1980s, 
German ODA amounted to little less than 0.5 % of Germany’s gross 
national product (GNP), the corresponding figure for 1998 was only 
0.26 %, a figure that has risen only slightly until 2004 to 0.28 % but 
then much faster in 2005 to 0,35 % of GNP (see Table A18, Annex). 
As early as 1968, the donor countries had declared in UNCTAD their 
intention to raise their total ODA to 0.7 % and their ODA to the least-
developed countries (LDCs) at least to 0,15 % of GNP – although a 
binding commitment was made only at the 2002 Financing for De-
velopment conference in Monterrey. In this connection, Germany 
committed itself to raising its ODA to 0.33 % of GNP by the year 
2006. In May 2005 the EU adopted its multistage plan that committed 
the 15 ‘old’ member states to raise their ODA to 0.51 % of GNP by 
2010 and to at least 0.7 % by 2015. The ‘new’ member states, on the 
other hand, have committed themselves to raising their ODA shares 
to 0.17 % of GNP by 2010 and to 0.33 % by 2015 (Alliance2015 
2005; Fues 2005; Herfkens 2005). In 2002, the MENA region ac-
counted for about EUR 500 million in German ODA commitments 
(roughly 10 % of overall German commitments), but only for EUR 
180 million of net disbursements (BMZ 2004a). 
– Increase of the share of ODA for LDCs (Target 13): German ODA 
for LDCs also declined between 1990 and 2001. Its share in overall 
German ODA declined from 28 to 24 %, with the corresponding 
GNP-related share declining from 0.12 to 0.06 % (see Figure 27 and 
Table A18, Annex). Other donors – including e.g. the UK, the World 
Bank, or the Netherlands – provide a far higher share of their overall 
ODA to the poorest developing countries (Alliance2015 2005). 
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Figure 27:  Share of ODA provided to the poorest 25 % of develop-
ing countries between 1999 and 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Baulch (2004); Nunnenkamp (2004, Figure 1) 
 
– Increase of the share of ODA for basic social services: The share of 
German ODA for basic social services (primary education, primary 
healthcare, food, access to drinking water, and sewage disposal) has 
stagnated since 1996 at a figure of 10 % (see Figure 28 and Table 
A18, Annex). The MDG agenda does not provide for any increase in 
this share, but it does contain an indicator to measure it. One reason 
for this is the logic of the MDG agenda itself, which focuses above all 
on the situation of the poorest segments of society; the other is a 1995 
OECD/DAC proposal to raise the share of ODA targeted to basic so-
cial services to at least 20 %, provided that the developing countries 
themselves earmark a minimum of 20 % of their overall government 
expenditure for basic social services. Nearly all other donors have 
dedicate a higher share of their ODA to social infrastructure in devel-
oping countries than Germany (Alliance2015 2005; Fues 2005). 
– Elimination of aid ties: The share of ODA that German provided 
without any aid ties was increased from 62 to 85 % between 1900 and 
2001 (see Table A19, Annex). 
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Figure 28:  Share of ODA dedicated to basic social services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: see Table A18, Annex 
 
– Financing of multilateral DC: While Germany is the world’s third 
largest contributor to the general UN budget, its engagement in UN 
development work is modest compared with that of other countries. 
For instance, since 1990 Germany’s annual contribution to UNDP has 
declined in nominal terms from EUR 70 to 26 million. This certainly 
has not recommended Germany for its wish to have a permanent seat 
in the UN Security Council (Fues 2005; Herfkens 2005). 
– Awareness-raising for the MDGs at home: DC is a task that is in need 
of support by the population of donor countries. One means of reach-
ing this objective is awareness campaigns in the media. This is also 
true for the MDGs, the central goals of international development 
policy. However, only 13 % of all German citizens have even heard 
of the MDGs. In Sweden the corresponding figure is nearly one third, 
while the figure for France is no higher than 4 % (see Figure 29). 
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Figure 29:  Awareness about the MDGs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: European Commission (2005, Table Q1) 
 
6 Recommendations for the future  
It has been shown in the preceding chapters how relevant the MDGs are 
for the MENA region. Most of the MENA countries have problems in im-
plementing MDG1 (income poverty and hunger), MDG2 (the quantity, 
and even more, the quality of education), MDG7 (mainly ecological sus-
tainability), and MDG8 (mainly good political and economic governance, 
reduction of youth unemployment, and access to modern technologies). At 
present it even appears that some of these countries will not be able to 
meet at least one single of the MDGs by 2015. This goes above all for the 
low-income countries Sudan, Mauritania, and Yemen, but also for Iraq. 
The main reasons for the deficits encountered thus far in implementing the 
MDG agenda in the region are financial, institutional, and organizational 
bottlenecks on the one hand, but also a lack of willingness on the part of 
some of the governments in the region to work for the international goals.  
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German DC should take this state of affairs well into account. In both geo-
graphic and sectoral terms it is oriented in such a way as to be able to pro-
vide support, in key places, for efforts to implement the MDGs in the re-
gion. Nevertheless. it remains unclear what contribution it is in fact pro-
viding. One reason for this is that German DC does not adequately docu-
ment what impacts it has (or is intending to have) on the MDGs. The other 
reason is that neither the German side nor the MENA countries have ever 
thoroughly analyzed their cooperation and its impacts on the MDGs. 
The German government has signed the Millennium Declaration, and it 
acknowledges that “the MDGs are binding goals, though not comprehen-
sive terms of reference, for the whole of development cooperation. They 
indicate what is to be accomplished, although they leave open how these 
goals are to be realized” (Bundesregierung 2004, 5). This is certainly cor-
rect. In addition, there is no reason why the whole of DC should have to be 
subordinated to the MDG agenda. But every donor should be able to state 
that he is at least providing a relevant and significant contribution to reach-
ing the MDGs in his partner countries (BMZ 2005a).  
It is getting to be time for German DC to live up to this statement. We can 
therefore derive the following recommendations for future German DC 
with the countries of the Middle East and North Africa: 
6.1 Regional orientation of bilateral German DC 
Generally speaking, it is important to ensure that the limited resources of 
DC in such a way that they achieve the maximum possible impacts. This 
will usually be the case in countries and sectors where the urgency to solve 
the existing problems is high and the partner country’s capacities are lim-
ited, i.e. where DC can make a good contribution to overcoming bottle-
necks. It is furthermore important to be sure that a partner government has 
a certain disposition to solve the problems of the country, since DC is not 
likely to achieve much – or its effects may prove highly vulnerable – if the 
relevant decision-makers in a partner country are not seriously interested 
in reaching the goals set by DC. 
Seen against the background of the MDGs, it is not immediately evident 
why Egypt and Morocco should be priority partner countries of German 
DC while e.g. Jordan does not have this status. All three countries are 
Middle East / North Africa and the Millennium Development Goals 
German Development Institute 153
middle-income countries with a moderate urgency, an advanced level of 
capacities, and an intermediate disposition to solve the existing problems. 
In addition, it is more than difficult to see why Mauritania, a low-income 
country, should not have the status of a priority partner country. 
There may be good reasons for this. But if there are, they cannot be de-
rived from the MDG agenda. In the name of transparency these reasons 
should therefore be named in the BMZ’s strategy papers. Otherwise the in-
tensive German engagement in Egypt and Morocco should be reviewed 
once again, and Mauritania should be given consideration as a priority 
partner country. It is e.g. conceivable that Egypt should be given generous 
support because of the key role it plays for the stability of the Middle East. 
Morocco and Tunisia in turn must likewise be seen as important partner 
countries for the simple reason that year for year large numbers of refu-
gees depart from their shores for Europe. These may all be reasons to en-
gage in especially intensive DC with them. Yet all this has at best very lit-
tle to do with the MDGs and the BMZ should frankly confess to such con-
siderations 
6.2 Sectoral orientation of bilateral German DC 
The rough sectoral orientation of German DC with the MENA region is 
compatible with the MDG agenda. The current priorities of German DC 
are entirely congruent with the priority needs of the MENA countries in 
pursuing the MDGs. 
However, German DC might consider intensifying its engagement in three 
sectors in which the solution of problems is at least equally urgent (GTZ 
2003, 6, 8). This would be support for 
– democracy promotion and improvements in governance; 
– social, economic, political, and legal equality for women; and 
– improved quality of schooling in the region. 
In these three sectors nearly all of the MENA countries have – if at all – 
made no more than insufficient progress in implementing the MDGs. Ac-
cording to the Arab Development Reports, these three sectors must be seen 
as the central bottlenecks for development in the region (AFESD / UNDP 
2002; AFESD / UNDP 2003; AFESD / UNDP 2004).  
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A recent IMF working paper13 also comes to the conclusion that higher 
expenditure for education and governance reforms is at once essential for 
the implementation of MDG2 and MDG8 and the most effective and effi-
cient approach that can be used to (i) accelerate economic growth, (ii) to 
alleviate income poverty and hunger, (iii) to contribute to gender equality 
(MDG3), and (iv) to reduce child mortality rates (MDG4). 
Improving political and economic governance in the MENA countries is 
especially urgent (GTZ 2003, 5 f.). According to IMF calculations, quali-
tative differences in the institutional framework can explain almost three 
quarters of the income differentials between the developing countries 
(Bundesregierung 2004, 34). 
But it would also be important to improve the quality of schooling in the 
MENA countries. It is the kind of education they receive (and not the 
number of school years completed) that determines whether and to what 
extent school graduates will be able to make use of their education. It is 
only education designed to teach children to learn on their own, to think 
critically, and to develop their creative skills that enables them to take 
charge of their own lives, to process information adequately, and to take a 
hand in shaping the political, economic, cultural, and technological devel-
opment of their country (AFESD / UNDP 2003; Weiss 2004b, 5). 
Any more intensive commitment of DC to gender equality should not con-
sist of women’s-promotion measures that are simply added on to existing 
projects or programs (e.g. in the sectors education, microfinance, SME 
promotion). This must instead be seen as a cross-cutting task. As early as 
in the planning phase of DC projects it is important to factor in potential 
impacts on gender relations. It should never be assumed a priori that a 
given DC measure is gender-neutral. Women can always be promoted or 
disadvantaged by a given measure as such, and in the formulation of mea-
                                                          
13  The authors of the paper (Baldacci et al. 2004) present the results of a regression analy-
sis based on panel data on 120 developing countries, and they look into the direct and 
indirect effects of five possible government interventions: (i) an increase of spending for 
education amounting to 1% of GDP, (ii) an equal rise in spending for health, (iii) a re-
duction of government spending equivalent to 1% of GDP, (iv) a 10 % reduction of the 
inflation rate, and (v) significant improvement of performance on the governance indi-
cators. The dependent variable used in the model included in particular (a) level of eco-
nomic growth, (b) the proportion income-poor persons among the population, (c) school 
enrolment rates for boys and girls, and (d) the child mortality rate.  
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sures it is essential to ensure that the former will be the case. In addition, 
promotion of women should not be restricted to individual fields (e.g. edu-
cation) and should always work for comprehensive legal, political, social, 
and economic equality (Rodenberg 2001, 15 ff.). 
Whether or not an intensification of German DC engagement in these 
three sectors is in fact advisable depends, among other things, on 
– whether the problems encountered in them could be solved by the 
MENA countries themselves without any external support; 
– whether the MENA countries are in fact prepared to tackle these 
problems; 
– whether German DC has comparative strengths in providing support 
for reform measures in the three sectors; and 
– whether there are not already numerous other donors engaged in 
them. 
Furthermore, it is important to keep track of the countries and sectors in 
which other donors are active or plan to become active in the future. Only 
timely coordination can lay the groundwork for a functionally specialized 
donor approach or ensure that a given contribution turns out to be focused 
and thus all the more intensive. Donor coordination furthermore proves 
important in cases where it turns out that conditionality is required.  
6.3 Orientation of bilateral German DC within the priority 
sectors defined for it 
One highly important aspect that must be kept in mind in defining the ori-
entation of German DC within its individual priority sectors is the conse-
quences that result from the MDG agenda (see Chapter 2): 
The poverty focus of DC: It is essential to ensure the DC has a stringent 
poverty orientation. This goes in particular for German DC measures in 
the WiRAM sector. This is not at all to say that DC should support only 
projects geared directly to poverty reduction. In fact, indirect poverty-
reduction measures that focus on the right points may, in the long term, 
cost less (input) or even achieve greater effects on the situation of the poor 
(impacts). However, the impact chains associated with these measures are 
often very long, and the priority strategy papers of the BMZ sometimes 
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analyze and describe them only in a fragmentary manner. It is simply not 
enough to declare that by promoting growth in a partner country German 
DC is automatically contributing to poverty reduction. Lines of argumen-
tation of this kind are based on the premise of an automatic trickle down of 
growth to the poor, an untenable assumption. Of course economic growth 
is conducive to efforts to reduce income poverty. But it must be pro-poor 
growth, i.e. it must benefit the poor (BMZ 2005a). Whether and to what 
extent this is in fact the case, and German DC is providing a contribution 
to this end, is something that should be better documented by partner 
countries in their planning papers, but also by the BMZ in its PSPs.  
Furthermore, it is essential not to equate poverty with income poverty. 
Many PSPs are based on a purely monetary understanding of poverty, 
even though a far broader definition of poverty has long since established 
in the international debate. If the poor are simply assumed to be the people 
whose incomes are below a certain line, this should be expressed in pre-
cisely this way. If, however, the aim is poverty reduction in the broader 
sense, the PSPs should state how and in what ways German DC is improv-
ing the capabilities of the poor and reducing social imbalances. 
In the water sector German DC should continue to pay attention to the so-
cial, but also, and above all, to the ecological sustainability of the meas-
ures it supports. In view of the scarcity of the renewable water resources 
available in the region, partner countries must take measures to ensure that 
water is used efficiently and effectively. This would call, among other 
things, for measures designed to reduce losses in water mains, to treat and 
reuse process water, to make more efficient use of water in agricultural ir-
rigation, and to introduce more efficient tariff systems that offer incentives 
to save water and at the same time ensure that poor people will be able to 
afford drinking water (Bliss 2004). Another important point is to ensure 
that water users actually pay their water fees. And it is also important to 
continue to point out to partner countries that the MDG agenda calls for 
more than simply connecting the largest possible number of households to 
the water supply. It is also important to ensure that water mains also de-
liver water regularly and reliably and that the water provided is of suffi-
cient quality (Satterthwaite 2004, 41).  
Effectiveness of DC: Moreover, it is also essential to pay close heed to the 
efficiency of German DC. It is not enough to document that German DC is 
providing a contribution to implementing the MDGs. It must also ensure 
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that the impacts it achieves bear a reasonable relation to the inputs in-
volved (BMZ 2005a). If this is not the case, thought will have to be given 
to alternative approaches and instruments. Under certain circumstance 
thought should even be given to completely terminating DC in a sector or 
country if the insufficient effectiveness noted for DC is due not to the inef-
ficiency of the measures taken but to structural problems or a lack of the 
will needed on the partner side to engage in meaningful reforms.  
Alignment and donor coordination of DC: Finally, it is also essential to 
give due consideration to the priorities of partner countries and the activi-
ties of other donors (BMZ 2005a). In some countries – e.g. in Yemen – 
this is already working very well (BZ 2005b). In others, though, coordina-
tion between donors is still very unsatisfactory. One reason for this is that 
some of the MENA partner countries have yet to work out national devel-
opment or poverty-reduction strategies keyed to the MDGs. Another, 
though, is the fact that the donors are not always prepared to coordinate 
their activities and then to key their approaches to a meaningful division of 
labor or to improve their cooperation in a given sector. Indeed, sometimes 
donors even compete for especially prestigious projects, a state of affairs 
that permits partner countries to play one donor off against another and 
thereby evade any conditionalization of DC (Loewe 2000a, 53 f.).  
6.4 Policy dialogue 
Moreover, the German government should make intensive use of the pos-
sibilities afforded by its political dialogue with the governments of partner 
countries. This dialogue is, for several reasons, an important instrument in 
pursuing the MDGs. First, government-level negotiations and consulta-
tions offer a good opportunity to coordinate the development strategies of 
partner countries with the contributions of donor countries to implement-
ing MDGs 1–7. Second, they also offer an opportunity to negotiate over 
donor measures designed to implement MDG8. Third, the dialogue offers 
both sides the opportunity to remind their partners of the obligations both 
of them have assumed under the Millennium Declaration and to call for 
more, and more efficient, engagement. 
What this implies is that the German government should continue to ad-
dress the MDGs in talks with governments of the MENA countries, inquir-
ing about the state of the ongoing implementation process. The German 
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government should also call on partner governments to explain in detail 
how or with what measures they intend to implement the MDGs and to 
name the sectors in which they need DC support and to spell out the rea-
sons involved and the kinds of support required. One especially important 
factor here is a coordinated, joint approach agreed on with other donors. 
This should not, in any case, be expressed in set phrases. It is essential to 
make it perfectly clear to dialogue partners that Germany is serious about 
the MDGs and expects its partners to do whatever their capacities permit 
them to reach all of the MDGs. This has three different consequences. 
First, if it is to appear credible, the German government must meet its own 
obligations and, in particular, provide a significant contribution to MDG8. 
Second, what the German government demands of partner countries 
should never seem to be empty talk. To ensure that such demands have the 
intended effects, it may be necessary – possibly in coordination with other 
donors – to announce that there will be consequences if a partner govern-
ment fails to work for the implementation of the MDGs. Third, concrete 
consequences announced for certain cases should, if need be, actually be 
imposed, because otherwise such announcements are unlikely to be taken 
seriously – in other partner countries as well.  
The MENA countries should be called upon to meet three principal de-
mands:  
– A more clear-cut poverty orientation of their economic and social  
policies; 
– democratization of their political systems and improvement of their 
economic and political governance; and 
– a real commitment to improving the social, economic, political, and 
legal situation of women (DFID 2004). 
Reform measures in these three areas are absolutely central to the imple-
mentation of all MDGs and for overall development in the MENA region, 
and for this reason both German DC in the sectors WiRAM, governance, 
and gender and, in some countries, the very continuation of DC should be 
made contingent on such reforms.  
Moreover, German DC should, among other things, make every effort to 
ensure that  
– the markets in the MENA countries are liberalized;  
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– poorer households have access to social protection instruments; 
– the goals pursued in the education sector are keyed to improving both 
the quantity and the quality of the education; 
– efforts are undertaken to advance research and development and to 
build scientific capacities; 
– support is given to an open, critical culture of learning and question-
ing; 
– gender equality is not only measured in terms of improvement of the 
educational chances of girls; 
– restructuring in the health sector is not accomplished at the expense 
of the poor; 
– measures are taken to increase the willingness and the possibilities of 
the population to engage in family planning and in this way to con-
tribute accelerating the present decline in population growth;  
– efforts are undertaken to remove the stigma attached to HIV/Aids and 
to compile more realistic statistics on the prevalence of the disease; 
– reforms in the water sector are not conducted at the expense of eco-
logical and social sustainability; 
– the need for environmental and resource protection is better anchored 
in the consciousness of both the population and national policy; and 
– access of poorer social groups to transportation, supply, communica-
tions, and information infrastructure is improved (Boughton / Qureshi 
2004; Weiss 2004b). 
6.5 Documentation and analysis of the German 
contribution to implementing the MDGs 
The present study’s most urgent recommendation is that German DC 
should better document its anticipated and actual contribution to imple-
menting the MDG agenda (BMZ 2005a). All donors should provide in-
formation on how the measures they support contribute to reducing pov-
erty in the sense of the MDGs (Satterthwaite 2004, 13). Most of the BMZ 
country concepts and priority strategy papers presently available do not 
live up to this demand. They should, in particular, provide answers to the 
questions listed in Overview 9 by: 
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– dealing explicitly with the state of the MDG process in given partner 
countries; 
– documenting the MDGs to which German DC aims to contribute and 
in fact contributes; 
– explaining why German DC aims to support the implementation of 
precisely these MDGs; 
– consistently derive the approach and the measures of German DC 
from its stated goals; 
– outline in detail and in understandable language the anticipated causal 
nexus between the measures it supports and the goals it seeks to im-
plement; 
– explain why German engagement in the measures it supports is rea-
sonable and meaningful, i.e. (i) that they help to bridge a crucial ca-
pacity bottleneck in the partner country and (ii) that German DC is in 
possession of comparative strengths vis-à-vis other donors; and 
– deal more transparently and assertively with goals outside the MDG 
agenda: admit frankly that some German DC measures may have no 
immediate relevance to the MDGs and yet be meaningful in view of 
the overall situation in a given partner country. 
It would furthermore be important to review regularly whether and to what 
extent the measures supported by German DC in fact generate the ex-
pected effects. The problem here is that the impact-analyses presently used 
in German DC are not well suited to the purpose. They measure only the 
effects of individual projects and in part trace impact chains back only to 
the level of immediate outcomes. It is therefore necessary either to further 
develop the instruments presently in use to the point where they are also 
able to measure impacts at the MDG level or to create new instruments. A 
BMZ working group, which includes representatives of the German im-
plementing agencies, is already working on a solution to this problem.  
6.6 Contribution to multilateral DC 
Like bilateral German DC, multilateral DC also has to take account of the 
MDG agenda. Germany is one of the major contributors to many interna-
tional organizations, a fact that permits it to exert considerable influence 
on their development work. Even though this possibility entails substantial 
Middle East / North Africa and the Millennium Development Goals 
German Development Institute 161
responsibility, very little use has been made of it thus far. From now on the 
German government should become more involved in the planning for 
multilateral DC and seek to ensure that the IMF, the World Bank, the 
UNDP, and UNICEF pay proper heed to the MDGs in the practice of de-
velopment policy. On the other hand, it would be important for Germany 
to ensure that its appropriations for international development cooperation 
again show an upward trend. 
6.7 German measures aimed at implementing MDG8 
Finally, it is essential not to lose sight of MDG8. However, many interna-
tional reports on the implementation of the MDG agenda do just that, the 
main reason being that the developing countries themselves are chiefly re-
sponsible for MDG8. But precisely for this reason it is essential that the 
German government not lose sight of this goal (BMZ 2005a). It should in 
particular 
– increase German ODA; 
– earmark a greater share of German ODA for basic social services; 
– increase the share of German ODA for LDCs; 
– devote more effort to debt relief for developing countries, to alterna-
tive or additional approaches to the financing of DC, and to the crea-
tion of a new international development facility; 
– push for an implementation of the TRIPS accord that is more in line 
with the interests of the developing countries; 
– work for longer transition periods for LDCs in the process of trade  
liberalization in the WTO context; 
– vote for an extension and enlargement of the arrangements concern-
ing facilitated access for developing countries to low-costs medical 
drugs; and 
– step up its efforts in favor of a rapid opening of the agricultural mar-
kets of the industrialized countries for exports from the developing 
countries (Baulch 2004; Boughton / Qureshi 2004; Bundesregierung 
2004; Fues 2005). 
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